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This thesis aims to contribute to the literature that discusses the impact of e-government systems 
on the value that is created by public services. Specifically, this work sheds light on how Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICT) mediated co-production of public service offers innovative 
ways to produce public services and on the value they create. An in-depth analysis of how the 
Government as a Platform (GaaP) can enable co-production of services across the entire public 
administration is presented to support the proposed argument. The thesis is based on three 
published papers that discuss the limitations and the complexities of co-production enabled by ICTs 
and the specific case of the GaaP. The first paper explains that, although ICTs-mediated co-
production helps to improve efficiency, it also reduces control over the public administration’s 
action and hence it is not suitable to produce public services that need a high level of control to 
deliver the expected outcome. The second paper adopts the public value perspective and explains 
that, in order to create value for the public, it is necessary to overcome the siloed view of value 
creation and thereby to serve not only the need for greater efficiency but also all citizens’ needs and 
expectations. Hence, when public agencies adopt ICTs-mediated co-production, they should also 
ensure a suitable level of control over the impact of public interests served by other public agencies. 
The third paper argues that the GaaP is constituted by multiple platforms and ecosystems which 
favour co-production of more services for citizens but also decrease control over the impact on 
other policy domains. The impossibility to control implications for other policy domains threatens 
public value creation. From the study of the Italian public administration that has recently adopted 
an e-government architecture based on the GaaP principles, it has emerged that to mitigate 
negative externalities of co-production, public agencies should adopt a governance mechanism 
called public value orchestration, which consists of continuous configuration of production in order 
to meet multiple needs and expectations.  
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This chapter outlines the key elements necessary to understand the research topic and the PhD’s 
main contributions. The first section provides the context, outlines the gap in the literature and the 
PhD research question. The section also provides an overview of the recent evolution in public 
service production and explains the importance of public agencies’ operational capabilities in 
evolving the production process and the public value creation process. The second section explains 
why technologies should not be regarded as neutral elements of the public agencies’ operational 
capabilities and demonstrates how they influence the public value creation process. The third 
section discusses, more specifically, the technologies that form the focus of the research, and 
explains how their characteristics can affect the public value creation process. The fourth section 
presents the complexities of public value creation mediated by the above technologies and how it 
is possible to mitigate them. The final section presents the structure of the thesis. 
1.Societal changes require a new model of production 
Great economical, ecological, technological, political and social changes which transcend political 
and geographical boundaries have led to a progressive transition from an industrial society to a 
postmodern and complex society described by Beck (1994) as “risk society”. The more 
interconnected and globalised society, together with the rise of complex problems such as global 
warming and the uncertainty about the future economic prosperity have put the lives of individuals, 
households and entire communities at risk. The inability of traditional beliefs and social support to 
help people cope with new societal and environmental adversities  have led to the detachment of 
individuals from communities and social groups (Zuboff and Maxmin, 2002). As a result of the 
dissolution of the power of social groups over individuals, clients as well as citizens started to self-
determine their own needs and expectations. Since the 1980s, the spread of neo-liberal ideologies 
has reinforced this trend towards transformation of citizens into clients, accentuating the 
importance to individuals of the private sphere over the public sphere of each individual (Benington, 
2011). As distinct to citizens, clients do not actively participate to achieve a collective good but 
passively consume services and pursue the satisfaction of personal needs and expectations 
(Sennett, 1977; Hoggett, 2000; Marquand, 2004; Cooper and Lousada, 2005). In order to serve and 





Companies have transformed their manufacturing production line designed to serve standardised 
needs and expectations, into a more open and networked production system which has enabled 
clients to assemble together different options of services to meet their personal needs. According 
to Pekka Himanen (2001), networked production is the result of the informationalism of society that 
has significantly reduced transaction costs by allowing everybody to access means of production. In 
the past, the need to reduce transaction costs of exchanging goods in the market was solved by 
individuals forming companies or organisations which more efficiently organise needs and 
capabilities to facilitate the production and exchange of goods and services (Coase, 1937). However, 
the diffusion of Web based technologies has reduced transaction (Cordella, 2006; Chen, Su and 
Hiele, 2017) and production costs to a minimum (Bharadwaj, 2000) and individuals can now pursue 
their goals without the intermediation of a company (Kallinikos, 2011). The creation of a network of 
actors which interact to exchange and produce services has changed the logic of production of 
services and goods (Normann and Ramírez, 1995; Lusch and Nambisan, 2015; Best et al., 2018). The 
networked production is multidirectional, spontaneous, unplanned, and involves unknown actors 
from different fields and countries (Stoker, 2006; Kallinikos, 2011; Negoita, 2018). Behind this 
change of production, there is also a change in work ethics. As discussed by Weber (1905), the 
Protestant ethic of work, which characterised manufacturing production, led employees to act in 
the production process to accomplish a duty, rather than for their personal satisfaction. On the 
other hand, in the networked production, actors (individuals, companies, NGOs, etc.) choose to 
participate in the production process for passion or because they believe in a common goal (Hertel, 
Niedner and Herrmann, 2003; Budhathoki and Haythornthwaite, 2012).  Himanen (2001) and others 
call this new ethic as ‘hacker’ ethic of work. Himanen’s conceptualisation of hackers goes beyond 
the free software movement born in the early 1980s. Hackers are all consumers who often work in 
communities to share information, pursue common projects, and create or modify existing (digital 
and non-digital) products in order satisfy needs or mitigate societal problems which the market or 
the state are unable to solve. This change of work ethics, together with the rise of personalised and 
fast-changing needs, represent a drastic societal change which has induced many organisations to 
review their model of organisation and processes of production. For example, many companies, 
primarily in the digital market, have left a centralised model of production and have started working 
with communities of developers to create more options of services and products for their clients. 
Similarly, public administrations have begun adapting their model of organisation to produce 




1.1 The public administration evolution to meet citizens’ needs 
Over the past century, public administrations have evolved their organisational model to adapt their 
production process of public services and to meet citizens’ emerging needs and expectations. In 
order to understand how the adoption of a new model of organisation of public administration 
impacts value creation for the public, Moore (1995) invites us to envision the production process as 
public value chain constituted by a collection of activities performed by a public agency to create 
value (Benington and Moore, 2011b; Osborne, 2018). The role of public agencies which constitute 
the public administration is to link all the production activities or tasks, in order to add a specific 
value to the public services, which then they propose to citizens. Each public agency is in charge to 
serve different policy domains, such as healthcare or education, and then to pursue a specific aspect 
of what is valuable for the public. In order to meet citizens’ needs, public agencies need to pay 
particular attention to the production configuration because it determines the characteristics of the 
service and then the type of value created for the public (Crosby, ‘t Hart and Torfing, 2017). Since 
over the past decades citizens’ needs have changed, the production configuration of public service 
has also evolved.  
 
During the 19th and 20th centuries,  the state and society used to profoundly influence citizens’ 
needs and their perception of value for the public (Zuboff and Maxmin, 2002). As a consequence, 
citizens used to have predictable, stable and objective needs (Benington and Moore, 2011b) that 
could be easily standardised according to a predefined list of public needs. Most of these needs 
were related to the public welfare (public health, education, safety, etc.), and in certain countries 
also to the basic democratic principles of equality, transparency and fairness. The traditional model 
of public administration often described as a bureaucratic organisation has proven to be particularly 
suitable to configure a production process able to meet the above needs and to create value for the 
public. Indeed, the bureaucratic model of production is characterised by precise norms and 
regulations which effectively coordinate the mass production of public services and also ensure a 
high level of standardisation of each step of production. The characteristics of the bureaucratic 
production process based on the linkage of different standard activities result in a public value chain 
able to embed efficiency, equality, fairness, and transparency into public service used by citizens.  
The diffusion of neoliberal ideologies in many western countries led citizens to become mere clients 
of the public administration. This switch of focus from citizens to clients is due to the major emphasis 
that neoliberal reforms put on the creation of economic value for individuals. The supremacy of 
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economic value creation for individuals over the achievement of value for the public reduced the 
difference between public agencies and private companies to the minimum. De facto, the new 
organisational model of public administration summarised by the New Public Management (NPM) 
approach led public agencies to behave as companies. The NPM  reshaped the production process 
according to corporate business logics which aim to create value for clients by offering more outputs 
for lower costs. In fact, similarly to companies, public agencies’ main objective was to assemble 
different resources and production activities to shape an efficient value chain able to create more 
economic value for each citizen. 
In the last two decades, the search of economic value has become insufficient to create value for 
the public. The neoliberal reforms have been ineffective to prevent and mitigate the economic crisis, 
and the rise of complex problems, such as global warming, pollution, terrorism, natural disasters 
and pandemics, have shown that the pursuit of economic prosperity should be combined with the 
reach of other societal goals (Mazzucato, 2018).  In this new societal context, citizens have started 
to evaluate not only the efficiency of public services but also their impact on other values such as 
safety or a clean environment which belong more to the public sphere of each individual (Benington 
and Moore, 2011b; Page et al., 2015; Osborne, 2018). Moreover, as a result of a more globalised 
and interconnected society, citizens’ needs have become so variegated and fast-changing,  that 
formally elected governments often do not represent people’s needs. According to the public value 
approach, in order to create value for the public in this novel socio-political environment, public 
administration has to rapidly adapt its model of organisation and also offer multiple options of 
public service to serve several needs. This means that it is crucial for public agencies to continually 
adapt or assemble different production activities to shape a public value chain able to create the 
value that the public expect.  
1.2 The importance of operational capabilities 
The possibility to adapt or change the public value chain, and create value for the public depends 
on the operational capabilities which determine what public agencies can or cannot produce (Moore 
and Khagram, 2004; Benington and Moore, 2011b). The operational capabilities are contingent on 
the operational resources available in a public agency. More resources correspond to more 
possibilities to assemble different options of production processes and result in more operational 
capabilities (Moore, 1995; Alford and O’Flynn, 2009; Johnson and Galea, 2009; Benington and 
Moore, 2011a). Moore (1995) identifies four types of organisational resources which affect the 
operational capabilities of a public agency: skills, finance, human resources, and technology (Moore, 
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1995; Benington and Moore, 2011a). Skills refer to general and specific organisational competencies 
of each public agency. General competencies are the skills that all public agencies should have, such 
as the ability to innovate, to coordinate different actors or to acquire resources necessary for the 
production process (Pang, Lee and DeLone, 2014; Goh and Arenas, 2020). Specific competencies are 
the organisational skills required to serve their policy domain. Finance refers to the funds that each 
public agency requires to run its operations and buy new organisational assets. Human resources 
refer to the personnel involved in the production process that can have different educational and 
physical characteristics according to the policy field in which public agencies operate. Technology 
mostly refers to Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).  
Public agencies adopt ICTs to automatize the production process and increase production efficiency, 
producing more outputs without acquiring new operational resources (Pang, Lee and DeLone, 2014; 
Crosby, ‘t Hart and Torfing, 2017). Technology can also enhance operational capabilities and lead to 
the disruption of the original public value chain, suggesting new ways to serve citizens’ needs 
(Benington and Moore, 2011b). Thanks to the diffusion of the internet, ICTs have also enabled the 
acquisition of additional organisational resources from external actors in order to enhance public 
agency operational capabilities. In fact, ICTs simplify collaboration with public and private actors 
because they reduce information asymmetries among actors (Cordella, 2006; Bertot, Jaeger and 
Grimes, 2010; Persson and Goldkuhl, 2010). More available information reduces coordination and 
transaction costs and facilitates the exchange of goods and services. Hence, thanks to ICTs public 
agencies can configure new forms of production, collaborating with other public agencies or with 
non-public actors such as companies, NGOs or citizens (Moore, 1995; Moore and Khagram, 2004; 
Stoker, 2006).  According to the type of actors public agencies collaborate with, it is possible to 
distinguish two primary forms of collaboration. Collaboration among public agencies at a different 
levels of governments (local, national and international), known as vertical collaboration, consists 
in sharing organisational resources and in producing public services jointly (Ling, 2002; Keast, 2011; 
Hodges, 2012). Alternatively, public agencies can also collaborate horizontally, by involving non-
public actors to share their resources with public agencies or in co-producing public services 
(Bovaird and Loeffler, 2012; Eriksson, 2012; Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere, 2013).  
Although co-production is not new in the public management literature (Brandsen and Pestoff, 
2006; Alford, 2009a; Armitage et al., 2011; Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere, 2013), in the last two 
decades, participation of external actors in the production of public services has become critical to 
provide public agencies with the operational capabilities necessary to deal with complex challenges 
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that the public administration alone cannot manage (Stoker, 2006; Mazzucato, 2018). In fact, thanks 
to ICTs,  public administration, market and society have become more interdependent and can easily 
collaborate to create greater value for citizens (Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere, 2013; Dickinson, 
2016; Howlett, Kekez and Poocharoen, 2017). The digitalisation of society has in fact not only 
simplified collaboration among actors, but it has also enabled both public and private organisations 
to assemble complex products and services constituted of several layers or components produced 
by a network of variegated actors (Yoo, Henfridsson and Lyytinen, 2010). In these mutated 
production conditions, distinctions between producers and consumers of public services are no 
longer accurate or realistic (Stoker, 2006; Chatfield and Reddick, 2020) because potentially all actors 
can add value to the public value chain and then help to satisfy more needs. As a result, the public 
value chain is not always linear and straightforward as in a typical manufacturing line, but instead, 
it can also be open and networked (Stoker, 2006; O’Flynn, 2007; West and Davis, 2011).  
A more open and networked production of public services can provide the operational capabilities 
which public agencies need to potentially meet all citizens’ needs and expectations. However, the 
impact of ICTs-mediated co-production has been usually discussed in terms of economic efficiency 
but not in terms of public value creation. The creation of public value is not limited to the satisfaction 
of economic interests, but also of other public interests such as health, safety, or education. 
Therefore, the main research question of this PhD thesis is how does ICTs-mediated co-production 
impact  the creation of public value?  The research question aims to explain how ICTs-mediated co-
production impacts the overall public value process described by Moore (1995). In order to answer 
this question, it is necessary first to contextualise the research question in public management, e-
government and information systems literature. The next sections explain how contributions from 
the three literatures complement each other and what is the main PhD research proposition. 
1.3 The public value creation process 
In the public management literature, there is a diffused opinion that a more open and networked 
production can help to create more value for the public than a closed production process (Osborne, 
2010; Bao et al., 2013; Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere, 2013; Negoita, 2018). This common view 
builds on the idea that the acquisition of more operational resources from external actors would 
enable public agencies to produce more options of services for citizens at lower costs. However,  
according to the public value literature  “the more, the better” principle is not sufficient to create 




Firstly, the value created for the public cannot be calculated by looking at the input/output ratio 
because more services do not always mean more value for the public. Citizens perceive as valuable 
not only the quantity or costs of services but also other values such as safety or environmental 
protection embedded in the service proposition. Therefore, public agencies should use their 
operational capabilities to configure production activities to meet multiple and fast-changing needs.  
 
Secondly, the way in which public agencies configure the public value chain is not only influenced 
by citizens’ needs, but it is also affected by other forces which can be other public interests or simply 
other contextual factors. In fact, public agencies do not operate in isolation but in a specific 
environment where there are multiple actors at different levels of Government that can influence - 
through regulation, policies, and reforms - how public agencies can configure the production of 
services. This is the reason why given the same needs and operational capabilities, the configuration 
of public service production which is successful in certain countries might fail to create value for the 
public in other countries. The importance of contextual factors and actors in the value creation 
process is well-known in the business management literature which invites companies to be “locally 
responsive” by evaluating the production process not only according to what is operationally 
feasible but also based on the local needs and other contextual factors such as Government, type 
of market or demographics (Zeithaml and Fry, 1984; Porter, 1997; Chandler and Vargo, 2011; Belton, 
2017; Arana-Solares et al., 2019; Khan and Mir, 2019).  
 
To help public sector managers to address these complex challenges, Moore (1995) provides a 
strategic framework: the strategic triangle of public value creation. Moore’s framework is 
conceptualised to help public agencies visualise the three main aspects of the public value creation 
process and configure the public value chain considering not only what they can operationally do to 
satisfy citizens’ needs, but also what the different contextual factors allow them to do (Weinberg 
and Lewis, 2009; Benington and Moore, 2011a).  
 
The first aspect of the framework refers to the primary need of public agencies to define the 
strategic goals that should be pursued to create public value. Because citizens are the only arbiter 
of public value, the definition of strategic goals consists of observing citizens’ needs and evaluating 
their level of satisfaction about public services performance (Benington, 2011; Benington and 




The second and most important aspect of the public value creation process is to explore the 
environment where the public agency operates. Although public agencies have a formal mandate 
from legislation and/or policies, they still need to build sufficient support among all the actors that 
constitute the authorising environment such as political bodies (municipalities, Ministry, cabinet 
etc.), other public agencies, relevant interest groups (professional associations, unions, lobbies) and 
others (the media, NGOs, universities, group of citizens etc.) (Mintrom and Luetjens, 2017). All these 
actors can formally (e.g. through policies, regulations or protocols) or informally (e.g. through strike 
or protest) influence the configuration of the public value chain and then affect the value creation 
process. Therefore, public agencies need to engage the above actors to gain awareness of all the 
interests involved and to understand under which conditions they can legitimately pursue their 
strategic goals.  
 
The third aspect refers to the operational capabilities which determine what the public agency can 
materially produce (Moore and Khagram, 2004; Weinberg and Lewis, 2009).  
 
                                             
Figure 1: Strategic Triangle of Public Value Creation (Moore 1995) 
The configuration of the public value chain is the result of a process of negotiation across different 
aspects of the public value creation process indicated by the strategic triangle (Moore and Khagram, 
2004; Meynhardt, 2009).  Public agencies need to negotiate a workable trade-off between what 
citizens want, the different public interests of the authorising environment and what is operationally 
feasible (De Graaf, Huberts and Smulders, 2016). In many public agencies which have adopted e-
government systems to better produce public services, the above process of negotiation is not 
straightforward, but rather, it is mediated through technology. Differently from Moore’s 
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conceptualisation, technology adoption in the production process is not neutral and apolitical. 
Public agencies design ICTs systems to serve specific purposes, interests, logics of production, and 
public values, and therefore can enable or constrains certain production configurations (Cordella 
and Iannacci, 2010). For example, the e-government system designed to support the England and 
Wales criminal justice system was designed not to exchange data with the police. The Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 reformed the relationship between the police and prosecutors to favour more 
collaboration. However, the previous e-government system, designed with opposite goals, initially 
represented an obstacle which influenced the new production configuration proposed by the 
reform (Cordella & Iannacci, 2010). Therefore, ICTs systems are carriers of value propositions which 
can affect how public agencies organise their public value chains. Moreover, e-government systems 
are often composed of several technological components. Hence, public agencies need to trade-off 
different interests and values which the different components of e-government systems embed. 
The evolution from siloed e-government systems usually based on in-house components to more 
networked and layered ICTs systems has further increased the complexity of public value creation 
because most of the components of e-government systems are not built within the boundaries of 
the public agencies but instead are sourced by external actors.  
Hence, when public agencies assemble different technological components to configure the 
production of public service, they need also to coordinate interests and values pursued by external 
actors, which are also mutable. As a consequence, in order to create public value, public agencies 
need to simultaneously: 1) configure e-government systems to serve their public interests and 
values; and 2) coordinate multiple interests embedded in the different technological components 
of their e-government systems to maximise public value creation. In this acceptation, ICTs systems 
mediate the public value creation process both as enablers to pursue specific values, and as 
instruments to balance the multiple interests carried by the other digital components. The trade-off 
among all the different interests embedded in the digital components is not a sum or subtraction of 
interests, but the result of a continuous negotiation which takes into account multiple situated 
factors and priorities in order to find the optimal production configuration to create public value. 
This latter perspective of how ICTs system impact the public value creation process has not been 
sufficiently addressed, even if e-government systems are becoming more networked and modular 
than in the past (Panagiotopoulos, Klievink and Cordella, 2019). It implies that the impact of 
production configuration of public services mediated by ICTs should be studied according to an 
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integrated perspective which includes the perspective of technology both as a carrier of interests 
and as an instrument to coordinate different interests to reach a specific public value goal.  
 
2. The impact of technology on public value creation 
Public value literature, as well as many public managers, have often considered technology as a 
malleable organisational asset which could automatize certain tasks and improve the overall 
production efficiency (Moore, 1995; Moore and Khagram, 2004; Benington and Moore, 2011a; 
Bryson et al., 2017). According to this perspective, the impact of e-government systems on the 
production of public services and on the creation of public value depends on the technical 
characteristics of the ICTs systems. Consequently, the value created by e-governments systems is 
the result of the sum of its technical features. For example, comparing two e-government systems, 
the one with more processing power, a higher speed of communication and greater storage 
capabilities will automatically improve the efficiency and then generate more value for citizens. 
Similarly, the adoption of the same ICTs systems which have been successful in a public agency or 
company will also be considered automatically successful in other organisational contexts since the 
technology is expected to generate the same types of effects on the production process. Hence, 
following this perspective, looking only at the technical characteristics of ICTs system, it is possible 
to predict and generalise how technology can contribute to public value creation. However, studies 
have revealed that the technological impact on production configuration is more complex and 
cannot be easily generalised by only looking at the technical characteristics of e-government 
systems (Bonina and Cordella, 2009; Cordella and Willcocks, 2010; Scott, DeLone and Golden, 2016). 
In fact, when public agencies design and develop e-government systems, they assemble and connect 
different technical and organisational components to reach specific political goals (Lanzara, 2009). 
Therefore, two public agencies can adopt e-government systems with similar technical 
characteristics (e.g. processing power, storage, etc), but they are likely to configure the production 
of public service differently because they are pursuing different sets of public value goals. The 
process of configuration of public service production consists in designing and developing e-
government systems according to logics of production, values, interests, procedures as well as 
regulations typical of the organisational context where public agencies operate. Once all these 
elements are embedded in the components of e-government systems such as algorithms, data 
standards or web interfaces, then technology starts mediating the entire production process, 
influencing the public value creation process. For example, based on a set of parameters, political 
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interests and logics embedded during the production configuration process into an algorithm, e-
government systems can automatize government spending and reduce corruption – such as 
ChileCompra, the procurement system of Chile that has digitalised most of the public administration 
procurement process (Bertot, Jaeger and Grimes, 2010). Thanks to the mediation of technology, 
each step of the process is mapped and can be checked by both government officials and citizens, 
leaving public officials no possibility to manipulate the process. The adoption of ICTs systems in the 
production of services then enhances control over the production process because it hides from 
public officials the logics or goals embedded in the system and forces them to perform specific tasks 
(Bovens and Zouridis, 2002; Kallinikos, 2005). Thus, the automatization through ICTs of certain 
production tasks increases both the efficiency of the production process and the control public 
agencies have over the public value chain because it reduces at the minimum the discretionary 
power of public officials which allows them to modify how the service is produced. However, the 
control power offered by ICTs system to public agencies not only depends on the logics, regulations, 
and decision-making tasks embedded in the system, but also on how public agencies configure the 
overall production of public services (Lanzara, 2009; Cordella and Iannacci, 2010). 
The strength of the e-government system control power is not the same and cannot be generalised 
because the way in which e-governments are designed and operate depends on the interaction 
between the organisational layer (constituted by regulations, policies, and protocols etc.) and the 
technological layer (Helbig, Ramón Gil-García and Ferro, 2009). The two layers are deeply 
intertwined, and any change in one of the two layers leads to changes in the other (Luna-Reyes et 
al., 2005; Heeks and Bailur, 2007; Lanzara, 2009). Changes in one of the two layers or in both are 
related to changes to the public service production configuration. The production configuration 
continuously mutates because the creation of public value is negotiated according to what citizens 
want, the different interests, the resources available and what e-government systems can support 
(e.g., Cordella & Iannacci, 2010; Janssena et al., 2009). Based on how public agencies reshape the 
production configuration, the control power offered by the e-government systems also change. As 
a consequence, a different configuration of the production mediated by an e-government system 
can increase or decrease the discretionary power public officials or other actors have on the public 
value creation process. For example, in many American cities like Los Angeles or New York, the 
police has adopted e-government systems that analyse data about past crimes to predict future 
crimes (Karppi, 2018). In the initial production configuration of the policing service production, the 
system was often considered the sole source of information to plan policing activities. Changes in 
20 
 
political views led to considering an extensive use of predictive policing unethical; hence, the 
policing service was re-configured accordingly. In the new production configuration process, an e-
government system’s use to predict crime become one of the sources relied on by police officers to 
plan policing activities (Hardyns and Rummens, 2018). Therefore, the same e-government systems 
which embed the same logics, regulations and values can have different regulative power on the 
creation of public value according to how public agencies configure the public service production 
process. Moreover, the previous example shows that public agencies are not free to set production 
configuration, but are conditioned by contextual factors such as new or pre-existing regulations, 
laws, political interests, logics of production etc.  
In fact, public agencies do not configure public services from scratch. When public agencies 
configure production of public services, they first have to deal with pre-existing regulations, political 
interests, organizational resources and e-government systems. Public agencies adapt or change the 
production configuration mediated by ICTs through a process of negotiation with the value 
propositions embedded in the pre-existing e-government system. While the value proposition of 
production configurations that do not involve technology can be changed, the ones mediated by e-
government systems might be frozen in the architecture of ICTs systems (Kallinikos, 2004a; Lanzara, 
2009). Therefore, past ICTs design choices to pursue public values which are no longer appreciated 
by citizens can still condition existing production configuration and the public value delivered to 
citizens. For example, many e-health systems initially developed to support a siloed production logic 
represent today an obstacle to support a more collaborative provision of public health services 
(France, Taroni and Donatini, 2005; Robertson et al., 2011). In fact, the design, technical standards 
and protocols that constitute many e-health systems were originally developed to serve other logics 
or goals which are incompatible with the current ones. E-government systems can then lock-in 
public agencies to old public value propositions or condition the future ones (Lanzara, 2009). 
However, the level of lock-in dynamics influences on public services production configuration is not 
generalisable because it is the result of a process of negotiation between previous and new 
production configurations which is different in each context. An emerging technical solution to 
easily configure the production of public services by mitigating lock-in dynamics it is to move public 
agencies’ e-government systems from a siloed architecture to a modular and open architecture 
(Janssen and Estevez, 2013). 
Open architecture favours the creation of e-government systems constituted by modular 
components which public agencies can easily assemble and dissembled like LEGO bricks (O’Reilly, 
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2011; Thompson, Ravindran and Nicosia, 2015; Brown et al., 2017). The possibility to combine and 
recombine modules ad infinitum allows public agencies to re-configure the public value chain easily 
according to citizens’ needs, without the risks to remain locked in with previous production 
configurations. Moreover, open architecture allows public agencies to access and reutilise existing 
modules/services developed by third parties without the need to create ex-novo services which are 
already available on the market. For example, instead of developing a payment module for its e-
government system ex-novo, a public agency would likely re-use the ones offered by other public 
agencies or companies, in order to save money and time. However, if the owner of the module 
changes how the payment service works (e.g. it starts accepting only debit cards) then, this would 
also affect the overall production configuration and the public value creation process of the public 
agency that has adopted it. Therefore, the possibility to configure the production as public agencies 
want only apparently increases control over the public value chain because more open and 
interoperable systems are also more difficult to control. Furthermore, e-governments systems 
designed according to an open architecture can also serve as a base to enable a massive network of 
external actors to co-produce thousands if not millions of modules/services on top of their core 
services. Although more modules represent more opportunities and resources to offer value for 
citizens, they also represent a challenge for the public agency that is responsible for the public value 
creation process. For example, Greater London Authority developed London Datastore, an e-
government system to enable a network of actors to use the city’s data about transportation, 
criminality, education, healthcare etc., to co-produce services (Coleman, 2013). Nevertheless, 
suppose that thousands of services are built on top of that e-government system. In that case, it 
becomes difficult for public agencies that own e-government systems to ensure that all external 
actors are contributing to the creation of public value. Thus, public agencies should configure the 
public service production to address or properly regulate the contributions of internal (e.g. public 
agencies in the same public administration) and also external actors (e.g. citizens, companies, NGOs, 
etc.) in order to maximise public value creation. 
Therefore, public agencies that adopt open architecture can hypothetically create more public value 
because they can easily configure public service production and at the same time enable the co-
production of public services on a large scale. However, public management literature as well as e-
government literature have not considered the complexities related to an open architecture which 
can potentially threaten public value creation. As discussed by IS literature, ICTs systems based on 
an open architecture are constituted by different technological and organisational layers which are 
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categorised as infrastructure, platforms and ecosystems (Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2008; Ghazawneh 
and Henfridsson, 2012). The next section explores the differences and the relationships between 
infrastructure, platforms and ecosystems and how they interact. The discussion will better clarify 
the complexities related to how ICTs-mediated the co-production of public services and their impact 
on public value creation. 
3. Infrastructures, platforms, ecosystems 
In e-government literature, differences between digital infrastructures and platforms and their 
effects on the public value creation process have not been discussed at length. The terms 
‘infrastructure’ and ‘platform’ are often considered as interchangeable (Janssen et al., 2009; 
O’Reilly, 2011; Janssen and Estevez, 2013; Joseph and Avdic, 2016; Okunola, Rowley and Johnson, 
2017; AlSayegh, Hossan and Slade, 2019). In fact, both infrastructure and platforms appear to have 
a dual role: 1) connectors of a network of heterogeneous actors, and 2) enablers for the co-
production of diverse and unforeseen services. 
As connectors, they facilitate a network of actors to interact through a set of components which 
allow the exchange of data (Tilson, Lyytinen and Sørensen, 2010; Grisot and Vassilakopoulou, 2013; 
Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013; Plantin et al., 2018). As enablers, infrastructure and platforms are 
the common foundation or the core building block which provides an essential service/functionality 
to multiple other modules or components for other services and uses (Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2010; 
Tilson, Lyytinen and Sørensen, 2010; Grisot and Vassilakopoulou, 2013). In both roles, all the 
network activities co-produced are mediated by infrastructures and platforms. Therefore, changes 
at the core service/foundation would impact all the activities built upon it (Contini and Lanzara, 
2008).  
However, even if infrastructures and platforms have apparently the same roles, they are not the 
same because they offer a different level of control over the co-production of public services (Plantin 
et al., 2018; Rossi and Sørensen, 2019). Therefore, their impact on the public value creation process 
has fundamental differences. 
3.1.Digital Infrastructures 
One of the historical roles of public administration was to build and maintain public infrastructures 
such as electric power grids, water pipes, highways, underground transport, railways etc. (Hughes, 
1987; Plantin et al., 2018). These infrastructures act as deep foundational structures of society. 
Hence, when public agencies modify infrastructures’ design or their functioning, this impacts all the 
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societal activities (Hughes, 1987; van der Vleuten, 2004) built on top of the infrastructure. 
Infrastructures and their influence on the value created by societal activities can be studied 
according to two main perspectives: as pure technical and engineered systems with effects on 
society that can be predicted by looking at their technical characteristics; or as large technical 
system (LTS), composed of several heterogeneous technical and organisational elements that 
interact with each other, generating unpredictable effects for society (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 
1987; Plantin et al., 2018). Through the lens of LTS, infrastructures such as power grids are studied 
as socio-technical systems which include technical components such as cables and high voltage 
poles, and by organizational components such as law, regulations, standards, and business 
strategies. All these components are assembled by public administration, which acts as a system 
builder (van der Vleuten, 2004). As a system builder, public administration pursues an agenda which 
aims to deliver certain public goals. These public goals are inscribed in the technical features of 
infrastructures to generate certain organisational routines and to address the behaviour of third 
parties that use the infrastructure (Hughes, 1987). Once the technical features are live, then they 
often shape the organisational layer - for example, making some development paths technically 
more difficult, while others easier to accomplish (Aanestad et al., 2017). 
 
The diffusion of information systems in society has led public administration to develop digital 
infrastructures such as e-health or e-justice systems which today represent the foundational layers 
of many public services co-produced by a network of public and private actors (Antonio and 
Francesco, 2012; Bygstad and Hanseth, 2016; Fragidis and Chatzoglou, 2017). The most important 
and diffused example of digital infrastructure developed by a public administration is the Internet.  
During the 70s, the American public administration acted as a system builder,  when the US Defense 
Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the US National Science Foundation 
(NSF) developed the Internet to permit scientists to share supercomputers available only in few 
research centres (Plantin et al., 2018). The internet as a socio-technical system was composed of 
technical components such as processors and cables, and of social elements, for example, intra-
agency agreements or protocols to use the infrastructure (Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2010; Plantin et 
al., 2018). Similarly to many public infrastructures, the internet was initially centrally designed by 
public administration. In fact, DARPA and NSF assembled all of the Internet’s technical and 
organisational components to reach specific public goals. However, when users and third-party 
developers had the opportunity to access the Internet infrastructure, they also started to modify or 
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extend the infrastructure to co-produce services and reach their own goals (Plantin et al., 2018). 
The extension of the Internet beyond the initial design has been possible through the linkage of the 
existing infrastructure with external systems assembled by external actors (Hanseth and Lyytinen, 
2010; Plantin et al., 2018). The existence of standards enabled the linkage of the Internet with third 
parties’ systems. Explicit and shared standards are centrally imposed by those who design the 
infrastructure or by those that win the “standard competition” within the network of actors that 
use public infrastructures like the Internet or power grids (Schilling, 1998; Hodgson and Cicmil, 2007; 
Fomin and Matinmikko, 2014).  In the case of power grids, the example of a standard that became 
dominant is AC/DC power converters, while in the case of the internet the most important standard 
became the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TC P/IP) (Plantin et al., 2018). AC/DC 
power converters and TCP/IP have become fundamental to expanding power grids and Internet 
infrastructure because they tend to act as gateways.  
 
Standards are often described as gateways because they act as links or connectors between 
components, objects, data and systems, and are essential for the growth of digital infrastructures 
(Hanseth and Monteiro, 1997; Fomin and Matinmikko, 2014). The way in which standards mediate 
the linkage among different systems is not simply a technical issue but the result of a process of 
negotiation which involves both technical and organisational components of digital infrastructures. 
One or multiple actors that use or manage digital infrastructures translate and inscribe their 
interests into standards to reinforce specific logics, rules, law, models of business etc.,  and to 
intentionally steer the infrastructure towards certain development paths (Hanseth and Monteiro, 
1997; P. N. Edwards et al., 2007). In fact, standards have the power to harmonize interests of the 
actors (public agencies, companies, citizens, regulators etc.) that participate in the development of 
the infrastructures according to specific principles (Grisot and Vassilakopoulou, 2013; 
Constantinides and Barrett, 2015). The process of harmonization of third parties’ systems consists 
in designing or adapting their systems according to a single mode of interaction, which allows 
integration with the digital infrastructures (Fomin and Lyytinen, 2011). Therefore, the process of 
connection is not straightforward, but rather, it is the result of a process of negotiation between 
standards and external systems that aim to be integrated within the infrastructure (Bekkers and 
Liotard, 1999). When the systems are combined with the digital infrastructure, they become 




The integration of different systems within a single infrastructure is accomplished only when all 
technological and organisational parts are linked together and harmonized in technological and 
organisational terms (Geels, 2002). Without the mediation of standards, digital infrastructures are 
just a collection of separate independent systems which cannot exchange information or work as a 
single integrated system (Aanestad et al., 2017). The inability to connect a digital infrastructure with 
other systems impedes the ability to evolve or innovate infrastructure’s functionalities to meet 
emerging needs or to adapt to a changing environment (Hanseth, 2001). National e-Health systems 
are a typical example of digital infrastructure that in many countries struggles to expand. The 
Ministries of Healthcare of many western countries have invested in national digital infrastructures 
to allow the exchange of patients’ electronic healthcare records among different public and private 
hospitals (O’Keefe, Greenfield and Goodchild, 2005; Pirnejad et al., 2007; Constantinides and 
Barrett, 2015; Margheri et al., 2020). However, years of decentralisations have favoured the 
proliferation of different standards for electronic healthcare records which have made hospitals 
unable to exchange data through a single national digital infrastructure (O’Keefe, Greenfield and 
Goodchild, 2005). The impossibility of integrating the hospitals’ systems with the national e-Health 
systems decreases the value that the entire national health system can create for citizens (Dunleavy, 
2005). 
 
The adoption of common standards among actors that belong to the same domain, such as the 
healthcare domain, is thus fundamental to coordinating multiple actors and to enable third parties 
to transcend boundaries of the infrastructure and develop new functionalities. In fact, digital 
infrastructures are often conceived to be potentially never finished or completed (Zittrain and 
Lessig, 2009; Tilson, Lyytinen and Sørensen, 2010). Standards embed a set of potential socio-
technical practices which actors can enact to add unforeseen properties, services, products, or 
contents (Hanseth et al., 2006). However, while actors attempt to enact the infrastructure to 
configure the production process and pursue their goals, they are not isolated. The design and 
evolution of digital infrastructure is an ongoing and situated process that can be compared to the 
realization of a puzzle or a  collage (Ciborra et al., 2001). This process involves a multitude of human, 
technological and organisational actors interacting with each other and with the external 
environment (Ciborra et al., 2001; Braa et al., 2007; Tilson, Lyytinen and Sørensen, 2010). These 
interactions are unplanned, and the ongoing negotiations among all the actors that participate in 
the infrastructure evolution can lead to an unexpected outcome (Ciborra et al., 2001; Fomin and 
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Matinmikko, 2014). This continuing process of expansions and co-production is the result of the 
generative mechanisms of digital infrastructure. The generative mechanism describes the dynamics 
through which external actors enact all the possible options of production configuration offered by 
digital infrastructure to create, generate, expand and produce a new structure without any input 
from the builder of the system (Zittrain, 2006; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013).  
 
In terms of generativity, there are some fundamental differences between digital infrastructures 
and classical infrastructures (Tilson, Lyytinen and Sørensen, 2010). Electric or water utilities cannot 
generate different types of infrastructure or co-produce alternative new services, while digital 
infrastructures can enable third parties to develop alternative types of services or digital 
infrastructures. The explanation of this difference is mainly related to the nature of data. In fact, 
both water and electrons have fixed physical properties which limited their generativity to certain 
domains. Conversely, properties of data are not fixed but are negotiated and arranged by those 
actors that use digital infrastructure (Kallinikos, Aaltonen and Marton, 2010). Third parties can 
repackage, combine and recombine data in infinite forms (Kallinikos, 2006a). Although third parties 
can potentially use data to generate many types of services or to extend digital infrastructures, 
access to digital infrastructure is not fixed but depends on the flexibility and openness of digital 
infrastructures (Tilson, 2008). In fact, the flexibility and openness of digital infrastructure is the 
results of socio-technical and regulatory arrangements embedded in standards. For example, strict 
protocols or regulations agreed by infrastructures’ owners and embedded within standards can 
reduce this openness, and thus impact the level of generativity. 
 
The design and configuration of standards impact the level of openness and control, and thus affect 
the level of generativity. Infrastructures that have more open standards which enable multiple paths 
of infrastructure development or evolution are often able to generate more services and more value 
(Grisot and Vassilakopoulou, 2013). However, more openness also corresponds to lesser control. 
The relationship between openness, generativity and control creates a phenomenon defined as the 
paradox of control (Tilson, Lyytinen and Sørensen, 2010). According to this paradox, when digital 
infrastructures are open, they favour the expansion and co-production of services. However, the 
decentralised infrastructure evolution and production of services results in allowing a network of 
actors to address the development and co-production of infrastructure. As a consequence of this 
major freedom, infrastructures might deviate from their original purposes and might follow other 
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path dependencies (Ciborra et al., 2001). The way in which infrastructures’ owners correct their 
development paths is by adapting or creating standards, such as legislation or protocols often 
embedded in the technical components (Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2010). Once these standards start 
mediating the interaction with external actors, they start conditioning the opportunities of 
production configuration and then the value creation process.  
 
Following the previous example, the Ministries of Healthcare can enable private and public hospitals 
to share electronic healthcare records through a single digital infrastructure, but they cannot control 
how hospitals’ systems use and process patients’ medical data (King, Smith and Williams, 2012). 
External actors can potentially misuse medical data and co-produce services which generate 
negative public value (Shenoy and Appel, 2017). Hence, the only action that the Ministry of 
Healthcare can take is to modify or introduce new standards to prevent or mitigate the generation 
of negative value or to steer the network towards a certain development path. By introducing and 
modifying standards, public agencies do not intervene directly in the co-production process, but 
instead “cultivate” the production configuration to address and limit co-production of services 
within certain boundaries (Ciborra, 1997; Constantinides and Barrett, 2015). However, if control 
over the infrastructure is completely removed from the public administration to the network, the 
process of cultivation can be difficult. External heterogeneous actors such as company associations, 
groups of users or a single company might have the power to impose standards in certain digital 
domains and then to influence the value creation process. 
 
In the public sector, 40 years of neoliberalist reforms have weakened the control of public 
administration over many digital infrastructures. The need to cut public spending has forced public 
administration to stop investing in digital infrastructures which have been usually considered too 
risky from a financial perspective (Mazzucato, 2011). Powerful private actors such as Google, 
Facebook or Amazon have filled the infrastructural gap left by the public and have invested their 
own funds to build digital infrastructures which today have become the pillars of the services co-
produced in many public domains such as transportation and communication (Plantin et al., 2018). 
As a result of the privatization of many digital infrastructures, the public administration has lost the 
role of being a “system builder” and has become a regulator of the market enabled by privately 
owned infrastructures.  However, differently from classical infrastructures such as power grids or 
highways, digital infrastructures like the Internet are a complex assemblage of a large number of 
28 
 
heterogeneous technical and organisational components often developed by third parties which 
continually shape each other (Edwards et al., 2007). The above complexity generates high 
asymmetry of information, which makes it difficult for public administration to control or regulate 
how third parties use the infrastructures (Zuboff, 2018). An example is the European Union Directive 
about “the right to be forgotten”. The distributed and unstructured architecture of the internet has 
favoured a decentralised production of data and therefore, the enforcement of this Directive 
represents a challenge for the public administration of many EU countries (Bennett, 2012). The 
impossibility of directly controlling and addressing the co-production of services might result in a 
higher risk that digital infrastructures might drift away from the public administration agenda to 
pursue other interests. 
 
Therefore, the need to enhance control over the production of public services mediated by ICTs has 
become critical for public administrations which have started to invest in open architecture based 
on platforms. Differently from digital infrastructures, platforms allow the coordination of multiple 
actors and co-production on a large scale, but offer higher control over the value created. 
 
3.2 Platforms 
The transition from infrastructures to platforms has never had a univocal explanation (Rossi and 
Sørensen, 2019). However, platforms are often considered as built on top of digital infrastructures 
like the Internet to facilitate control over the transmitted data among different actors (Hanseth and 
Lyytinen, 2010; Plantin et al., 2018; Helmond, Nieborg and van der Vlist, 2019). In fact, digital 
platforms organise, aggregate, and coordinate user-generated content exchanged among 
heterogeneous actors through digital infrastructures.  According to this perspective, private and 
public organisations have invested in platforms to introduce control points on top of digital 
infrastructures and to monitor and address free flow of data among distributed actors. Another 
perspective considers platforms as a new organisational model which can boost innovation and co-
production on a large scale. In the mid-1990s, the term ‘platform’ started getting diffused in the 
tech industry as synonymous with interoperability and co-production. Microsoft described its 
Windows operating system as a platform which could connect and become interoperable with other 
digital products developed by third parties. During the following years, other companies such as 
Google, Spotify, Uber and Airbnb followed and evolved the platform model which in two decades 
has transformed the global economy (O’Reilly, 2011; Zuboff, 2018; Cusumano, Yoffie and Gawer, 
2020). Governments have also invested in developing digital platforms for their public 
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administration to facilitate the co-production and innovation of alternative options of public 
services (O’Reilly, 2011; Fishenden and Thompson, 2013). All the digital platforms developed by the 
market and by the Government share common dynamics and characteristics which can be studied 
according to different theoretical perspectives.  
 
Economic literature approaches platforms as intermediaries that mediate transactions between two 
groups of actors such as buyers and sellers (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). As 
intermediaries, platforms create economic value by acting as a bridge to fill gaps in the market and 
by connecting two or multiple groups of actors. Thanks to their positions, digital platforms can 
collect data from all the parties and have superior knowledge of the market. This knowledge is used 
to decrease transaction costs by reducing uncertainty among actors or acting as controllers of the 
transactions (Akbar and Tracogna, 2018). The ability of platforms to create economic value also 
depends on economic mechanisms defined as network effects. Network effects imply that the value 
of platforms increases as the number of users increases (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Shapiro and Varian, 
1998). The bigger the users’ base, the more useful and attractive the platform becomes for both 
users and co-producers of services (Arthur, 1989). This is particularly evident for mobility apps such 
as UBER. Their economic value is not determined by functionalities and business models (which 
often are identical), but it depends on both sides of the market which influence each other. As more 
users use the app, the demand of mobility becomes higher and more service providers will join the 
app. As more services are co-produced by third parties, the bigger is the offering of additional 
options of services or products and more users will use the app (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Therefore, 
the ability to innovate and co-produce new services and products is a critical goal for all platforms 
that want to offer more value to their users. 
 
Innovation management literature approaches platforms as enablers of innovation and co-
production of services and products. According to this conceptualisation, platforms are constituted 
by a central and stable core which acts as a foundation for a modular architecture that allows 
external organisations to easily plug-in modules to add complementary services (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Thanks to this architecture, organisations can decrease cost 
of development when they launch a new product or service because instead of building an entirely 
new system from scratch, they only have to develop a module to sustain the new functionality. 
Therefore, the modular architecture facilitates the production of new products and services by 
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decreasing costs, delivery time as well as risk of failure. However, platforms do not enable the co-
production of services in the same way. In terms of production process scope, platforms can be 
distinguished by belonging to three main categories (Gawer, 2014). Internal platforms enable actors 
within the organisation to develop complementary modules of services. Supply chain platforms 
allow restricted and selected number of suppliers to co-produce additional modules. Finally, 
industry platforms enable external actors to co-produce and then co-invent modules and services. 
Usually, these three categories of platforms are described as innovation platforms because their 
role is to facilitate the innovation process. They can be therefore distinguished from transaction 
platforms which serve to mediate and facilitate exchanges and interactions among actors. 
Nevertheless, most innovation platforms offered by companies like Google or Facebook can be 
categorised as innovation and transaction platforms (Gawer, 2014). It is likely that the platform 
organisational model will evolve and new platform categories will probably emerge in the future 
(Cusumano, Yoffie and Gawer, 2020).  However, the evolution of platforms is not exclusively limited 
to changes in the organisational structure. The technical layers are not neutral. Both the 
organisational and architectural layers mutually affect each other, and their interactions influence 
platform configuration and thus the value creation process (De Reuver, Sørensen and Basole, 2018).  
 
According to the socio-technical view, the impact of platforms on the value creation process cannot 
be determined by looking only at the organisational or technical aspects of its architecture because 
platforms are constituted by both layers intertwined together (Tilson, Sørensen and Lyytinen, 2012). 
Platform architecture is neither neutral nor homogeneous because it embeds organisational 
components such as rules, goals, and business models which belong to the organisational context 
where the platform is situated. As a consequence, the process of plugging in modules to the core of 
the platform is not straightforward, but the result of socio-technical negotiations. Both the module 
and the platform embed different organisational and technical properties which need to be aligned 
and combined together in order to interoperate (Tiwana, Konsynski and Bush, 2010; Ghazawneh 
and Henfridsson, 2015). The process of integration is mediated through some resources such as 
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs) defined as 
boundary resources (Eaton et al., 2015). The platform owner inscribes in APIs and SDKs the rules, 
and goals to enable and address how external actors co-produce services and products. If external 
actors do not adapt and align their modules to the APIs and SDKs requirements, they would not be 
able to connect to the platforms and co-produce products and services (Eaton et al., 2015). 
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Therefore, the platform owner can affect the generativity of the platform by modifying the 
boundary resources (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013). If for example, the requirements of the APIs 
and SDK are too strict and offer only limited access to data, co-production of services will be weak. 
Differently, more open and less regulated APIs will facilitate co-production of services.  Hence, APIs 
enable public and private organisations to govern the platform’s generativity and enact the desired 
level of control over the co-production of services (De Reuver, Sørensen and Basole, 2018; 
Jacobides, Cennamo and Gawer, 2018; Plantin et al., 2018). In fact, the way in which APIs mediate 
the flux of data affects the entire public service production configuration. For example, Transport 
for London (TfL), the public agency that manages public transportation in London, opened to the 
public a set of APIs to enable external actors to access data about public transportation. The goal of 
TfL was to incentivize external actors to develop multiple options regarding information services 
about public transportation in order to provide a better public service with no further public 
investments. Given this goal, TfL has used its APIs to configure a production process which implied 
the involvement of third parties in the production of the information service. APIs represented the 
medium through which TfL enabled and addressed co-production of the information service. TfL has 
today reached its goals because its APIs power hundreds of mobility apps in London developed by 
external actors, such as City Mapper, which complement the information services offered by TfL.  
 
As it appears from the TfL’ case, access to data can be clearly beneficial to foster efficiency of the 
production process. However, the problem is that third parties can edit, reprogram and distribute 
data in different ways (Yoo, Henfridsson and Lyytinen, 2010; Kallinikos, Aaltonen and Marton, 2013). 
In fact, digital products tend to be constituted of several layers of hardware and software which 
often combine data sources from different platforms (Yoo, Henfridsson and Lyytinen, 2010). This 
problem has also emerged in the case of TfL, when one of the thousands of co-producers found the 
way to use data about bike-sharing to threaten citizens’ privacy. Once TfL noticed this problem, it 
closed the APIs about bike-sharing to not allow the co-production of this negative service for the 
public (Hogge, 2016). By taking this action, TfL used the API not as a medium to enable co-production 
but as a medium to enact control and address the co-production of the service. This example shows 
that public agencies can use e-government systems based on platforms to simultaneously enable 
co-production on a large scale and also control, address or limit how co-producers use platform 




In fact, differently from digital infrastructures, digital platforms enable public agencies to confine 
the activities of external actors within the boundaries of an organisational space defined as an 
ecosystem (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2012). The platform ecosystems organise the co-
production of public services according to a shared view, rules and values, which help public 
agencies to address value creation towards predefined paths (Lusch and Nambisan, 2015; Hein et 
al., 2020). Therefore, e-government systems based on platforms represent a potential opportunity 
for public agencies which can use the platforms’ ecosystems to exploit co-production with the 
possibility of managing its potential negative side effects. The next section discusses how digital 




The term ‘ecosystem’ has been originally used in the field of biology to describe a community of 
organisms which interact with each other and live within an environment (Loreau, Mouquet and 
Holt, 2003). In a similar acceptation, Moore (1993) used the biological ecosystem metaphor to 
describe the business community characterised by companies from different industries which 
cooperate, compete and evolve within a specific area. According to this perspective, organisations, 
companies and individuals conduct their activities which mutually affect each others’ supplies and 
the overall value proposition for costumers (Iansiti and Levien., 2004; Teece, 2007). The actors that 
populate ecosystems share the same fate of the community where they operate because their 
individual performances are often connected with the performances of the others (Iansiti and 
Levien., 2004). However, the success of business ecosystems is not only the result of the interaction 
among autonomous actors, but it also depends on the foundational layers which enable those actors 
to co-produce value (Kapoor and Lee, 2013). Silicon Valley is an example of flourishing business 
ecosystems. Its success was due mainly to the American public administration and not only to the 
interaction of independent Venture Capitalists and high qualified engineers who populate the 
Silicon Valley community. The US Department of Defence (DoD) invested in GPS, hard disk drive, 
microprocessor, and LCD displays which are today the fundamental layers of many digital products 
such as iPhones (Mazzucato, 2011). The role of the public administration in the case of Silicon Valley 
was not limited to the provisions of foundational layers which enabled the co-production of digital 
services and products. As an enabler of the Silicon Valley ecosystem, the American public 
administration has also governed its development using incentives such as fiscal benefits and legal 
policies to facilitate the brain circulation across different companies and thus make the ecosystem 
33 
 
flourish (Mazzucato, 2018). Today, most of the tech companies founded in the Silicon Valley, such 
as Google or Facebook, are acting as the American public administration. They developed digital 
platforms which enable ecosystems of digital services and products. The main difference between 
digital platforms and the American public administration is that the former allow the above 
companies to have more power to coordinate and address the contribution of external actors to 
certain value creation streams. 
 
In fact, differently from classic business ecosystems, the value creation process of digital ecosystems 
can be better addressed and controlled. Thanks to the platforms’ mediation, platforms’ owners can 
govern the ecosystem value creation process by addressing and coordinating the co-production 
activities. Existing literature about platforms and ecosystems has discussed the capability to 
influence the value creation within ecosystems according to different perspectives.  According to a 
technical perspective, the capability to address ecosystems towards a specific value creation process 
is a technical matter (Tiwana, Konsynski and Bush, 2010). Ecosystems are an array of peripheral 
technical components developed by third parties which are connected to the central platform. The 
platform mediation consists in the provision of a technical core codebase which external actors can 
extend to add complementary technical functionalities to the platform, defined modules (Tiwana, 
Konsynski and Bush, 2010; Boudreau, 2012). Due to the dependency of modules to the platform, 
the technical characteristics of platforms can influence the functioning of the modules and then the 
value creation process within the ecosystems (Eaton et al., 2015). For example, the e-government 
systems which diffuse machine-readable data facilitate external actors to co-produce more effective 
digital services because it reduces the risk of technical errors in processing data (Janssen, 
Charalabidis, and Zuiderwijk 2012). The value creation dependency between platforms and modules 
is also bidirectional (Eaton et al., 2015). If the services/modules built on the platform have a 
technical failure, they would negatively affect the ecosystem’s value proposition as well. Therefore, 
according to the technical perspective, the ecosystems’ governance results in finding the most 
suitable technical arrangements for both platforms and modules which help the ecosystems to 
create more value for the public. However, a recent study that has analysed and compared several 
data portal configurations of the major Australian cities  revealed that the success of ICTs-mediated 
co-production is not only related to technical arrangements of platforms and ecosystems, but it also 
depends on organisational aspects such as the adoption of an open data policy (Chatfield and 
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Reddick, 2017). Therefore,  technical variables alone are not sufficient to determine the value 
creation process within an ecosystem. 
 
According to the organisational view, organisational variables such as policies, protocols, strategic 
positioning, production flow, and organisational structure frame the roles and the range of activities 
of external actors in the ecosystems, and have an impact on the value creation process. However, 
the way in which the platform owner organises the ecosystem might not correspond to the goals, 
values and interests of external actors (Adner, 2017). Therefore, the platform’s owner has to align 
all the external actors to the rules and values of the ecosystem organisation in order to coordinate 
the value creation process (Huber, Kude and Dibbern, 2017). The values indicate the code of conduct 
to operate within the boundaries of the ecosystem as well as the shared vision which inspires all the 
partnerships and opportunities of collaboration (e.g. norms of collaboration) (Gulati, 1999).  Rules 
define the duties and rights each actor has while co-producing services within the ecosystem 
(Markus, 2007). In fact, rules inhibit and enable actors to contribute to the value creation process 
within certain boundaries. For example, the Italian platform of digital Identity SPID1 enables an 
ecosystem of different identity providers. In order to join the ecosystem as identity providers, 
companies like Poste Italiane or TIM have to sign a contract of collaboration, pass several security 
controls and meet legal standards to co-produce their identification services.  If they do not meet 
the above rules and release digital identities without following the producers, then their licence as 
identity provider is withdrawn together with their presence in the SPID ecosystem. However, the 
organisational structure of the ecosystems is not completely detached from the technical layers. In 
order to become SPID identity providers, companies also have to implement  SPID platform 
requirements contained in the SDK. The SDK libraries are not neutral. They have been designed to 
meet the principles and rules which regulate the co-production of the identity service. Once 
implemented, the SDK influences the characteristics of identity service architecture as well as of its 
organisational structure.  Therefore, technical and social elements mutually shape each other, and 
their interaction determines the value creation process. 
 
According to the socio-technical view, the platform and ecosystem’s organisational and 
technological elements are intertwined and evolve in the context within which the platform is 





the technical architecture which sustains the ecosystem functioning is not neutral; rather, it is 
intentionally constructed to support specific value creation logics (Kapoor, 2018). An organisation, 
such as a public agency, deliberately chooses the ecosystems organisational form and architecture 
to address the co-production and create a specific value proposition for the public (Boudreau, 2010; 
Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). This means that rules, values, interests protocols, policies etc. shape 
the design of technological connectors such as APIs and SDKs to enable certain activities and inhibit 
others. Once published, the APIs or SDKs of the platform address how external actors can co-
produce services within the ecosystems.  The logics and rules embedded in the SDK and APIs set the 
boundaries within which co-producers can create value for the ecosystem and eventually also for 
themselves. In the previous example, the SPID ecosystem has set specific rules for the co-production 
of the identity service, to ensure all identity providers positively contribute to the overall SPID value 
proposition. Nevertheless, the same rules also offer the possibility to identity providers to create 
value for themselves by co-producing the identity services according to different processes and 
models of business. Therefore, today the SPID ecosystem offers Italian citizens a wide range of 
options of identification procedures and pricing models, which in the past years have changed. 
 
In fact, the design of the digital ecosystems and consequently, their value creation process can 
evolve and mutate to respond to contextual changes and citizens’ needs (Adner, 2017; Hein et al., 
2020). For example, the recent Italian reform for digitalisation has changed the business model of 
all SPID2 ecosystems and today, most of SPID identity services are free for citizens but not for 
companies. The ability to realign all the ecosystems according to a new public value proposition was 
possible because SPID is a digital platform. The power to address and coordinate the co-production 
within certain boundaries represents the main distinction between the co-production mediated by 
platforms and digital infrastructure (Plantin et al., 2018). Digital infrastructures enable co-
production of public services without the possibility to define specific boundaries and effectively 
address the value creation process. Instead, digital platforms allow organisations such as public 
agencies to control how external actors co-produce public services and then avoid possible negative 
contributions to the overall public value proposition (Eaton et al., 2015). The possibility to 






opportunity for public administration, which has often struggled to handle the dark side of co-
production (Williams, Kang and Johnson, 2016).  
 
Tim O’Reilly (2011), in his seminal paper ‘Government as a Platform’ (GaaP), widely discussed the 
opportunities related to the adoption of digital platforms in the public administration, but mainly in 
terms of economic value. He has suggested that public agencies should imitate the organisational 
model of many tech companies which use digital platforms to facilitate co-production and increase 
production efficiencies. However, his conceptualisation and the subsequent literature about GaaP 
have not discussed the impact of co-production mediated by digital platforms on other public 
interests which together contribute to the creation of public value (O’Reilly, 2011; Fishenden and 
Thompson, 2013; Brown et al., 2017). Based on the above literature and on the main PhD research 
question, the research proposition is the following: The co-production mediated by digital platforms 
(GaaP) can help the public administration not only to improve the efficiency of public services 
production but also to ensure the creation of public value. This research proposition has driven this 
PhD research and fieldwork. However, the three papers which constitute this PhD thesis have 
unveiled several complexities which challenge the above assumption and consequently, the public 
value creation process mediated by the digital platforms. 
 
4. The public value creation and GaaP complexities and the need for public value 
orchestration 
The  PhD research question’s context provided by existing literature and summarized in the previous 
sections has informed the fieldwork which aimed to find sufficient evidence to confirm or reject the 
main research proposition. 
The main research proposition is built on three related research propositions that the researcher 
explored through the three papers: 
• Paper 1. ICTs-mediated modes of co-production (Crowdsourcing and Opensourcing) are the 
best production configurations to produce public services because they allow public 
agencies to produce more or better options of public services 
• Paper 2. The adoption of co-production can then help public agencies to satisfy all citizens’ 
needs and create public value  
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• Paper 3. The entire public administration configured as a platform will provide the 
operational capabilities that all public agencies need to co-produce services and contribute 
to the creation of public value 
The research was based on two organisational levels: public agency and public administration. The 
first case studied how the Open Data platform developed by Transport for London (TfL) mediates 
the co-production process of the information services about transportation service offered by 
hundreds of apps. The second case study has instead studied how the multiple digital platforms 
owned by different public agencies of the Italian public administration mediate the co-production 
of public services on a large scale and impact public value creation.  The document analysis, followed 
by in-depth interviews with the main stakeholders of the two cases have unveiled three main 
complexities related to  three main assumptions that the literature did not previously consider. 
4.1 The complexities of public value creation mediated by GaaP systems 
Each of the three papers that constitute the PhD thesis has contributed to answering the main PhD 
research question by unveiling some complexities of ICTs-mediated co-production and public value 
creation. 
In this study, the concept of complexity refers to the inability to predict how ICTs-mediated co-
production impacts the public value creation process. This complexity emerges as a result of the 
interaction of a network of social and technical actors involved in the production process which can 
lead to non-linear behaviours and therefore to unexpected outcomes (Kallinikos, 2005; Merali, 
2006). In the digital age, complexity has increased because ICTs facilitate the interoperability among 
several actors and different ICTs systems (Hanseth, 2004; Kallinikos, 2005).This interoperability can 
lead to benevolent or malevolent actions that, thanks to ICTs, can rapidly scale without control or 
possibility to be predicted (Star and Ruhleder, 1996; Ciborra and Hanseth, 2000). 
In this research, the complexity of ICTs-mediated co-production was not immediately evident, but 
gradually emerged through the interaction with the field, feedback from other academics, and the 
discovery of new studies and perspectives. 
The first paper “ICTs and value creation in public sector: manufacturing logic vs service logic” 
assesses the operational capabilities (skills, finance, technology, human resources) of the four 
modes of production of public services: in-house, joined-up, crowdsourcing and open sourcing. The 
research question of the paper is: What is the best mode of production to create value for citizens? 
According to public management and e-government literature, the best production mode is the 
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most efficient production configuration (Janssen and Estevez, 2013; Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013). 
Based on this view, the research proposition is that ICTs-mediated modes of co-production such as 
crowdsourcing or opensourcing are the most suitable public production configurations to create 
value for citizens because they enable public agencies to produce more or better options of public 
services for lower costs (Linders, 2012; Vamstad, 2012; Best et al., 2018). The paper discusses the 
case of two public agencies which have used these modes of production of public services. TfL has 
opensourced the production of information service about transportation through its open data 
platform and it has been able to offer more than 500 options of information service without the 
need to invest any of its resources in the development of an app. The San Ramon Valley Fire 
Protection District (SRVFPD) has offered a more efficient first aid service without the need to hire 
any paramedics, through the development of a crowdsourcing platform that has facilitated the 
involvement of trained volunteers in the co-production of the emergency service. Therefore, looking 
at TfL and SRVFPD, all public agencies should choose production configurations such as 
crowdsourcing or opensourcing to create more economic value for citizens. However, the adoption 
of co-production implies lower control over the value proposition because when public agencies co-
produce a service, they open the value creation process to third parties’ inputs. Hence, public 
agencies cannot fully control the output of the production process and the value delivered to 
citizens. For certain services like transportation or education which usually require lower level of 
control, the open value creation process might be the most suitable option. However, for other 
services like policing or judicial services, which require a high level of control over values such as 
safety or fairness, a closed value creation system typical of the in-house or joined-up mode of 
production is probably suitable. In fact, although ICTs-mediated co-production can benefit the 
efficiency of policing or judicial services, a more open value creation implies higher risks to deliver 
unsafe, unequal and not homogeneous services which are other important public interests for the 
creation of public value. 
The second paper “Creating and Capturing Value through Crowdsourcing:  Renegotiating Public 
Value” explains how ICTs-mediated co-production impacts the creation of public value. The research 
question of the paper is: How can public administration benefit from co-production to help the 
creation of public value? The research proposition is that all public agencies should choose an ICTs-
mediated co-production configuration typical of platform organisations, to better serve citizens’ 
needs in their policy domain (O’Flynn, 2007; Alford and Hughes, 2008). However, the paper explains 
that public agencies create public value when their production process impacts positively all public 
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interests (Bozeman, 2007; Alford and O’Flynn, 2009). Public agencies should then overcome the 
siloed view of value creation typical of the corporate field to guarantee a sufficient level of control 
over the effects on the policy domains served by other public agencies. Therefore, to create public 
value,  public agencies should choose the production configuration that ensures a suitable level of 
control over public values that belong to all policy domains.  
 
The third paper “Government as a Platform, Orchestration, and Public Value Creation: The Italian 
Case”  builds on the IS literature about infrastructure, platform and ecosystem presented in the 
previous section. The research aims at answering the following research question: How does GaaP 
mediated co-production impact public value creation? The research proposition is that GaaP 
enables all the public agencies to co-produce services on a large scale while ensuring a suitable level 
of control over the public value creation process.  However, from the Italian case, it has emerged 
that the GaaP’s architecture is not constituted only by a single platform (O’Reilly, 2011; Janssen and 
Estevez, 2013; Brown et al., 2017), but rather, by several platforms and ecosystems. The existence 
of multiple ecosystems decreases control over value creation and potentially increases the creation 
of negative externalities (Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2008). In fact, public agencies govern their 
ecosystems to ensure that public and private actors serve the interests of their policy domains. 
Hence, third parties might intentionally or unintentionally co-produce services that create negative 
externalities in other policies domains served by other ecosystems. For example, the Ministry of 
Transportation has to govern the public transportation ecosystem to create more value for mobility. 
In order to create more value in its field, the Ministry can decide to open data about tube station, 
airport and railway station maps to improve mobility services. However, the same data that enhance 
the public transportation domain can negatively affect national security because third parties can 
potentially use third parties to plan terrorist attacks. The siloed perspective of value creation of the 
Ministry of Transportation, combined with the impossibility of predicting how third parties can 
impact other policy domains, risks to decrease control offered by GaaP and to potentially create 
negative value for the public.  
All the above complexities represent a threat for the public value creation. Nevertheless, from the 
Italian case study, a governance mechanism has emerged to mitigate the above complexities and 
create public value through GaaP. The modular structure of GaaP allows public agencies to assemble 
and disassemble their production configurations an infinite number of times, like construction made 
of LEGO bricks (Ciborra, 1996; Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). Thanks to this architecture, public 
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agencies can then easily configure and re-configure the production process by substituting the 
modules which threaten the creation of value for the public. The process of configuration and re-
configuration of the public service production process is called public value orchestration. 
4.2 The public value orchestration 
The adoption of ICTs-mediated co-production represents an opportunity but also an additional 
factor of complexity for the creation of public value. E-government systems based on ICTs systems 
such as digital platforms can enable the co-production of public services on a large scale and deliver 
more economic value to citizens (Janssen and Estevez, 2013). Digital platforms can also help public 
agencies to control the co-production of public services. However, oftentimes, public agencies 
configure complex public services based on different digital platforms and related ecosystems. The 
existence of multiple platforms managed by different actors decreases the level of control over the 
co-production and can negatively impact the creation of public value. Therefore, when public 
agencies opt for e-government systems based on platforms, they should also adopt a dedicated 
governance mechanism called “public value orchestration” to ensure the creation of public value. 
The notion of orchestration as a mechanism of governance to create value for the public is not new 
and has been discussed according to different acceptations. Nevertheless, none of them have 
considered ICTs as political artefacts able to carry interests or values that influence the public value 
creation process described by Moore (1995). 
 
The term of orchestration has usually referred to the activity of coordination of multiple interests 
that public agencies often conduct in the political and administrative realm (Kleinschmit et al., 
2018). According to this perspective, the activity of orchestration is limited to the authorising 
environment that in the strategic triangle of Moore (1995) is the second aspect that describes the 
public creation process. In this acceptation, public agencies act as a conductor of an orchestra 
constituted by stakeholders who have different political interests (Abbott and Bernstein, 2015). The 
stakeholders that compose the “orchestra” can be political bodies, lobbies, unions, NGOs, citizens’ 
associations etc. which together represent multiple societal interests. Hence, orchestration consists 
of trading off all the public interests and building a consensus among all the various stakeholders 
about what is valuable for the public (Benington, 2011). However, according to the public value 
literature, third parties not only contribute to a shared view of public value but also participate in 
the production process. Therefore, public agencies are not only an orchestrator of multiple public 
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interests. They are also an orchestrator of contributions and resources offered by a network of 
public and private actors. 
 
In this second acceptation, orchestration consists of coordinating the internal and external 
organisational resources (financial, human, technological, skills) to provide the operational 
capabilities public agencies needs to configure the production process (Janssen and Estevez, 2013). 
The digitalisation of production implies that most of the organizational resources offered by third 
parties are embedded or mediated by ICTs system. Therefore, in a highly digitalised context, the 
process of orchestration might consist mainly of coordinating a portfolio of applications necessary 
to produce public services (Queiroz et al., 2018). As previously mentioned, the connection of 
different ICT elements to create an e-government system is not straightforward and is not limited 
to plug-in different digital platforms. The ICTs elements that compose e-government systems carry 
political interests, logics, values, regulations etc. and have the power to influence the activities that 
compose the public value chain (Antonio and Francesco, 2012). Therefore, the influence of 
technology on the overall public value proposition cannot be limited to the technical sphere. As a 
consequence, when technology is involved in the production process, the orchestration activity 
implies a negotiation process among different ICTs systems that mediate the production process.   
 
According to this view, the public value orchestration entails finding the right technological and 
organisational configuration in order to produce public services able to create public value. Hence, 
the process described by the chart of the strategic triangle of Moore should be modified because 
technology mediates all the three aspects of public value creation simultaneously. However, a 
modification of the strategic triangle is graphically difficult because technology embeds citizens’ 
needs, political interests and regulations, and is deeply intertwined with all the organisational 
elements which compose the operational capabilities. Depending on how public service production 
is configured, the mediation of technology can reinforce or address some values instead of others. 
Hence, technology can become an instrument to enforce control over the public value chain. The 
level of control offered by the ICTs systems that mediate production is not fixed but is variable and 
is the result of situated negotiations between the technological and organisational layers. For 
example, the more open is the public service production process to the contributions of external 
actors, the lower is the control over the public value creation process. 
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The ability to control public value creation depends mostly on the type of e-government 
architecture that enables co-production. E-government systems based on platforms instead of 
digital infrastructures can facilitate public value orchestration because they help to easily re-
configure the production process and govern the co-production of public services within 
ecosystems. Nevertheless, the co-production of public services mediated by digital platforms can 
also threaten public value creation. E-government systems developed according to the GaaP model 
are often composed of different modules or digital platforms (and related ecosystems) owned and 
governed by other actors that pursue their own interests. As a consequence of the layered structure 
of e-government systems, the public value creation process becomes dependent on ICTs systems 
controlled by other actors. If public agencies want to mitigate against the risk of creating negative 
value for the public, they should continually orchestrate the creation of value by disassembling and 
reassembling the public service production configuration. For example, the foreign affairs agency 
configures the production of the service to request resident permits, by combining a module for the 
identification service, a module to process the required documentation and a module for the tax 
payment. The modules for the identification and for the payment are usually platforms owned by 
other companies and public agencies which enable ecosystems of options of identification methods 
offered by third parties (e.g. phone identification, post office, webcam, etc.) or payment options 
(e.g. credit card, debit card, check etc.). After a national terrorist threat arises, the foreign affairs 
agency increases the level of security. The agency disassembles the previous configuration, 
internalizing the activity of identification through the development of an in-house platform. The 
action of re-configuration of the production of the residence permit service to increase public safety 
is an example of public value orchestration.   
Moreover, public value orchestration, mediated by e-government systems that enable co-
production on a large scale, must also address the tension between openness and control of the 
public value creation process (Boudreau, 2010). Public agencies deal with the above tension, 
orchestrating public value creation on horizontal and vertical dimensions (Eisenmann, Parker and 
Van Alstyne, 2009; Benlian, Hilkert and Hess, 2015). On the horizontal dimension, public value 
orchestration consists of restricting or enabling the possibility of ensuring interoperability and 
interconnection between different platforms. Usually, more interconnection and interdependencies 
among digital ecosystems help to improve public value proposition. Nevertheless, more openness 
also corresponds to lower control over the production process and then major risks that some 
external actors' contributions might threaten the creation of public value. On the vertical dimension, 
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public value orchestration implies the possibility to enable or restricts users from co-producing 
services within the platforms’ ecosystems. More open ecosystems can offer a more prosperous 
public value proposition but also increase the risk of negative contributions.  However, lower control 
over the value delivered to citizens does not always mean less public value delivered to clients.  In 
fact, public services produce different services in different contexts. Some public services, like the 
policing service, require a high level of control over the public value chain; while others, like 
transportation services, are more valuable when open to the co-production with third parties. 
Moreover, public agencies orchestrate public value creation, also evaluating the impact the 
production configuration has on multiple policy domains and not only on the one under their direct 
responsibility. Therefore, a public agency might choose the less economically convenient production 
configuration to protect other policy domains' interests and create public value. 
5. The thesis structure 
The thesis is based on three published papers. For copyright issues, the three papers are available 
through the following links: 
• Paper 1  ICTs and value creation in public sector: manufacturing logic vs service logic.  
• Paper 2 Creating and Capturing Value through Crowdsourcing Renegotiating Public Value 
with Co-Production 
• Paper 3 Government as a Platform, Orchestration, and Public Value Creation: The Italian 
Case 
 
The following chapters provide the theoretical background and the structure necessary to link the 
three papers and appreciate their contributions.  
 
Chapter 1: Methodology 
The chapter outlines the overall methodology and explains the relationship between the 
methodology and the three papers. A clear description of the data collection and analysis of the 
two cases, Transport for London and the Italian public administration, is included, with brief and 
significant examples that form a clear link between the sources of data and the main theoretical 
claims. 
Chapter 2:  The creation of value in public management literature 
The chapter explains the linkage between the different conceptualisation of value for the public and 
the model of public administration. This chapter seeks to provide a relevant background for the 
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whole thesis by reviewing characteristics of all five public management approaches and by 
discussing how their models of organisation for public administration impact the creation of what 
they think is valuable for citizens. 
Chapter 3:  The impact of e-government systems on the creation of value for the public 
Public administration has adopted ICTs to support and enhance the production of public services 
and to create more value for citizens. As explained in the previous chapter, the conceptualisation of 
how public agencies create value for citizens has changed. This chapter critically reviews e-
government literature and discusses how the role of technology has evolved to serve different value 
creation conceptualisations. 
 
Chapter 4: Theoretical framework  
The chapter presents the main theoretical framework of the thesis. The first section briefly 
summarises different research perspectives about the impact of e-government systems on value 
creation and discusses the socio-technical perspective adopted for this study. The second section 
describes how the interaction of the organisational and technical dimensions of the GaaP enables 
public agencies to configure production. The third section discusses the limitations of GaaP in the 
creation of public value. 
 
Chapter 5: Discussion and conclusion 
The chapter provides a synthesis of the findings across the thesis work. The chapter offers a 
theoretical discussion which links the main research question with the three papers’ contributions 













CHAPTER 1 Methodology 
 
This PhD research started with an in-depth review of public management and e-government 
literature. Chapter two reviews public management literature and summarises how the evolution 
of the conceptualisation of public value has affected public administration's organisational model 
and how public agencies configure the production of public services. Following the same 
evolutionary process, chapter three reviews e-government literature and focuses on how public 
agencies have used ICTs to enable different public services production configurations and to support 
different value creation processes. Chapter three also discusses the emergent use of e-government 
systems to co-produce public services on a large scale.  
 
The impact of the adoption of ICTs-mediated co-production has been typically discussed in terms of 
economic efficiency, but not in terms of public value creation. Therefore, this PhD thesis' main 
research question is: How does ICTs-mediated co-production impact the creation of public value? 
The research proposition is that ICTs systems that meet GaaP’s characteristics enable and mediate 
public administration's operational capabilities necessary to co-produce services, thereby increasing 
efficiency and ensuring public value creation.  
 
The above research proposition and the focus on GaaP as an enabler of co-production were defined 
after a back and forth learning process (Stracke and Kumar, 2010; Aitchison et al., 2012). During the 
PhD journey, the research method was improved and scope of research refined. At the start of this 
research project, the type of ICTs system that enabled co-production, its organisational and 
technical characteristics and its overall configuration had not been defined yet. 
 
This methodology chapter presents the journey from defining the research question to reaching the 
main findings. The chapter is organised as follows. The first section after a review of e-government 
research perspectives presents the PhD research perspective. The second section motivates the 
selection of the case study research method. It explains the process that led to the selection of the 
two main cases: TfL and the Italian public administration. The third section presents the data 
collection, analysis and discussion of the main findings of the TfL case. The fifth section presents the 





1.1 E-government research perspectives 
E-government studies have analysed the impact of ICTs systems on the creation of value for the 
public, mainly according to the technological determinist, social determinist, and socio-technical 
research perspectives. The adoption of these three research perspectives has influenced how 
researchers perceive and investigate technology and organisations' role in shaping production 
configuration and then the value creation process (Easterby-Smith, R and Lowe, 2002; Guba, 2002). 
These views are implicitly rooted in the same research philosophies that drive other management 
and social science researchers. These research philosophies can be ordered along a hypothetical 
continuum where at one extreme we can find positivism and at the other, social constructivism 
(Heeks and Bailur, 2007). Influenced by positivism, technological determinist studies analyse specific 
technological features and assume that technological functions are the main determinants of the 
trajectory of change and transformation associated with specific e-government systems (Bellamy 
and Taylor, 1998; Layne and Lee, 2001). On the other hand, e-government studies influenced by 
social constructivism have adopted the social deterministic and socio-technical approaches that 
emphasise the role of socio, organisational, and cognitive elements in shaping the trajectory of 
change associated with deploying ICTs in the public sector.  
 
E-government studies driven by the positivist research philosophy hold an objective ontology that 
implies the existence of a single universal reality, independent from individual interpretation (Meijer 
and Bekkers, 2015; Alkhalifah, 2017). As a result of this view, authors of e-government studies are 
inclined to consider technology, work procedures, organisational culture, and skills as objective 
variables independent from contextual forces or individual choices (Heeks and Bailur, 2007; Aliyu et 
al., 2014). In these studies, the value delivered for citizens is conceived as independent, objective, 
and often measurable (Osborne, 2010). Influenced by the above ontological stance, researchers in 
the e-government field tend to investigate the dynamics among the social and technological 
variables and estimate their impact on the public's value via systematic and controlled investigations 
which are usually based on quantitative research methods (Samuel et al., 2020; Uyar et al., 2021). 
Findings of these studies are oftentimes statistically generalised to a population and used to predict 
specific social or technical outcome related to the adoption of specific e-government systems 
(Alkhalifah, 2017). In most e-government studies, there are no clear references to positivist research 
philosophy, but its influence can be retraced in those studies categorised as technological 
deterministic (e.g., Bellamy & Taylor, 1998; Layne & Lee, 2001) which investigate how ICTs systems’ 
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technical variables determine production configuration that generates a specific value for the public 
(Layne and Lee, 2001; Yang, 2003). This perspective is typical of engineering-oriented studies which 
tend to approach e-government systems as a composite of hardware and software components 
(Fleck, Webster and Williams, 1990; Bellamy and Taylor, 1998). Authors of e-government research 
that have adopted the technological deterministic perspective tend to focus on the characteristics 
of architectural dimension (e.g. interoperability standards) and to assess the value created for the 
public by looking to their technical performances (e.g. processing power, speed, storage etc.) 
(Guijarro, 2007; Janssen et al., 2011). The findings of these researchers are valid in any context 
because the same ICTs system architecture can be installed and replicated in any public agency to 
deliver the same technical performance. Oftentimes, e-government studies utilise models that 
generalise the correspondence between the type of architecture and its results. These models help 
public agencies to know ex-ante the type of e-government configuration they should adopt to reach 
a specific value outcome described in terms of technical effectiveness (Layne and Lee, 2001; Torres, 
Pina and Acerete, 2005; Andersen and Henriksen, 2006). Hence, research that adopts the 
technological deterministic perspective is very useful to study the technical functioning of e-
government systems and their technical impact, but not to understand or explain the production 
logics and the decisions that had led to the design of e-government systems (Cordella and Iannacci, 
2010).  
 
E-government studies that investigate how human choices (e.g. political reforms, new logics of 
production) shape the functioning of ICTs systems tend to consider technology not as an objective 
tool but as a social artefact which embeds the subjective view of individuals or social groups situated 
within specific contexts (Kallinikos, 2004b). This view is typical among authors of e-government 
studies that adopt the social constructivism ontology (Pinch and Bijker, 1984; Meikle and Bijker, 
1997). In these studies, the design, development and management of ICTs systems is subjective to 
the political or managerial choices of the actors involved in the process of e-government 
configuration (Suchman, 1987; Williams and Edge, 1996; Heath, Knoblauch and Luff, 2000; 
Orlikowski, 2000). Authors who have adopted the social constructivist view tend to perceive what 
is valuable for the public as constructed in the subjective sphere of the individuals involved in the 
production process or the utilisation of the service (Alford and O’Flynn, 2009; Hartley et al., 2015; 
Osborne, 2018). The need to capture the view that individuals or groups of individuals have about 
the functioning of ICTs systems and the impact on the value created for the public has led 
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researchers to adopt qualitative research methods (Van den Bulck, 1999; Heeks and Bailur, 2007). 
Studies that focus on understanding how the configuration of an e-government system impacts  
value proposed for citizens (e.g. Cordella and Iannacci 2010) tend to collect and analyse the views 
of those individuals involved in the configuration of e-government systems. Conversely, those 
studies that focus on understanding if e-government systems have effectively created value for the 
public (e.g. van Velsen et al. 2009) investigate the subjective view of the citizens that use the services 
mediated or enabled by the e-government system researched. These two types of social 
constructivist research focuses can be traced in those e-government studies categorized as social 
determinist and sociotechnical which differ in their opinion about the role of technology. 
 
E-government studies that adopted the social deterministic perspective (e.g., Fountain, 2001; 
Schellong, 2007) look at social variables such as administrative protocols and regulations to explain 
how political reforms or organisational changes drive changes in e-government systems and impact 
the value created for citizens (Williams and Edge, 1996; Yang, 2003; Gil-García J. et al., 2005).  
Authors of socio-deterministic studies are inclined to consider technology as a neutral tool shaped 
by human choices (Zuiderwijk and Janssen, 2014; McBride et al., 2019). Conversely, authors of 
studies that adopt the socio-technical perspective (e.g., Cordella & Iannacci, 2010; Janssena et al., 
2009) consider technology as an active actor that embeds certain logics of production which can 
enable or constrain production configuration. In these studies, negotiations between ICTs systems 
and other organisational components are continuous and shape the e-government configuration 
and, consequently, influence the production and value creation process (Helbig, Ramón Gil-García 
and Ferro, 2009). The socio-technical perspective is common in those studies that aim to research 
how the organisational and technical dimensions of an e-government system impact the production 
process (Bekkers and Homburg, 2007; Cordella and Bonina, 2012).  
 
This PhD study adopts the socio-technical perspective to investigate how ICTs-mediated co-
production impacts public value creation and looks mainly at how the technical and organisational 
dimensions of an e-government system mediate and enable the operational capabilities that allow 
the co-production of public services. The PhD research question can be potentially answered 
according to three different perspectives common in e-government literature. As presented in this 
section, each perspective determines the research focus, what type of data should be collected and 
analysed and how. This study adopted the socio-technical research perspective which, in 
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combination with an explanatory research question, had led the researcher to choose the case study 
research method.  
 
1.2. Research method: case study 
The e-government field does not subscribe to a predefined research method (Heeks and Bailur, 
2007). Authors of e-government studies choose the most suitable research method, based on the 
type of research question, the level of control over the phenomena studied, and the time when the 
phenomenon has occurred (Yin, 2009). For this PhD study, the author researched how ICTs-
mediated co-production impacts public value creation. The "how" of the research question indicates 
that the nature of the research is explanatory (Yin, 2009). Case studies, histories, and experiments 
– unlike archival analysis or surveys - are the research methods suitable for explanatory research 
because they help explain how ICTs-mediated co-production impacts public value creation. Another 
factor that helped guide the selection of the research method is that ICTs-mediated co-production 
is a phenomenon that cannot be isolated and controlled in a lab (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Zaidah, 2007). For 
this research, experiments could not be conducted on one or two isolated variables because ICTs-
mediated co-production is situated within broader and external spatial and temporal contexts 
where there are variegated organisational and technical variables (Bostrom and Heinen, 1997). In 
fact, changes in the external environment where public agencies operate - due to political reforms, 
new privacy regulations or the introduction of new technologies - can influence how e-government 
systems mediate public services production (Janssen et al., 2009). 
 
Another factor that affected the research method's selection is that ICTs-mediated co-production is 
a contemporary phenomenon. Therefore, the history research method was not suitable because it 
is usually adopted to deal with past phenomena, by focusing mainly on document analysis. 
Conversely, the case study is generally adopted to investigate contemporary events. Here, it offered 
the possibility to interview and interact with public managers, politicians and regulators, and to 
understand how their choices have shaped e-government systems' configuration that mediated co-
production (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2009). Through their stories, the researcher gained a collective and 
situated understanding of e-government system's functioning and its impact on the public value 
creation process (Lather, 1992). The possibility of discovering the subjective view of the actors 
involved in the production configuration was also particularly beneficial to meet the requirements 




Another factor that specifically affected the case study selection is that ICTs-mediated co-
production of public services is a rare phenomenon. The research question required a public 
organisation that co-produces a public service through an ICTs system. In the public sector realm, a 
public agency that co-produces services through ICTs represents an extreme and unusual case, 
which deviates from the widespread use of technology to improve internal efficiency or the 
interoperability among public agencies (Dunleavy, 2005; Fishenden and Thompson, 2013). The 
extreme case study is a typology of a case study that aims to extend, develop, or confirm a theory 
that analyses rare or unique phenomena (Darke, Shanks and Broadbent, 1998; Yin, 2009). In 
management studies,  extreme case studies represent an opportunity to study organisations, 
processes, or routines that differ from the "average" type of organisation in the same domain 
(Darke, Shanks and Broadbent, 1998; Elsbach and Kramer, 2016). In fact, most e-government studies 
or reports (e.g. Ubaldi, González-Zapata, and Barbieri 2020) have studied organisations by sampling 
similar organisations or looking only at few variables. However, this approach has two 
methodological limitations which lead to underestimate non-standard or extreme organisations 
that often cannot be compared with others and therefore do not fit the "average" (Flyvbjerg, 2006; 
Elsbach and Kramer, 2016). The first limitation is that looking only at the average or at few variables 
risks to hide or soften outliers or contradictions. The second limitation is that a random and 
representative sample tends to follow certain guidelines and methods. If an organisation does not 
fit within these standards, it remains excluded from the study (Elsbach and Kramer, 2016). 
Nevertheless, extreme organisations can serve as a "black swan" to develop, improve, reject or 
develop new theories (Flyvbjerg, 2006). In fact, extreme case studies act as anomalies that allow for 
studying infrequent phenomenon in intensive details.  
 
The focus of one extreme case study represents the most suitable method to answer this PhD 
research question. However, research findings based on one case study are often criticised for their 
lack of objectivity because they cannot be statistically generalised (Yin, 2009). Researchers who 
adopt the case study research method typically rely on theoretical sampling and aim to reach the 
saturation point when additional data collection does not add more information (Faulkner and 
Trotter, 2017). By adopting such an approach, the PhD study’s findings can corroborate, modify, 
reject, or extend a theoretical explanation related to the impact that the e-government system that 
enables co-production has on public value creation (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2009). The theoretical 
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explanation provided by this PhD research remains valid until other studies do not find different 
answers or exceptions in other contexts. 
 
Another cause of the lack of objectivity of a case study is that, differently from experiments or 
surveys,  the case study researcher is not separate from the object of study (Zaidah, 2007). The 
researcher involved in qualitative research is also situated and often immersed within the research 
context and thus constructs an understanding of the phenomenon, which sometimes risks differing 
from the understanding of the involved actors (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Therefore, the researcher adopted 
certain design principles to mitigate the potential lack of objectivity and guarantee the findings' 
quality and validity. 
 
Yin (2009) has set four tests to assess the validity and objectivity of findings. The researcher designed 
the PhD research plan to logically connect empirical data to the study's proposition, to comply with 
Yin's tests. The first test, pertaining to "construct validity", aims to mitigate the influence of 
subjective judgements in the collection and analysis of data. The tactic adopted to satisfy this test 
was to collect data from different sources and ask key informants to review the study's draft. The 
second test, concerned with "internal validity", is particularly important for explanatory studies 
because it ensures that the event X led or caused the event Y. The main tactic adopted to strengthen 
internal validity was to adopt a thematic analysis which was mainly conducted through NVivo 
software. The themes used to categorise and organise the data in order to explain the phenomenon 
logically derived from a precise theoretical framework. The third test was to "build external validity" 
by ensuring that the findings could be generalisable. As previously mentioned, the goal of the study 
is to provide a theoretical explanation of the phenomena. The case studies of TfL and the Italian 
public administration represent an opportunity to shed empirical light on the impact of ICTs-
mediated co-production on public value creation and to advance a theoretical explanation of this 
phenomenon. Another essential test is to verify the PhD findings’ reliability, so that if later 
researchers follow the same procedures as described in this chapter, they will arrive at the same 
theoretical explanation of the phenomenon. The two main tactics to ensure reliability adopted in 
the studies of TfL and the Italian public administration were a case study protocol constituted by 
the list of questions asked during  the interviews. The second tactic was the development of folders 
in the researcher's personal Dropbox to store the documents, recordings of the interviews and the 




Table 1 Design principles and tactics (Yin, 2009) 
Principles Tactics applied for the PhD research 
Construct validity • Use multiple sources of evidence 
• Ask  key informants to review the study 
Internal validity • Pattern matching 
External validity • Use theory in single case studies 
Reliability • Use case study protocol 
• Develop case study database 
 
The above tactics were applied to the PhD research plan, which changed several times during the 
PhD journey. Although the research interests remained the same, the research question, as well as 
the unit of analysis and the theoretical framework, evolved. As a consequence, the case study data 
collection and analysis changed. The following section reviews the journey that led to the selection 
of the TfL case and then of the Italian case.  
 
1.3. The case selection process  
In this PhD, two extreme case studies were selected according to specific criteria and rationale to 
answer the research question. The two extreme case studies represent unique cases of public 
agency and of public administration that co-produce services through ICTs, respectively. The 
researcher conducted separated data collection and analysis on each of the two cases to mitigate 
the risk of not gaining interesting findings and not having the possibility to access each case.  
 
The initial PhD research question was: How does a public agency configure an ICTs system to co-
produce services and create public value? This aimed to understand how a public agency could 
configure an ICTs system to create public value. The combination of two theoretical lenses 
constituted the theoretical framework for this research: 1) the strategic triangle of Moore invites us 
to analyse the process of public services production configuration by looking at all the political and 
operational aspects which influence the production configuration and then the creation of public 
value (Moore and Khagram, 2004; Meynhardt, 2009); and 2)the socio-technical view of technology, 
which considers  ICTs systems as the result of contextual negotiations between organisational and 
technical layers (Cordella & Iannacci, 2010). The object of study or the unit of analysis was holistic, 
and it included the process of configuration of the e-government system that mediates the co-
production process. The research output was the explanation of the process that leads a public 
agency to configure e-government systems to mediate co-production that could create public value. 
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In order to select a case suitable for the above research, the first principle was that the public agency 
has to be located in London close enough to the researcher's location to allow multiple access to 
the field of study (Simons, 2009). The second principle was to find a public agency that co-produces 
public services through ICTs with third parties. In fact, although many public agencies have ICTs 
systems like digital platforms to co-produce services, they often fail to co-produce public services 
with third parties. The third criterion was the availability of abundant sources of data (Simons, 2009; 
Yin, 2009). Collection from different sources of data is essential to gain more insight and allow 
triangulation of the understanding case. The fourth criterion was case accessibility, which refers to 
the possibility of accessing data - for example, by interviewing the main stakeholders of the case.  
 
Table 2 The first case selection criteria 
 
According to the above criteria, one of the public agencies assessed was the Department for 
Environment Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA). In 2015, DEFRA had begun the development of an API 
platform where it is possible to find environmental data such as about air and water quality. Most 
of the 100 documents collected about DEFRA Open Data initiative came from the DEFRA and the 
Open Data Institute (ODI), which presents DEFRA as a model of digitalisation and transparency. From 
the collected documents and especially from DEFRA's Open Data strategy, it emerged that DEFRA 
recognised the importance of open data to increase transparency and enable third parties to co-
produce services for environmental or farming purposes3. In 2016, DEFRA reached the most 
important milestone of their data strategy, making more than 13,000 Dataset open to the public4. 
The flood monitoring API was designed to potentially help Red Cross or Facebook to inform people 
about flood risks. The LiDAR (Light Detection And Ranging) data about heights of buildings, gutters 






THE FIRST CASE SELECTION CRITERIA 
Criteria Defra London Data Store Transport for London 
1. Location (London) YES YES YES 
2. Co-production of public 
services with third parties 
NO YES YES 
3. Abundant availability of 
documentation 
YES NO YES 
4. Possibility to interview main 
stakeholders 
NO NO YES 
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Therefore, DEFRA had the intention and the operational capabilities to enable co-production of a 
public service on a large scale. Although they organised many hackathons and meetings to show all 
the DEFRA valuable data, the ecosystem of applications built on DEFRA's APIs remained weak. 
Therefore, DEFRA met only one of four conditions to be the ideal case study for this PhD research 
and was therefore not completely suitable to answer the research question. However, DEFRA's 
study opened new connections and further developed my understanding of how the UK 
government, especially in London, perceived the importance of open data for the British economy. 
 
Initially, the open data initiative in the UK aimed to increase transparency. Only later, British public 
agencies began to understand the potential and the relationship between Open Data and co-
production of public services. Greater London Authority (GLA) founded the London data store in 
2010. Its main goal was to release public agencies' data in an open format that could also be 
machine-readable to enable multiple actors to monitor public agencies' performance and to better 
understand London’s biggest challenges. GLA invested in the London Data Store primarily to 
improve transparency and facilitate the Mayor’s and GLA’s decision making. However, GLA soon 
noticed that opening the city's data could positively impact transparency and co-production of 
public services. Therefore, GLA expanded the data available on the London Data Store. In 2010, 
London Data Store published 500 open datasets. In 2020, this reached 6000 datasets and 60,000 
users each month5. The London Data Store met two of the criteria for a suitable case study. The 
most significant limitation was the lack of documentation about the case and the impossibility of 
accessing additional data sources such as through interviews with the politicians and managers who 
had developed the London Data Store initiative. Nevertheless, through the study of this case, it 
emerged that the data primarily responsible for enabling co-production of public services on a large 
scale comes from TfL.  
 
TfL's journey into the ICTs-mediated co-production started in 2007 when TfL released a widget for 
travel news and journey planners that could be adopted for different websites. In 2010, in line with 
the Mayor of London's and UK Government’s policies about the release of open data, TfL started to 
open its travel data (such as for the London Underground train location or the Journey Planner APIs) 






was launched, which soon became the most popular TfL data among developers (Hogge, 2016). In 
2013, more than 5,000 developers registered in the TfL's developers' area and published more than 
30 APIs which power hundreds of apps, such as  City Mapper and Google Maps. The decision to open 
public service production helped TfL to offer a better information service, especially during strikes 
or weather events that could cause public transportation disruption. In fact, currently, the 
information service is offered through TfL internal channels (TfL personnel, website, SMS service, 
screens, email etc.) and through more than 700 smartphone applications that, in 2012, were 
downloaded approximately 4 million times (Deloitte, 2013). Access to the TfL case was facilitated 
thanks to the availability of many official documents and those written by third parties, and the 
possibility to interview some of the senior managers who had led the Open Data initiative. TfL met 
all the criteria to be a valuable case study to answer the PhD research question. TfL's data collection 
and analysis helped to better understand ICTs-mediated co-production and to access many 
practitioners' views about this topic. 
 
Preliminary study of the TfL revealed that its ICTs system that mediates the information service's 
co-production met a digital platform's characteristics. Thanks to its API platform, TfL also acts as a 
platform organisation, enabling different modes of production and co-production. In May 2016, 
during a seminar at LSE the researcher presented the preliminary findings about the TfL case. Among 
the participants of the seminar, there was one of the authors of the paper of Brown et al. (2017) 
"Appraising the impact and role of platform models and Government as a Platform (GaaP) in UK 
Government public service reform: Towards a Platform Assessment Framework (PAF)" who 
provided an interesting feedback and shared the preliminary version of their paper. The paper 
offered an alternative theoretical framework that induced the researcher to evaluate another 
research focus and to study ICTs-mediated co-production at the public administration level instead 
of at public agency’s level.  After a period of reflection based on the TfL case’s preliminary data and 
on the GaaP's concept, the researcher decided to adopt the above theoretical framework and 
change the research question to study the entire public administration as a platform and its impact 
on the public value creation. The researcher developed an alternative research question: How does 
GaaP mediated co-production impact on the public value creation? This new research question 
changed the research proposition and moved the unit of analysis from the process of ICTs 
configuration to the GaaP's organisational and technical characteristics. The expected research 
output was the explanation of how GaaP technical and organisational characteristics mediate public 
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agencies' operational capabilities, enabling how they configure the production process and how 
they create public value. The new research goal led the researcher to also reflect on the difference 
between digital platforms and infrastructure and how differently mediate co-production. 
 
Table 3 The second case selection criteria 
 
One of the cases evaluated by the researcher was the British public administration which 
conceptualised its e-government architecture according to the GaaP principles (Brown et al., 2017).  
The Government Digital Service (GDS), the British Government's public agency in charge of 
digitalising the British public administration, has repeatedly stated that the GaaP principles of Tim 
O'Reilly inspired and profoundly influenced the development of the British e-government 
architecture. However, except for the identity verifying program that has enabled an ecosystem of 
identity providers to co-produce identity verifications services, the rest of the digital platforms did 
not mediate public services' co-production. The majority of digital platforms, such as GOV.UK pay, 
were developed to avoid duplications of e-government systems and to facilitate interoperability. 
Therefore, GDS developed a "digital platforms for the government" (Brown et al., 2017), and not to 
enable co-production of public service. The lack of intention to co-produce services made the British 
public administration not suitable to answer the research question. 
 
Another Government case seeking to develop an e-government architecture according to the GaaP 
principles which the researcher considered was the Italian public administration. Through its digital 
government agency AgID (Agenzia per l'Italia Digitale) and a specialised temporary team called 
"Digital Transformation Team", the Italian Government developed the 2017–2019 three-year plan 
for ICTs in public administration (herein the Italian GaaP reform) (Mergel, 2019). Following the GDS 
example, the AgID and Digital Transformation Team planned and developed an e-government 
architecture constituted by many digital platforms managed and owned by different public 
agencies. Differently from the British architecture, the Italian e-government architecture was 
designed not only to facilitate the interoperability among public administration and to avoid 
THE SECOND CASE SELECTION CRITERIA 
Criteria British public administration Italian public administration 
1. Location  YES YES 
2. Digital platforms and ecosystems NO YES 
3. Abundant availability of 
documentation 
YES YES 





duplications, but also to support the development of ecosystems of services co-produced by third 
parties. Thanks to the availability of documentation and the researcher’s access to the public 
managers and politicians that conceptualised the three-year plan, the Italian public administration 
case met all the criteria for a suitable case study. 
 
The next section presents firstly, the data collection and analysis of the TfL case, and then, of the 
Italian public administration. For each case, a table that links examples of data sources, the 
analytical findings, and the papers' theoretical claims is provided. 
 
 
1.4.The case of Transport for London (TfL) 
 
 
Figure 1 The five phases of the TfL study 
Data collection and analysis of the TfL case can be divided into five phases. Phase zero indicates the 
case selection phase conducted during the last months of the first year of PhD, in parallel to the 
MPhil examination preparation. During phase zero, the researcher collected and analysed a 
restricted number of documents about the TfL Open Data initiative and interviewed the TfL manager 
who granted access to the case and provided final feedback on the case study's understanding.  
After phase zero, the researcher set as a research goal to explain through Moore’s strategic triangle 
how TfL configured its ICTs system to enable the co-production of 700 additional options of 
information service proposition. The primary assumption was that TfL was creating value for the 
public because it offers a big value proposition of information service, resulting in increased 
likelihood of satisfying all citizens' individual needs and then creating more value for the public.  
Therefore, by explaining how TfL configured its ICTS system to enable co-production and create 
public value, the researcher could have drawn a framework capable of indicating how public 
agencies configure an e-government system to create public value.  
 
Table 4 The five phases of TfL case in details 
Phase Zero  Jan 2016-Apr 2016 Preliminary data collection and analysis for 
the case selection 
Phase One  Jan 2017 Data collection 
34 TfL Digital Blogs articles 
Phase zero: Preliminary 
data collection and 
analysis
Phase one: Data 
collection










11 TfL slides presentation 
25 TfL articles 
2 Catapult UK reports 
1 Open Data Institute reports 
5 Central and Local Government reports 
10 Private companies reports 
13 NGOs reports 
Phase Two  Feb 2017 Data analysis:  Thematic Analysis through 
NVivo of all the collected documents 
Phase Three March 2017 Interviews with High Level Managers 
2 Senior manager from Online at TfL (first in 
charge of the developer community and later in 
charge of developing partnerships) 
2 Senior Manager from Online at TfL (in charge of 
managing external channels) 
1 Senior Manager from Online at TfL (in charge of 
technical management of TfL API platform) 
1 Senior Manager from Online at TfL (in charge of 
managing the Online TfL digital strategy) 
1 Senior Manager from Online at TfL (in charge of 
architecture management) 
1-Answered by email GLA director (main supporter of the TfL Open 
Data initiative) 
1 Interview with CityMapper manager 
1 Interview with Moovit Manager for EU 
Phase Four Confirmation of case study understanding  
1 May 2017 TfL manager provided feedback about the 
research outcome   
1 Jan 2018 Presentation at Catapult UK  
 
 
1.4.1 Data collection 
The researcher dedicated phases one and three to data collection. After phase zero, the researcher 
accessed the field with a priori insight constituted of the research question, a theoretical framework, 
and preliminary knowledge of the case. The researcher collected empirical qualitative data from 
several public sources through documents and interviews conducted with high-level TfL managers 
from June 2016 to March 2017. Documents were the primary source of qualitative data. They 
represent a rich source of information, especially for studies in the public sector field, where public 
officials or politicians might be reticent to provide more information than that already officially 
available (Natow, 2020). 
 
Moreover, documents can be retrieved and potentially accessed by others, increasing the research 
findings' transparency and objectivity (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 2009). However, not all documents are 
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precise or provide a complete recording of the events (Bowen, 2009). Therefore, the researcher 
conducted a systematic review of the documentation, guaranteeing a sufficient number of different 
documentary sources to triangulate information about the case. The documentation was first 
selected based on the sources' reliability, credibility and accuracy, and by preferring official sources 
such as Government or TfL. A second screening of the documentation ensured that the content fit 
the focus of the research question.  
 
The primary source of documents comes from TfL, and especially from Online at TfL’s department, 
which manages the TfL Open Data initiatives. The first source of internal documents about the Open 
Data initiative was the TfL digital blog6. Online at TfL’s managers are the authors of the blog’s articles 
and provide extensive and rich information about how the Open Data platform works, as well as 
news and updates about the release of new TfL's APIs  and features. The blog articles are beneficial 
to understand the TfL digital platform's organisational and technical functioning, which mediate the 
information service's co-production. All the available TfL’s public slide presentations which discuss 
the strategy and the production configuration behind the Open Data initiative were the second 
source of internal information. TfL’s organisational policies or reports that refer to open data 
initiatives represented the third source of internal data. All these internal data sources describe the 
TfL’s internal and shared view about the Open Data initiative.  
 
Documents produced by the local and central Government represented another essential source of 
information because they illustrate the political context/authorising environment where TfL 
operates. A particularly helpful document is the "Market Assessment of Public Sector Information" 
published by the Department for Business Innovation & Skills in 2013 that provides a good overview 
of the political context, expectations and visions about Open Data and insights about the TfL's case7. 
"The Smart London Plan" of 2013 produced by the Mayor of London shows how London's local 









Other sources of documents about the TfL case came from civil society. The 20139 "Shakespeare 
review" is an independent study that deeply influenced the national and local governments' 
perception about Open Data. Public managers, politicians, NGOs and companies that contributed 
to the study agree that open data could enable transparency and co-production on a large scale. 
Another important source is offered by the blog "Lesson from the London Datastore" written by a 
former GLA director which offered (especially in chapter 4) insights about how TfL started opening 
its data to the public10. Researchers from different NGOs or companies wrote additional reports 
about TfL after reviewing the available documents and interviewing TfL managers online. These 
studies represent an interpretation of the TfL case and helped the researcher to have a more precise 
overview of the case. For example, GOVLAB's researchers published in 2016 a complete study about 
the impact of the Open Data initiative, which helped the researcher to comprehend the evolution 
and the results of the Open Data initiative11. Finally, many companies discussed the TfL case in 
depth. In 2015, Accenture presented its study about TfL Open Data initiative. In 2017, Deloitte 
presented a detailed report. The report describes the TfL Open Data initiative's journey, evolution 
and the impact of TfL’s open data on the information service' production. Later, Deloitte's report 
was also officially shared by TfL to show the value of its Open Data initiative12. Moreover, TfL’s 
suppliers such as Amazon presented studies of how their technologies or services enabled the Open 
Data initiative. Thanks to the triangulation of internal and external documents, the researcher could 
triangulate the correct case understanding. 
 
At the end of data collection, the researcher began phase two. During phase two, the researcher 
started the document analysis that provided an in-depth knowledge of the case, which was 
propaedeutic to conduct interviews during phase three. In total, the researcher collected seven 
interviews with TfL managers who had configured the ICTs system to co-produce the information 
service. The interviews' goal was to triangulate the understanding of the case that emerged from 
the documentary data (Merriam, 1998).  Five recorded interviews, which lasted on average 60 
minutes, were conducted at the TfL's office in London. The TfL manager who had allowed access to 
the case was interviewed twice in separate meetings outside the TfL office. Another Senior Manager 









meetings at TfL's office. At the suggestion of a few interviewees, the researcher interviewed a 
former GLA director involved in the TfL Open Data initiative. The director answered interview 
questions by email. The researcher also interviewed senior managers of two mobile applications 
(Moovit and City Mapper) that use TfL's APIs, in order to better understand how developers used 
TfL's data rather than to comprehend the TfL's internal view about the case. Excluding these last 
three interviews, all the managers interviewed were from Online at TfL and were in charge of dealing 
with all different parts of the Open Data initiative. All the managers interviewed could be 
categorised as "elite". Considering the small number of top managers in all organisations, the limited 
number of interviews with high-level managers does not represent a limitation for this study 
(Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead, 1987; Parry, 1998). TfL's high managers hold positions of command. 
Therefore, they have a privileged and broader view about the Open Data initiative and its 
configuration, as opposed to other personnel such as software developers, administrators or legal 
professionals, who have specialised and siloed view on specific aspects only (Natow, 2020).  
 
A limitation related to interviewing public managers such as TfL' managers  is that they are often in 
a politically sensitive position and, consequently, might be reticent to say more than what is officially 
public (Davies, 2001).High-level managers or politicians also tend to provide contradictory 
information due to misrepresentations, elusiveness, self-servicing statements, or faulty memories 
(Martin, 2013; Todd, 2014). In order to mitigate against the above limitations, the researcher 
conducted semi-structured interviews and used the interviews mainly to confirm the understanding 
of the case that emerged from review of documents. The researcher used the results of document 
analysis to develop an interview guide to direct the discussion on specific aspects of the case, leaving 
interviewees the possibility to add comments or reflections (Longhurst, 2003; Adams, 2015). The 
first section of the interview guide aimed to provide the research goal and common background of 
discussion and terminology through a summary of the case analysis (Adams, 2015). A set of open-
ended questions about the three main steps of the public value creation process constituted the 
second section: public value definition, authorising environment, and operational capabilities. The 
researcher designed the open-ended questions to allow the interviewees to add additional 
information, offer reactions or conduct common brainstorming. During the interviews, the 
researcher took notes about the possible divergences or additional information or ideas that could 
emerge. However, most of the inputs received during the interviews confirmed the understanding 
of the case that came from the documents and did not add additional significant information. 
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Similarly to other studies that involve interviews with the "elite", the researcher used the interviews 
to triangulate the understanding of the case and to seek clarifications when needed (Davies, 2001). 
The process of triangulation was also useful from a social constructivist point of view. The 
combination of documentary and interview data helped the researcher to interpret the common 
views which actors involved in the Open Data Initiative at TfL have about the research topic (Vanhala 
and Hestbaek, 2016). 
 
Finally, once the research was completed, the researcher started the last phase (phase four), which 
consisted in collecting additional feedback to ensure research findings' validity and reliability (Yin, 
2009). The researcher discussed the case and the main research findings with one of the TfL 
managers who was also involved in the interviews. The manager confirmed the understanding of 
the case and manifested agreement for the research findings. The researcher also publicly 
presented his study in a conference organised by Catapult UK, attended by TfL managers who 
confirmed the case's understanding and provided positive feedback on the research's overall 
contribution13. 
 
1.4.2 Data analysis 
Phase two of the research focused on analysis of relevant documents. As part of the document 
analysis procedure, the researcher read and interpreted the documents produced by TfL and third 
parties. In fact, these documents do not list only a series of facts and events but also present views 
of different authors about how the Open Data initiative works (Daly, Kellehear and Gliksman, 1997; 
Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The researcher adopted thematic analysis to capture shared views about 
the case embedded in these documents (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The researcher's decision to use 
thematic analysis also reinforced internal validity (Yin, 2009) because it helped to logically compare 
empirical data with the themes predicted from the theoretical framework (Eisenhardt, 1989; Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1994). As part of thematic analysis, the researcher started separating pertinent and not 
pertinent data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Then the researcher labelled and organised data, 
according to "patterns" or "themes" which describe a common phenomenon or the characteristics 
of a phenomenon (Boyatzis, 1998; Xu and Zammit, 2020). 
 
 
13 13 https://futurecities.catapult.org.uk/event/lunchtime-lecture-google-transport-london/ 
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Given that no previous studies have applied Moore’s Strategic Triangle according to the 
sociotechnical perspective, the researcher followed the paths of other explanatory e-government 
studies’ approach that similarly lacked a consolidated theoretical framework (e.g. Mergel 2019). 
Therefore, the researcher decided to keep the thematic analysis open to the different perspectives 
that could emerge from documentary and interview data (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; Xu and 
Zammit, 2020). In fact, relying exclusively on top-down thematic analysis based on the theoretical 
framework risked inducing the researcher to miss essential factors that could explain the process of 
configuration of the ICTs systems that enable co-production of the information service (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). Thus, the researcher opted for the hybrid approach of thematic analysis, which 
combines the deductive approach typical of top-down thematic analysis with the inductive one of 
bottom-up thematic analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Before accessing the TfL case, the 
researcher used the theoretical framework to define a set of categories in the template (or 
codebook) (Crabtree and Miller, 1999). The researcher entered the documents in the NVivo data 
management program, and then started to systematically code and categorise the themes.  
 
The researcher conducted document analysis by applying the six-steps framework for thematic 
analysis suggested by Braun & Carke (2006). During the first step, the researcher aimed to become 
familiar with the entire data corpus, making notes of interesting aspects even if they did not appear 
immediately related to the research focus. The researcher reviewed several times the most 
important and rich documents such as the TfL blog articles and TfL slide presentation before starting 
the coding step. The second step involved generating initial codes, which helped to reduce lots of 
data into small chunks. During the third step, the researcher categorised the codes under the most 
suitable themes. If a code satisfied the meaning of two themes, the researcher allocated the code 
under both themes.  
 
Most of the themes came from the theoretical framework. During phase zero, the researcher only 
had four macro themes: authorising environment, operational capability, technology, and public 
value. During phase two, the researcher added some sub-themes under the operational capabilities 
themes, such as human resources, technology, skills, and finance. Some themes also emerged during 
this phase, such as reasons for adopting ICTs-mediated co-production or change of production 
perspective. The fourth step involved revising the themes. The researcher read all the data 
associated with each theme and verified if the data really met its meaning and the research question 
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perimeter (Clarke and Braun, 2014). During the fifth step, the researcher looked at how the themes 
relate together, reviewing the entire configuration of the TfL's system for Open Data. Once the final 
step was reached, the researcher read all the data analysed and wrote a summary that provided an 
overview of the case's understanding through the theoretical framework lens.  
 
Once the summary was completed, the researcher - inspired by GaaP literature - started reflecting 
on the differences between the concepts of platforms, infrastructure, and how they enable co-
production. The analysis was conducted outside the main research path that led the TfL case 
analysis, and had the goal of using empirical data to better clarify the difference between platform 
and infrastructure. The researcher remembered specific data from the documents analysed 
conducted through NVivo. Driven by the need to understand this new research issue and without a 
precise research project, the researcher manually took notes about the data he remembered and 
derived four different themes. The researcher discussed his findings with a TfL manager to ensure 
the interpretation was correct. The findings categorised in the themes were not added to any paper. 
However, they helped to build the research proposition of paper 3, because they show that a public 
agency that mediates co-production of public services through a digital platform can control co-
production and also the public value creation process.    
 
Table 5  Description of the themes 
Themes about the process of ICTs-mediated co-
production configuration 
Description 
Authorising Environment The political context where TfL was situated 
and that allowed TfL to embrace the Open 
Data initiative 
Third-party analysis about authorising 
environment (emerged) 
Third parties’, NGOs’, or research centres’ 
point of view about the reforms that led TfL 
and other public agencies to embrace Open 
Data and co-production 
Reasons for adopting ICTs-mediated co-
production 
(emerged) 
The reasons that led TfL to consider ICTs-
mediated co-production 
Operational capability A general overview of the capabilities 
required to co-produce services through 
Open Data 
Human resources TfL's human resources for the new 
production configuration 
Skills TfL's organisational skills necessary to 
support the new production configuration 
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Technology TfL's ICTs system which enables co-
production 
Change of production perspective (emerged) TfL's  logic of production 
Public Value The value TfL seeks to deliver to the public 
TfL passengers’ needs (emerged) Citizens' expectations, as perceived by TfL 
Themes about infrastructure, platform and co-
production 
These themes are not directly related to the 
previous research question and aimed to 
clarify the differences between how digital 
infrastructure and platform mediate co-
production 
Infrastructure and co-production (emerged) Explanation of how infrastructure mediates 
co-production 
Platform and co-production (emerged) Explanation of how digital platform mediates 
co-production 
Ex Ante co-production governance (emerged) How TfL configures co-production of public 
services to create public value 
Ex Post co-production governance (emerged) How TfL steers the co-production process to 
avoid the create of negative public value 
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Table 6 Themes, Analytical findings and theoretical claims 
 
Themes Sample of data collected Interview outcomes Analytical Findings Theoretical claims- PAPER 
Authorising environment Transport for London (TfL) has signed up to the 
transparency agenda and provides a wide range of 
information to users and re-users - principally through its 
website but also through other channels. In so doing, it 
builds on the 2010 Mayor's Transport Strategy, which 
included among its commitments "improving the provision 
of real-time and other journey planning information, 
including upgrading the TfL web-based journey planner, 
allowing further improvements to its real-time 
performance, accuracy and personalisation." TfL writes 
that through transparency it hopes to:  
"Enable our stakeholders to hold TfL to account; Deliver 
better value for  money; and enable 
businesses and non-profit organisations to develop 
innovative applications using our data."14 
The interviewees confirmed 
that TfL Open Data Initiative's 
objective was to improve 
transparency, create economic 
opportunities, and deliver more 
value to citizens. 
Political reforms tend to 
drive the adoption of 
new technologies.  
This finding confirmed previous e-
government studies (e.g. Cordella and 
Iannacci 2010; Schellong 2007) which 
show how political decisions shape e-
government systems configuration. This 
theoretical claim is presented in papers 
2 and 3. 
Third-party analysis about 
authorising environment 
Through its Open Data Policy, the (UK) Government has 
committed itself to making more of its data freely 
available to use and re-distribute. This commitment was 
made with a view to becoming one of the most open and 
transparent governments in the world. The 2012 Open 
Data White Paper noted that this would generate savings, 
promote innovation and support social and economic 
growth.15 
The interviewees confirmed 
that TfL started the Open Data 
Initiative as part of changes in 
the political context at the 
national and local levels. 
Public agencies do not 
act in isolation but are 
influenced by the 
environments in which 
they are situated.  
This finding confirms previous public 
value studies (e.g. Chatfield and Reddick 
2018; Moore 1995) which discuss how 
different political actors in the same 
environment interact to build a shared 
political view. This theoretical claim is 
presented in papers 2 and 3. 
Reasons for adopting ICTs-
mediated co-production 
Third Party applications, web services and tools can help 
customers make their journeys even better 
and this reflects well also on the actual public transport 
service providers….. to choose the tools that most suit 
their personal needs, often enabling them to 'personalise' 
The interviewees confirmed the 
view that more possibilities to 
satisfy citizens’ needs results in 
a bigger value proposition. 
Public value is created 
only through the 
satisfaction of one public 
need at a time. 
Therefore, more options 
of a single service help 
This finding confirmed Moore’s (1995)  
view of public value creation, which 
considers public value as the equivalent 
of corporate value in the private sector. 
The PhD research in papers 2 and 3 
have instead adopted the Bozeman 
 
14 Page 196  Market Assessment of Public Sector Information written by Deloitte for the Department for Business Innovation & Skills in 2013 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/198905/bis-13-743-market-assessment-of-public-sector-information.pdf 
15 Page 2 Open data or 
closed doors?  Written by Centre for Cities in 2013 https://www.centreforcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/13-12-10-Open-data-or-closed-doors1.pdf 
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information even when using mass transit with millions of 
others. This 'personalisation' helps increase 
customer satisfaction with transport services and allows 
operators to present a more 'human' face.16 
to create more value for 
the public. The more, 
the better. 
(2007) view, which claims that public 
value is created when public agencies 
meet a set of public values 
simultaneously. 
 
Operational Capabilities We defined five key data capability groups for intelligent 
mobility, focused on:  
• Raw data creation, collection and curation  
• Dataset handling and manipulation 
• Computational and statistical analyses  
• Human intelligence and use of data insights  
• Software and technology development. 
These led us to three key requirements for building 
capability and capacity for intelligent mobility: 
• Skilled technical talent capable of handling and 
analysing very large datasets compiled from 
multiple sources. 
• Organisational capability that ensures business 
leaders understand new analytical processes and 
business models in outline and can use actionable 
insights for strategic decision-making. 
• Technological investment to ensure access to 
requisite data storage capacity and 
computational processing power, for example, 
through the use of cloud-hosted servers.17 
The interviewees confirmed 
that the adoption of Open Data 
implied several organisational 
changes at a technological and 
organisational level which 





This finding confirmed that different 
production configurations require 
different operational capabilities. This 
theoretical claim is presented in Papers 
1 and 2. 
Human resources At the beginning of 2012, TfL's Digital Team numbered 40 
people. By 2015, the original team had almost doubled in 
size, but this is seen as just an interim step (with further 
expansion likely) as the organisation sees new 
opportunities to exploit the cloud platform to develop 
more of its own apps and services, and to more fully 
support third-party developers, in order to meet its 
The interviewees confirmed 
that TfL started hiring human 
resources from tech companies 
and start-ups. All the 
interviewees expressed their 




changes of human 
resources.  
This finding did not lead to any 
particular theoretical claim except the 
need to adapt human resources when 
changing to a new production 
configuration.  
 
16 page 5 Action Points Advancing Public Transport April 2014-Report no longer available online at http://www.uitp.org/ 
17 Page  9 The Transport Data Revolution written by Catapult UK https://ts.catapult.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/The-Transport-Data-Revolution.pdf 
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customers' growing expectations for digital channel 
engagement.18 
Skills No specific data about TfL. The main organisational skill 
was the adoption of the Agile 
mindset. 
New work practices are 
adopted to support the 
new production process 
mediated by the TfL's 
ICTs system. 
This finding did not lead to any 
theoretical claim. 
Technology This will enable registered application developers to 
freely access the same journey solutions that are 
available to customers on the TfL website and mobile 
site. The API is intended to enable developers to 
create solutions on a variety of platforms and 
increase the reach of reliable travel information in 
London.19 
During the interviews, it 
emerged that the same API 
could power the internal digital 
information services and the 
apps co-produced by third 
parties. Moreover, it also 
emerged that the ICTs system 
that enables the Open Data 




From the interviews, it also 
emerged that the Cloud made 
co-production possible. The 
demand for data is not fixed. 
For example in rainy days the 
demand for information 
increases. 
 




Digital platforms can 
support different modes 
of production 
simultaneously.  
Thanks to ICTs systems like digital 
platforms, a public agency can combine 
multiple modes of production to 
produce a service. This analytical finding 
supports the theoretical claim 
presented in Paper 1. 
 
The second analytical finding is that the 
ICTs system that enables co-production 
is a digital platform. This finding has 
opened the need to understand the 
difference between digital platforms 
and infrastructures and how they 
enable co-production. 
 
Finance No specific data about TfL. The payment of Cloud service 
could not be predicted. 
Therefore TfL had to change its 
financial procedures. 
The adoption of co-
production also implies 
changes in internal  
financial routines. 
This finding did not lead to any 
theoretical claim. 
Change of production 
perspective  
Partnership with Developers: 
As explained, TfL is not producing any Smartphone' Apps'. 
So, who is the client in this new model? TfL 
The interviewees confirmed 
that the production became 
more open and that developers 
Co-production implies 
the diffusion of an open 
logic of production, as an 
Public agencies can produce services 
following two production logics: 
manufacturing logic and service logic. 
 
18 Pag 5  report Transport for London creates an open data ecosystem with Amazon written by MWD advisors https://d0.awsstatic.com/analyst-
reports/MWD_AWS_TFL_Case_Study_Sept_2015.pdf 
19 page 4 official TfL Journey Planner API documentation http://content.tfl.gov.uk/journey-planner-api-documentation.pdf 
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engaged some of the developers of existing Smartphone 
apps and worked with them on the design of 
the API , allowed them access to early versions, and 
worked in a constructive partnership with them 
to exploit the possibilities that the data provided. 
As a result, the release of the data played a part, albeit a 
small one, in the continuing development of 
the UK’s digital economy.20 
were considered as partners 
and not as competitors. 
alternative to the close 
logic of production 
supported by  
bureaucratic 
organisations. 
This finding supports the theoretical 
claim presented in Paper 1.  
Public Value Deloitte study estimated £15m-£58m per annum benefits 
from customer time saved in apps powered by TfL open 
data. 
• Usage has since doubled – bringing the estimate to 
£30m-£116m per annum. 
• Significant investment from app development firms has 
attracted hundreds of millions of pounds in technology 
investment in London and elsewhere off the back of our 
data  
• Over 1,000 jobs estimated to be enabled by our open 
data ecosystem 
• Around 175,000 people are now employed in the digital 
technology industry in London, in 45,000 companies with 
£30bn annual turnover21 
The interviewees confirmed the 
KPIs in the documents. They  
also added that an additional 
KPI to measure the Open Data’s 
initiative success is the drastic 
reduction of citizens’ 
complaints about poor 
transportation information.  
Organisations that adopt 
an open logic of 
production tend to value 
economic performance 
but also the user’s 
overall satisfaction. 
The finding confirmed the shift of focus 
from output to outcome promoted by 
the public value management approach 
(Stephen Osborne, Radnor, and Nasi 
2013; S. P. Osborne 2018). This 
theoretical claim is presented in papers 
2 and 3. 
 
 
TfL passengers' needs Accurate real-time arrival predictions are now the most 
basic of passenger expectations, but this and published 
performance information has to feel relevant to the 
passenger. It is not enough to approximate. Information 
must reflect the passengers' experience of the network 
and therefore become 'trusted'. Information has to be 
expressed in ways that the customer can understand and 
it must enable the service to be benchmarked against 
other services.22 
The interviewees confirmed 
that TfL always monitors clients' 
satisfaction and needs, and 
develop services accordingly. 
This finding confirmed 
that citizens’ needs 
evolve and therefore, 
public agencies need to 
adapt the production of 
their services to 
constantly keep creating 
value. 
Public organizations have to continually 
change their service production to meet 
fast-changing citizens' needs and 
expectations (Zuboff and Maxmin, 
2002). This theoretical claim is 
presented in paper 2.  
 
 
20 Page 103 report Transport for London-Using Tools, Analytics and Data to inform passengers written by Simon Reed Head of Technology at TfL https://docplayer.net/158000-
Transport-for-london-using-tools-analytics-and-data-to-inform-passengers.html 
21 Slide 26 from the TfL presentation https://nhsproviders.org/media/1940/using-technology-to-transform-engagement-rikesh-shah-informatics-leads-28-april.pdf 




Infrastructure, platforms and co-production 
Infrastructure and co-
production 
There was quite a heated exchange between the 
developers and the official while they explained that, as 
soon as the data went live on TfL's website, they would 
simply scrape the data and build their apps anyway.23 
An interviewee24 confirmed 
that it is possible to acquire 
data from the website 
through the data scraping 
practice.  
A website acts as a digital 
infrastructure enabling co-
production without any control. 
Digital infrastructures offer low 
control over the co-production 
process (Hanseth and Lyytinen, 
2010; Plantin et al., 2018).This 
theoretical claim is presented in 
paper 3.   
Platform and co-production Open data license terms:  
• License modelled on the UK Open Government License 
with minimal additions 
• Developers must register with TfL 
 • They receive access tokens from our API portal, used to 
access data 
• This allows us to meter and throttle usage should it 
reach unacceptable levels beyond our thresholds 
(which are very high) 
• Developers give attribution to TfL (“powered by TfL”) 
and must not use TfL brand marks or imply they 
are 'official' TfL products.25 
An interviewee confirmed 
that TfL has complete control 
of its data and knows that 
the developers are using its 
data. If developers do not 
meet their license terms, TfL 
will not allow them to use 
data. 
Digital platforms allow public 
organisations to control the co-
production of services. 
This finding confirms digital 
platform literature (De Reuver, 
Sørensen and Basole, 2018; 
Jacobides, Cennamo and Gawer, 
2018; Plantin et al., 2018) and is 
presented in the research 
proposition of paper 3. 
Ex Ante Governance This data is not published under the OGL, and the licensing 
terms for developers set by TfL include some restrictions, 
including branding conditions. The data is, however, 
available free of charge, and TfL encourages its re-use in 
innovative ways, subject to licensing conditions. The TfL 
website contains an extensive guidance system providing 
contextual information and assistance for each feed, as 
well as suggestions for its use by developers.26 
An interviewee confirmed 
that data are not completely 
open due to specific terms 
and conditions. Moreover, 
TfL does not open all APIs to 
the public. For example,  
Oyster card data contain 
personal data, credit card 
numbers, etc. TfL will never 
open this data to the public 
to co-produce other services 
There are two analytical findings 
here: 
 1) the decision to co-produce or 
not to co-produce a service 
depends on the level of control 
required for that specific service; 
 
2)Public agencies consider 
multiple public interests before 
choosing the most suitable 
production configuration. 
The first finding supports the 
theoretical claim of paper 1, 
which explains that public 
agencies choose the most suitable 
production mode, based on the 
level of control over the final 
output. 
 
The second finding supports the 
theoretical claim presented in 
paper 2, which explains that in 
 
23 Information CHAPTER 4 Lessons from the London Datastore present in the blog written by Emer Coleman 
Former Director of Digital Engagement Government Digital Service  https://beyondtransparency.org/part-1/lessons-from-the-london-datastore/ 
24 Only one TfL manager was interviewed to specifically discuss the issues related to the platforms and infrastructure research path 
25 Slide 15 from the slide presentation of Phil Young Head of Online Transport for London https://www.slideshare.net/Sportandrec/open-data-for-tfl 





because that would risk 
threatening citizens' privacy. 
 
order to create public value, 
public agencies choose 
production configuration after 
considering multiple public 
interests which often belong to 
other policy domains. 
Ex-Post governance In April 2014, software engineer James Siddle 
demonstrated how cycle hire use statistics connected to 
Customer IDs could theoretically be de-anonymised in 
the presence of "any seemingly innocuous personal signal" 
(such as a Foursquare check-in, Facebook post, picture, or 
tweet linking an individual to a cycle hire location), 
leading to exposure of "a detailed record [of] someone's 
life in London". TfL said that including Customer 
IDs in the data had been an administrative error. They 
have since been removed.27 
An interviewee was not 
aware of this specific case. 
 
However, in case of any 
misuse of its APIs, TfL has the 
right to turn off the APIs and 
not allow the developer to 
use that API anymore. 
This finding shows that digital 
platforms allow public agencies to 
control the value creation 
process. 
 
The second finding is that co-
production can also create 
negative public value and 
therefore, requires a higher level 
of control. 
The finding confirms that co-
production can also create 
negative value for the public 
(Williams, Kang and Johnson, 
2016).  
 
Public agencies cannot predict the 
services third parties will co-
produce. Therefore, they have to 
continually govern the co-
production and address the 
ecosystems to the right value 
creation paths. Differently from 
digital infrastructure, digital 
platforms allow public agencies to 
better control co-production 
(Eaton et al., 2015) and then to 
address the public value creation 
process. The theoretical claim is 




27 Page 5 of the Open Data’s Impact report written by Becky Hogge for GOVLAB https://odimpact.org/files/case-studies-transport-for-london.pdf 
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1.5.The case of the Italian public administration 
 
Figure 2 The five  phases of the Italian public administration case 
 
The Italian case study can be similarly divided into five phases. Phase zero indicates the stage where 
the researcher started framing the research question, conceptualising the theoretical framework 
and selecting the case. This phase began when the researcher reflected on the TfL preliminary data 
and on the concept of GaaP. After studying the Italian case and meeting the Congressman who 
granted access to the case, the researcher started phase one.  
 
During phase one, the researcher collected documents from two official sources: AgID and the 
Digital Transformation team. During phase two, the researcher applied the theoretical framework 
presented in chapter 4 and in paper 3 to analyse how the organisational and architectural dimension 
of GaaP mediates the entire Italian public administration's operational capabilities, influencing how 
public agencies can create public value. After documentary analysis, the researcher summarised the 
case understanding and started phase three. During phase three, the researcher interviewed the 
main stakeholders who had conceived the Italian e-government reform to triangulate the 
understanding of the case and to discuss implication of this architecture in the production of digital 
services. In phase four, the researcher asked a senior manager from the Digital Transformation team 
to review the first research draft presented at AOM. Moreover, the researcher had the opportunity 
to work with public officials from AgID and Digital Transformation team to further develop and 
present one of the cases discussed during the interviews. This unique opportunity helped to better 
understand and triangulate the emerging complexities of how GaaP mediated the public value 
creation process and of the need for public value orchestration.   
 
 
Table 7 The five phases on the Italian public administration case in details 
Phases Description 
Phase Zero  Sept- Dec 2016 Preliminary data collection and analysis 
Phase One  Jan-Dec 2017 Data collection 
Phase zero: Preliminary 
data collection and 
analysis
Phase one: Data 
collection










Strategy for digital growth (120 pages)28 The preliminary document which addresses 
the vision and the reforms necessary to adopt 
the platform model in the Italian Public 
Administration  
The Three-Year Plan for information 
technology in the Public Administration 
(133 pages)29 
A detailed plan for the development and the 
launch of the digital projects necessary to 
support the platform model of public 
administration 
27 Medium’s blog articles by Digital 
Transformation Team30 
Articles written by managers from the Digital 
Transformation team to update and explain 
their progress and initiatives 
28 Medium’s blog articles by Italian 
Digital Agency (AgID) 31 
Articles  written by managers from AgID to 
explain the activities and the projects related 
to the new digital strategy 
40 newspaper articles Articles from major Italian newspapers that 
reported interviews and explanations of the 
new reform 
 Phase Two Apr-Dec 2017 Document analysis: Thematic Analysis 
through NVivo of all the collected documents 




The three Congressmen from different 
political parties coordinated and developed 
the digital reform of the Italian Public 
Administration 
2 high-level public managers The two public managers from AgID were in 
charge of the strategic planning and 
coordination of national and local actors 
3 high-level public managers of Digital 
Transformation Team 
The three public managers of the Digital 
Transformation team were directly involved in 
the development of the platforms necessary 
to provide the core services 
1 High Manager form the data 
protection Authority 
The manager was in charge of data protection 
and contributed to the development of the 
strategy. The manager studied how the 
platform configuration can be used to govern 
data privacy 
1 High Manager of Italian Regulatory 
Authority 
The manager was in charge of market 
regulatory policies and actively contributed to 
the development of the strategy 









Feb 2018 Senior Manager Digital 
transformation team 
The manager reviewed a draft of the first 
version of the third paper 
Sept 2018 Presentation at the mobility 
week organised by Rome municipality32 
The mobility case discussed during the 
interviews was presented during the mobility 
week conference and  discussed with the 
managers of  mobility companies that 
attended the event 
Sept 2018 Presentation at the Ministry 
of Transportation 
The researcher presented the case of mobility 
as a service platform based on SPID, CIE, 
PagoPA  and Open Trasporti 
May 2019 Presentation at the Rome 
Municipality 
Together with Poligrafico dello Stato and 
Digital Transformation team, and managers 
from ATAC,  the researcher discussed and 
presented the project to the Mobility 
Commission President of Rome Municipality 




1.5.1 Data collection 
Phases one and three were dedicated to data collection. The researcher started data collection with 
a preliminary knowledge of the case, a research question and a theoretical framework which drove 
the data collection (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). The researcher collected data through documents 
and interviews with public official and politicians from April to December 2017.  Politicians’ or public 
managers' general reticence to add more information than what was already officially declared led 
the researcher to rely mainly on official documents (Natow, 2020). Therefore, also in the Italian 
case, documents remained an essential source of information (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 2009). In fact, 
documents provide precise and objective information and can be accessed and consulted by 
everybody (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 2009). Nevertheless, documents are not perfect and can often also 
be imprecise (Bowen, 2009). Therefore, the researcher selected relevant documentation according 
to the reliability, credibility and accuracy of the sources and also to guarantee a certain grade of 
heterogeneity to allow a first stage triangulation. 
 
The researcher collected 56 official documents from the two agencies and 40 from newspapers. The 
primary sources of official documents were AgID, the Italian agency for digitalisation, and the Digital 
Transformation, which produced two key documents. The first document is "Strategy for the Digital 






administration's digital strategy. The document's goal is to give a general and preliminary vision of 
what the Government and AgID intended to pursue to solve the problem of interoperability and to 
relaunch shared digital platforms. "Three-Year Plan for ICTs in Public Administration 2017–2019"34, 
written by AgID and Digital Transformation team, is a detailed plan to digitalise the Italian public 
administration. The document is complete and provides references, tables, and figures to explain 
the e-government architecture and the organisation's functioning in details. The details and the 
clarity of this document were crucial to understand the organisational and architectural dimension 
of the Italian e-government system for the public administration. The researcher also collected 
official documents from the Medium blog of AgID 35and the Digital Transformation team36. Both 
agencies' managers wrote several articles to complement the Three-Year plan's explanation and to 
provide operational insights or updates. These blog articles represented an important source to 
triangulate the shared understanding public managers have about the case. Moreover, the 
researcher collected data from newspaper articles, which discussed the plan or included interviews 
of some of the main stakeholders.  
 
The collection of documents continued in parallel with data analysis in phase two. In fact, managers 
from AgID and Digital Transformation continued to post articles, especially on Medium, to clarify 
the projects included in the Three-year plan or to provide updates. Therefore, the researcher kept 
collecting and analysing documents until reaching the saturation point (Yin, 2009). The continuous 
collection and analysis of data also helped the researcher to better prepare for the interviews in 
phase three. The researcher interviewed the group of public managers and politicians who 
conceived the reform in the Parliament or in the office of AgID. The interviews lasted 30-70 minutes 
and were conducted in the Parliament or at AgID’s headquarter. The first person interviewed was a 
Congressman who actively contributed to drawing the public administration digitalisation reform. 
He suggested and put the researcher in touch with others to interview to understand the collective 
view about the digitalisation plan and to clarify specific topics. The researcher contacted and met 
two other Congressmen from different political parties who had conceived the reform. In two 
separate meetings, the researcher interviewed two high-level managers from AgID: the head of AgID 








case understanding of the researcher and filled some background gaps about the origin of reform 
and the connection with other previous e-government projects such as E015. The meeting with the 
second senior manager was focused mainly on pagoPA and its functioning. Interviews were also 
conducted with other senior managers of the Digital Transformation team who provided insights 
about the evolution of the e-government architecture and the functioning of the Interoperability 
model. The researcher interviewed two other high public managers involved in the development of 
the reform: the head of the Italian Regulatory Authority for Communication and one member of the 
Italian Data protection authority.  
 
As in the case of TfL, all the managers interviewed in the Italian case could be categorised as "elite". 
As for the TfL case, the limited number of people interviewed does not represent a limitation for 
this study (Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead, 1987; Parry, 1998). In fact, except for the head of Digital 
Transformation team and two other managers from the Digital Transformation team, the researcher 
interviewed all the top managers and politicians who had discussed and conceived the reform. As 
high-level public managers and politicians involved in the reform, they had a privileged and unique 
view on the case, unlike other bureaucrats, Congressmen or managers who did not work on the 
reform (Natow, 2020). Although the reform was a highly sensitive topic because it influenced the 
Italian Government's digital services procurement for the next decade, the interviewees did not 
avoid discussing it (Davies, 2001). Generally, they all tended to be very open, helpful and 
collaborative.  
 
The Congressman who had helped the researcher to reach the other participants made the 
researcher aware that, although all the people involved knew very well the entire reform process, 
they typically had contributed to the development of only the reform's aspect under their domain. 
Therefore, the researcher had to avoid asking misleading questions that could lead to 
misunderstanding about the reform (Phellas, Bloch and Seale, 2011) or to receive contradictory or 
incorrect information on other related topics (Martin 2013; Todd 2014). To mitigate this problem, 
the researcher used semi-structured interviews which helped to set a common background, and at 
the same time left interviewees free to express their opinion on the topic of their specialisation 




Before conducting the interviews, the researcher prepared and studied in-depth the entire case and 
the specific domains managed by each interviewee (Adams, 2015). Analysis of the documents had 
helped the researcher to prepare an interview guide. The first part of the guide summarised the 
case study's understanding and set a common terminology for the discussion. A set of open-ended 
questions constituted the second section. The researcher tailored this second section's questions to 
receive specialised feedback or additional information on each interviewee’s area of specialisation. 
The final and third part of the interview guide was dedicated to discussing two hypothetical 
examples related to the healthcare and mobility service. This part was very important to understand 
how the e-government system mediates the production and co-production processes. During the 
interviews, the researcher took notes about possible divergences from the researcher’s 
understanding of the case. 
 
Interviews with the people who conceived and implemented the reform offered an important 
source of triangulation to understand the case and to seek clarifications (Davies, 2001). This 
triangulation process was essential to ensure that the interviewer's subjective interpretation of the 
case corresponded to the collective perspective of all the stakeholders involved in the reforms 
(Vanhala and Hestbaek, 2016). To further ensure the validity of the findings, the researcher asked a 
Digital Transformation team senior manager to review the  draft of the third paper . His feedback 
was  positive. Moreover, the researcher continued to interact with the Digital Transformation team 
and AgID to further develop the mobility case discussed during the interviews. The researcher 
worked together with AgID and Digital Transformation to propose Mobility as a Service (MaaS) 
platform, based on the digital platforms pagoPA, SPID, and CIE. The result of the initial proposal was 
presented and discussed at the Mobility Week organised by Rome municipality37. After the 
conference, the group reviewed and discussed the project with the Ministry of Transportation that 
hypothesized the adoption of its API platform (Open Trasporti) as an additional layer for the Maas 
platform. The project was also discussed in four additional technical meetings with ATAC, the 
transportation company owned my Rome Municipality, which considered the proposal to 
reconfigure the MaaS initiative using their mobility platform instead of OpenTrasporti. Once the 
project passed the feasibility study of technical managers of ATAC, the researcher presented it to 
the Mobility Commission of  Rome Municipality, in front of all the involved stakeholders and the 






1.5.2 Data Analysis 
The second phase of research focused on analysis of the documents. The data analysis had a double 
goal, to understand: 1) the architectural and organisational dimension of the Italian public 
administration's e-government system, and 2) how the e-government system could mediate the co-
production of the service. The collected official documents embedded the view of the Government 
and public officials of AgID and Digital Transformation team who had discussed and collectively drew 
up the reform (Daly, Kellehear and Gliksman, 1997). The researcher adopted thematic analysis to 
capture and interpret the Italian Government's general view represented by the two agencies 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006). As in the TfL case, the researcher adopted a hybrid approach of thematic 
analysis, by mixing deductive and inductive approach (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Hence, 
before accessing the case, the researcher defined a set of categories based on the theoretical 
framework in the NVivo's codebook. Given that only a limited number of GaaP studies exists and 
that this theoretical framework’s roots are in the private sector literature about platforms, the 
researcher decided to keep the thematic analysis open to the emergence of different perspectives. 
The process of themes’ selection followed the six-steps framework for thematic analysis suggested 
by Braun & Carke (2006).  
 
During the first step, the researcher studied all the corpus of data to familiarise himself with the 
case. The researcher read the Three-Year Plan for ICTs in Public Administration 2017–2019 and  
other available documents to gain an overview about the case. At the second stage, the researcher 
started coding the documents to reduce the data's complexity into small chunks of code. At the 
third stage, the researcher categorised the code according to four macro themes which were 
derived from the theoretical framework: Representation of the public administration as a platform, 
GaaP architectural dimension, GaaP organisational dimension, Ecosystem structure and 
management. During analysis, one additional theme emerged:  open source. The theme contained 
all the data that refer to the Government's will to build platforms according to the open-source 
principles. However, once the researcher reached the fourth stage of the data analysis process, 
which is dedicated to reviewing the consistency between the themes and the research question, he 
decided to delete this emergent theme because the data about open source were not pertinent to 
the research scope. During this phase, the researcher also checked that the data were correctly 
associated with the right themes (Clarke and Braun, 2014). During the fifth stage, the researcher 
printed the Three-Year Plan's chart that illustrates the Italian GaaP e-government architecture and 
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started to link the information provided in the themes to the architecture components presented 
in the chart. This exercise was necessary to ensure that the researcher had all the necessary 
information to understand all the technical and organisational characteristics of the Italian GaaP e-
government system. Once the final step was reached, the researcher wrote a summary of the case 
which was presented during the interviews and then re-used for the first draft of the third paper. 
 
Table 8 Description of the themes 
Themes Description 
Public administration as a platform Consistent representations of public 
administration as a platform 
GaaP architecture dimension The themes collected information to explain 
the relationship between material (Cloud, data 
centres etc.) and immaterial infrastructures 
(ANPR, SPID etc.), Data and Analytics 
Framework (DAF) 
GaaP organisational dimension The organisational elements of the platform 
such as core services, building blocks, and 
modularity 
Ecosystem structure and management The organisational and technical elements 
which indicate the existence, functioning and 
dynamics of ecosystems where external actors 




Table 9 Themes, analytical findings and theoretical claims 
Themes Sample of data collected Interview outcomes Analytical Findings Theoretical claims- PAPER 
Representation of the public 
administration conceived as 
a GaaP 
The Plan's objective is to guide and support the Public 
Administration in implementing the technological vision of 
the operating system for the Country. It sets the 
foundation for the construction of a number of key 
components upon which public administrations can deliver 
simpler 
and more effective services for citizens and businesses by 
adopting flexible methods, a mobile-first approach, 
architectures that are secure, interoperable, scalable, 
highly reliable, and based on clearly defined application 
programming interfaces (APIs).38 
The interviewees confirmed that 
the vision of an operating 
system corresponds to the one 
of GaaP and that in the Italian 
context, the GaaP concept 
refers to an e-government 
system constituted by different 
platforms. 
GaaP is a platform of 
platforms which enables 
different ecosystems of 
services. 
GaaP e-government system is 
constituted not by a single platform 
but by a bundle of platforms. The 




Data and Analytics Framework (DAF) is the tool that the 
PA will use to maximize the value of public information 
assets, break down the barriers inhibiting data and 
information exchange, improve and simplify the 
interoperability of public data between Public 
Administrations, and standardize and promote the 
diffusion of Open Data. The DAF introduces a new way of 
operating and processing the data needed to create 
intelligent applications for the PA, citizens and businesses. 
That's not all. The reduction of barriers in data exchange is 
also an enabling factor for possible developments of the 
once-only principle.39 
The interviewees confirmed 
that the architecture's goal is to 
facilitate - through APIs - the 
interoperability among public 
agencies and the co-production 
of service with third parties.  
 
Thanks to the DAF, public 
agencies can also govern data 
and decide who and under 
what conditions can access its 
data. 
 
This architecture enables public 
agencies to pursue their 
interests but also to avoid 
threatening  other public 
interests. 
The GaaP architecture 
enables co-production on a 
large scale and at the same 
time also offers public 
agencies the means to 
govern their data and 
create public value. 
Public agencies need to configure the 
production or co-production of 
services, after taking into account 
different public interest to avoid 
creating negative value for the public. 
The theoretical claim is presented in 
Paper 2. 
 
The process of production 
configuration to meet all the different 
public interests is considered in paper 
3 as ex-ante public value orchestration. 
GaaP organisational 
dimension 
The "operating system" of the country: a series of 
fundamental blocks upon which Services for citizens, 
An interviewee confirmed the  
GaaP modular structure based 
The GaaP allows public 
agencies to assemble 
 GaaP organisation allows public 







the Public Administration, and enterprises are built with 
modern digital products.40 
on multiple platforms helps 
public agencies and companies 
configure their digital services.  
For example, a bank can adopt 
CIE or SPID platform instead of  
other identity systems to 
identify its clients. 
different public and private 
platforms to configure 
their services. 
and disassemble their service 
configurations as Lego bricks to better 
meet citizens' needs. The theoretical 
claim is presented in paper 3. 
Ecosystem structure and 
management 
Each ecosystem identifies a thematic sector with 
characteristics of homogeneity. It includes public bodies 
and may also include private individuals, such as 
associations, that, for various reasons, carry out 
important functions within the ecosystem. For example, 
the public finance ecosystem includes public entities, such 
as the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, the Ministry 
of the Interior, the Revenue Agency, the Regions, the 
Guardia di Finanza (Fiscal Police), as well as private 
entities such as accountant, CAF (fiscal assistance 
centres), and fiscal practitioners.41 
The interviewee confirmed the 
existence of multiple 
ecosystems. Each ecosystem 
represents specific policy 
domains that public agencies 
govern according to their 
competencies. 
 
However, from the mobility and 
healthcare cases' discussion, it 
has emerged that the control of 
the ecosystems is challenging 
because it is difficult to predict 
how third parties co-produce 
services. When the production 
configuration involves multiple 
ecosystems governed by 
different public agencies, the 




Public agencies need to 
continually reconfigure the 
production of public 
service to meet emerging 
needs or to avoid the 
creation of negative value. 
 
The public value 
orchestration becomes 
more complicated when 
the production 
configuration involves 
multiple platforms and 
ecosystems owned and 
governed by other public 
agencies. 
This finding supports two theoretical 
claims of paper 3: 
 
 1)The process of public value 
orchestration  is necessary also ex-post  
public services production and the co-
production configuration to avoid the 




2)GaaP as a platform of platforms 
exercises more control than an 
infrastructure, but less than a platform 











CHAPTER 2 The creation of value in public management literature 
 
Public administration is a large administrative apparatus composed of several public agencies which 
are in charge of pursuing various political goals and creating value for society. In public management 
literature, perceptions of what is valuable for society and of what is the best model of organisation 
for public administration to enable the production of public services have evolved over time (Bryson, 
Crosby and Bloomberg, 2014). Traditional public administration had focused on serving values 
typical of democratic regimes and had adopted bureaucratic model of organisation. The New Public 
Management (NPM) tradition has focused on economic efficiency to create value for society and 
has embraced a typical market-oriented and corporate model (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Hood, 
1995). The joined-up-government (JUG) approach has also focused on efficiency, but it has 
promoted a more collaborative model of public administration to avoid duplications and to deliver 
more value to citizens (Kavanagh and Richards, 2001; Pollitt, 2003; Hodges, 2012). The New Public 
Governance (NPG) management approach has similarly focused on efficiency and has suggested a 
more open model of public administration to enable a networked production of public services, 
which combines synergies between public and private actors to co-produce public services and to 
create more value for citizens at lower costs (Eriksson, 2012; Wiesel and Modell, 2014). The most 
recent public value tradition has instead focused on fulfilling values that society collectively 
perceives as belonging to the public sphere (Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg, 2014). The public value 
perspective has similarly supported a more networked and open model of organisation for public 
administration.  This chapter seeks to provide relevant background for the whole thesis by reviewing 
characteristics of all five public management approaches and by discussing how their models of 
organisation for public administration impact the creation of what they think is valuable for citizens. 
2.1.Bureaucracy and the traditional model of public administration 
2.1.1 Traditional public administration and the creation of value for the public 
Traditional public administration is often identified according to the bureaucratic paradigm. 
Separation between political and administrative power is at the core of this perspective (Barzelay, 
1992). The traditional form of public administration is characterised by a strong emphasis on 
controlling and dictating procedures and regulations to address social and economic activities 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). This focus is linked to the perception that citizens are passive 
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consumers of services and that only public agencies can create value for society by executing 
political goals according to the principles of impartiality and homogeneity (Lynn, 2001).  
The key organisational features of bureaucratic organisation aim to pursue principles of impartiality 
and homogeneity of administrative action (Weber, 1968; Kallinikos, 2006b). In the first place, 
bureaucracies are based on a formal and explicit hierarchical structure of authority. Secondly, 
bureaucracies organise the production of public services according to a rationalised division of 
labour. Thirdly, a set of stable and impersonal rules and detailed procedures governs bureaucracies 
and ensures a neutral and objective decision making. This system of rules guarantees that public 
officials enforce procedures ‘sine ira et studio’, that is, without passion or prejudice (Newman, 2005; 
Olsen, 2006). This is necessary to ensure that every citizen is treated impartially, equally, and fairly 
while interacting with public administration. Moreover, to enhance  administrative action functions’ 
impersonality, administrative roles are separated by the person that occupies them (du Gay, 2005). 
Complete ownership of the means of production helps public agencies to reinforce separation 
between private and administrative spheres and to make public agencies more independent from 
individual discretion (Persson and Goldkuhl, 2010).  
The impartiality and homogeneity of administrative action also require centralised communication 
and a control system that ensure consistent application and enforcement of political decisions. 
Centralisation of decision making is critical to reduce discretional power of ‘street-level public 
officials’ that might lead to inconsistent applications of rules and might generate inequalities (Lipsky, 
1971; Kelly, 1994; Bovens and Zouridis, 2002).  
Characteristics of bureaucratic organisation that make the action of public agencies homogenous 
and impartial are also critical to serve values typical of democratic regimes, such as efficiency, 
impartiality, homogeneity, fairness, equality, legality, transparency, accountability and objectivity 
(Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014). In fact, for many western countries, bureaucracy has 
represented the most suitable configuration to create value for society by serving democratic values 
within the boundaries of a determined territory (Olsen, 2006; Guillamón, Bastida and Benito, 2011). 
 Institutionalised rules and regulations that make procedures impartial and homogeneous are also 
critical to maximising efficiency of bureaucratic organisations because they prompt employees to 
perform their duties according to a standardised and optimal technical process (Beetham, 1987; 
Kiser and Schneider, 1994; Adler and Borys, 1996; Gajduschek, 2003; Kallinikos, 2004b; Antonio, 
2006; Cordella, 2007; Cordella and Tempini, 2011).  
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Bureaucratic organisational configuration also has an impact on fairness, that is, non-discriminatory 
enforcement of rules. Bureaucracy ensures fair decisions, due to its system of rules which 
guarantees that public officials process administrative cases according to impersonal rules rather 
than their own preferences (Newman, 2005; Olsen, 2006).  
The complete impersonality of decision making also helps to create more objective administrative 
actions that are not influenced by personal factors. Public officials’ impersonality is at the core of 
the ethics of public services and it guarantees an objective and equal treatment of all citizens 
(Seidman, 1987), which is, for example, fundamental in judicial services (Newman, 2005; 
Wettergren and Bergman Blix, 2016). In fact, politicians can defend interests of certain parties, but 
bureaucrats can only execute political orders even if they do not correspond to their personal 
convictions (du Gay, 2005). 
Minimising public officials’ discretion also helps to generate equality in the relationship between 
citizens and public administration. In fact, the presence of a system of rules, together with the 
certainty that decision-making processes are executed impersonally, lead to more predictable  
outcomes (Gajduschek, 2003) that guarantee a fair and equal treatment of all citizens who are 
encompassed by certain typical administrative cases (Lipsky, 1971; Kelly, 1994; du Gay, 2005; Persson 
and Goldkuhl, 2010). This is especially important for public officers such as policemen, welfare 
workers or doctors, who are often in direct contact with citizens and who might be tempted to treat 
individual citizens differently due to their personal convictions.  
The system of rules that addresses and constrains the power of public officers is also fundamental 
to pursuing legality, which refers to the importance of behaving according to abstract and 
impersonal rules applicable to everybody.  By clearly indicating which actions are legal and which 
are not, regulations delimitate the sphere of competence of each public officer (Rothstein, 2003). 
Moreover, a career system based on meritocracy or seniority, rather than on discretionary 
decisions, reinforces legality because it limits forms of corruption such as nepotism (Dahlström, 
Lapuente and Teorell, 2012). Officials are not elected, but instead appointed due to their merit and 
their technical qualifications (Kiser and Schneider, 1994). Due to this system, the position of public 
officials is legitimised because it is regulated by abstract regulations rather than by individual 
discretion (Cassel, 2000; du Gay, 2005).  
The same rules and procedures which help to improve legality also enhance transparency of 
administrative decisions. All decisions, procedures, and rules are based on written documents which 
are stored in archives. Written documents help to improve both transparency and accountability 
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because it is possible to assess ex-post the formal responsibility of public officials as well as the 
reasons behind certain administrative decisions (Drewry, Greve and Tanquerel, 2005; Persson and 
Goldkuhl, 2010). Transparency of administrative decisions is critical to legitimise public 
administration actions and to legitimise the elected government (Guillamón, Bastida and Benito, 
2011). 
More transparent decision making also helps to improve accountability of administrative actions. 
Accountability refers to the possibility of understanding who is the public officer responsible for an 
administrative action because there are precise hierarchical structures (Rothstein, 2003) and rules 
that define the sphere of personnel competence (Mulgan, 1997). Moreover, each role has specific 
duties and obligations that make public officials accountable for their actions, and also enable and 
constrain their actions (Kelly, 1994). 
2.1.2 Bureaucratic rationale of value creation 
Although the relationship between public administration and bureaucracy seems symbiotic, 
bureaucratic model of organisation is also used to support non-democratic regimes and to pursue 
unethical goals. The reason for this ambivalence of bureaucratic configuration can be explained by 
looking at rationality that drives administrative actions. 
 According to Weber, social action is rational if it is driven by goals or by values and if the means 
used to reach these goals are suitable (Parsons 1947, p.16; Weber 1968).  Value-driven rationale 
describes people’s actions as meant to satisfy what is valuable according to their personal 
convictions. On the contrary, instrumental rationale describes actions that are driven by specific 
goals, and involves the selection of the most effective means to reach objectives. 
Instrumental rationale drives administrative actions of bureaucratic organisations. This rationale 
has influenced the design of the system of rules and procedures which guarantees impersonal and 
standardised administrative actions. It regulates public administration offices, mediates the 
relationship between citizens and public administration, and thus regulates how civil servants 
provide services.  As a result of its pervasiveness in bureaucratic organisation, all administrative 
procedures are rationally designed to influence and address actions of the numerous public servants 
providing services to citizens (Merton, 1957; Antonio, 2006). 
Weber (1968) postulates that instrumental rationale is the result of a cultural phenomenon typical 
of western society. The mathematisation of science, chemistry, historiography and the development 
of the doctrine of the state based on abstract concepts, as well as the rationalisation of art and 
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architecture are all examples of how rationalisation was deeply embedded within western society 
when bureaucracy was conceptualised. 
This type of rationalisation affected both the private and public sectors, as evident, for example, if 
we compare Ford’s assembly lines and the bureaucratic model of public administration (Osborne, 
Radnor and Nasi, 2013). In fact, traces of the instrumental rationale described by Weber can be 
found in Taylor’s scientific management that inspired industrial assembly line as well as the 
production configuration of many public administrations (Maier, 1970). Similar to the bureaucratic 
model of organisational, Taylor’s scientific management suggested standardisation of work, division 
of labour, specialisation of personnel, promotion of impersonality, and subordination of strict rules 
to increase efficiency of the final output. 
The overlap between the rationale of large manufacturing corporations like Ford and the rationale 
of large public administration apparatus clearly emerged between 1920 and the early 1970s, when 
public administrations, especially in the US, became responsible for leading the war industry and 
rebuilding post-war economies (for example, through the administration of the New Deal) (Bryson, 
Crosby and Bloomberg, 2014). During this period, the role of public administration in the economy 
was omnipresent. Public agencies were put in charge of planning, organising, staffing, directing and 
coordinating ‘mass production’ of welfare services and of rebuilding infrastructures such as dams, 
highways or power grids. The rationale of bureaucratic configuration was then extended to entire 
public administration to respond to new organisational challenges.  
According to Weber (1968), the universal expansion of bureaucracy is related to its technical 
superiority over other forms of organisation.  Bureaucracy has become widely diffused also due to 
its cultural power based on rational deliberation and calculation, which address social action and 
provide legitimacy and objectivity to the results. Finally, bureaucratic organisations are the most 
suitable configurations that guarantee ability to control and to correct the enforcement of political 
decisions.  
2.1.3 The limitations of bureaucracy 
As predicted by Weber, bureaucracy is highly diffused, especially in the public sector. However, the 
same rational system that guarantees impartiality has also generated several dysfunctionalities that 
have contributed to the creation of negative sentiment about bureaucracy (Kallinikos, 2004b; du 
Gay, 2005; Persson and Goldkuhl, 2010).  
Bureaucratic configuration can be described as a Janus-faced organisation. On the one hand, it has 
been able to rationalise public service and to deliver efficiency, fairness, equality and other positive 
87 
 
values (Adler and Borys, 1996). On the other hand, it is irrational and it creates conditions enabling 
corruption, injustice and other types of negative outcomes (Clegg et al., 2016).  
In fact, as argued by Weber (1968), the same systems of rules that can contribute to controlling and 
coordinating a public agency can also become an ‘iron cage’ that constrains the freedom of public 
employees and makes public agencies unable to serve society effectively. The same rules that 
guarantee fairness and objectivity alienate bureaucrats who tend to act only according to the rules 
and to their sphere of authority (DeHart-Davis and Pandey, 2005). Rules and procedures might, in 
fact, become so oppressive that individuals forget to pursue organisational goals and only 
concentrate on executing procedures and protocols (Bonjean and Grimes, 1970; Adler and Borys, 
1996; Gregory, 1998). This habit may cause ‘systemic failure’ that induces public agencies to fail to 
meet their purpose even if all the right procedures have been followed correctly (Gregory, 1998). 
Acting according to a system of rules and procedures may, in fact, have a negative impact on 
communication, information sharing and teamwork, and may cause dysfunctional group dynamics 
or inconsistent and contradictory decisions (Hood, Lodge and Clifford, 2002). 
Moreover, often, the abundance of rules, procedures and competencies typical of ‘red tape 
bureaucracy’ is redundant and might generate not only alienation but also delays and more 
complexities (Bozeman, 1993). Increased complexity of procedure might become an obstacle to 
transparency, and might paradoxically increase the discretional power of public officers that opens 
new opportunities for corruption (Hope, 1985). In fact, public officers often request bribes (speed 
money) to speed up administrative procedures or to reduce the rigidity of applicable rules (Guriev, 
2004; Fredriksson, 2014). 
Furthermore, the culture of rules promoted by bureaucratic organisations tends to reduce 
organisational change and might also generate a chronical inability to respond to citizens’ new 
needs (Burns & Stalker 1961). According to Crozier (1964), public agencies are incredibly inefficient 
because ‘a bureaucratic organisation is an organisation that cannot correct its behaviour by learning 
from its errors’ (p 187). Merton (1957) similarly agrees on how the structure of rules typical of 
bureaucratic organisation might cause an inability to adapt and evolve. Rules and procedures are 
designed and applied to work under specific circumstances, but when these circumstances change, 
bureaucratic procedures become obsolete and may create negative effects. Merton (1957) clarifies 
his critique of bureaucratic organisation with an example of a farm where there are chickens trained 
to interpret the sound of a bell as a signal for food. Every day, when chickens hear the sound of the 
bell, they assemble to eat. However, one day the same sound is used to assemble the chicken to kill 
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them. The incapability of bureaucratic organisations to adapt and improve their configuration 
illustrated by the above example has been confirmed by later  studies in the public management 
(e.g. Hoggett, 1991; Lynn Jr., 2003; Simonet, 2015) and e-government field (e.g. Cordella and 
Tempini, 2011; Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013) which similarly consider these dysfunctionalities to 
be the major cause of inefficiencies embedded within/caused by the traditional model of public 
administration. 
As also described in Kafka’s novels, such as The Castle or The Trial, these dysfunctionalities have 
always affected bureaucratic organisation (Clegg et al., 2016), but they have become unsustainable 
only when public administration apparatus expanded under the pressure of welfare services that 
have increased the scope of public administration in multiple domains.  The negative impact of 
bureaucratic organisations caused democratic disaffection (Bonina and Cordella, 2009; Margetts 
and Dunleavy, 2013) and a substantial rise in public expenditure (Dunleavy, 2005). The chronic 
inability of bureaucratic configuration to adapt to new needs, the rise of neoliberalism, and the 
diffusion of an economic-oriented conceptualisation of value had led to a drastic reform of the 
traditional model of public administration. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, a wave of neoliberalist policies spearheaded in the UK by Margaret 
Thatcher and in the US by Ronald Reagan reformed the bureaucratic model of public administration 
according to the New Public Management (NPM) approach, which promoted a more central role of 
the market in the production of public services. The primary result of these reforms was the removal 
of bureaucratic ethos and its replacement by economic ethos that elevates the importance of 
management and internal procedures above all other aspects of society (Clegg, Johnston and 
Shearer, 2016; Bishop and Connors, 2018). The next section critically reviews literature on the 
alternative management approach and organisational configuration proposed by these reforms and 
explores/critiques the rationale behind them. 
2.2.New Public Management and the corporate model of public administration 
2.2.1 The NPM and efficiency as a value  
The advent of the New Public Management was a reaction to the perceived weaknesses of 
traditional public administration based on the bureaucratic model (Stoker, 2006; O’Flynn, 2007). 
The dysfunctionalities of bureaucracy were associated with the state’s incapability to address  
economic stagnation and growing public debt. For decades, welfare policies rooted in Keynes’ 
economic theories promoted a dominant and pervasive role of the state in each sphere of the 
economy, based on massive public investments for the creation of public and private services. The 
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economic crisis of the 70s made urgent the need for an alternative model of the economy as well 
as of public administration. The USA and the UK responded to the economic crisis with strong 
neoliberal reforms based on Hayek’s theorisation of the economy, which promoted a minimal 
presence of the state to leave more space to the market in the provision of public services.  At the 
core of this paradigmatic change lies the conviction that the only way public administration can 
create value for citizens is by opening the provision of public services to the market and by 
decreasing their costs.  
Under growing pressure to cut taxes by reducing public expenditure, the pursuit of efficiency 
became the paramount objective of public administration reforms to create value for citizens. In 
line with neoliberal policies, the NPM approach sought to correct bureaucratic dysfunctionalities 
through the promotion of a new model of public administration based on privatisation, outsourcing 
and the adoption of corporate management approaches (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Hood, 1995). 
As a result, the NPM dismantled the monolithic, vast, hierarchical structure of bureaucratic public 
administration and promoted the disaggregation of public administration into leaner and more 
autonomous units organised as companies with precise goals and often in competition with each 
other (Stoker, 2006). The NPM introduced the typical corporate model of organisation to public 
administration in order to increase managerial quality and efficiency of production processes. Public 
agencies adopted corporate practices such as centralised planning of budget and goals, 
performance monitoring and central auditing. Contracts substituted bureaucratic regulations and 
protocols, and became a tool to govern the relationship among public agencies and between public 
agencies and private companies (Walsh, 1995; Hughes, 2003). In this new organisational model that 
tends to equalise public and private management, public managers adopted a more entrepreneurial 
approach focused on results rather than on procedures (O’Flynn, 2007). Citizens remained passive 
consumers of services, but according to the NPM, they should be treated as clients with individual 
needs that must be satisfied to create value in their personal sphere.  
A close analysis of NPM’s characteristics can clarify how these reforms have changed public 
administration to improve the efficiency of public service production and thus to create value for 
citizens. Although NPM reforms started in the 70s, it was not until the 90s that Hood (1991) 
attempted to summarise NPM characteristics and to explain how public agencies deliver more value 
to citizens by increasing efficiency of public services. The first NPM characteristic is the substitution 
of bureaucratic control with professional management. Professional management means that the 
decision making of top public managers is not constrained by ‘the iron cage’. Hence, they can 
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discretionally find the most efficient production configuration to reach their organisational targets 
and to deliver more value to citizens. More freedom to manage is also favoured by the 
establishment of informal relationships which facilitate communication and coordination, especially 
within the same public agency. The second characteristic is relying on explicit standards and 
measures of performance, which consists of clearly defined goals, targets and standards, and 
success indicators that public agencies need to follow to ensure an efficient provision of public 
services. Definition of goals and indicators, expressed in quantitative terms, is important to address 
scope of administrative action, monitor cost per output, and make public agencies more 
accountable for reaching results and following procedures.  The third characteristic is the emphasis 
on output controls over procedures. Public agencies should pay attention to  results and to their 
ability to deliver value to society. They need to continuously measure internal and external 
performances to ensure that public agencies, as well as contractors, meet the standards defined in 
contracts and do not waste public financing (Kaboolian, 1998). The measurement of outputs is often 
related to customer satisfaction and to providing the most efficient solution to satisfy their personal 
needs (Barzelay and Kaboolian, 1990; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). To guarantee a more efficient 
ability to respond to citizens’ needs, the NPM has favoured the disaggregation of public 
administration into units, which promotes more decentralised and flexible management. More 
decentralised production of services reduces the complexity of production, simplifies control of 
performances, and streamlines/clarifies each public agency’s contribution. The disaggregation of 
public administration also reinforces the division between policymaking and service delivery 
(Thompson and Miller, 2004). This system of division generates greater efficiency because it favours 
greater competition in the public sector (Rimmer, 1994; Walsh and O’Flynn, 2000). More 
competition leads to less expensive public services and thus more value for citizens. In fact, market 
dynamics incentivise service providers to find the most efficient production solution and propose it 
to policymakers (Savas, 1982). In a market-oriented and decentralised provision of public services, 
contracts become an important way to guarantee efficient provision of public services and to 
facilitate better monitoring of public expenditure. Public agencies use contracts as a tool to address 
entire markets, set performance standards, and choose actors that should deliver public services on 
behalf of the state (Kelly, 1998). Another characteristic of the NPM is the import of private sector 
styles of management practice into the administration of public agencies. Public agencies adopted 
corporate management practices such as Total Quality Management (TQM) and Business Process 
Reengineering (BPR) to redesign the production process and improve the efficiency of the 
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production of public services. The adoption of these management methodologies has greatly helped 
public agencies to reduce public expenditure without affecting the effectiveness of public services 
(O’Flynn, 2007; Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013; Osborne, 2018). Another common characteristic 
of NPM reforms is increased discipline and parsimony in resource use. In line with the need to 
reduce public expenditure, public agencies were invited to ‘do more with less’ by using fewer 
resources while leaving the offer of public services unchanged. Therefore, many public agencies 
promoted cost-cutting projects that have favoured re-utilisation of existing resources, which has 
reduced public expenditure without affecting public service provision. All these organisational 
characteristics have helped public agencies to configure a more efficient production of public service 
and thereby to provide more value for citizens at lesser costs (Osborne, 2018). 
2.2.2 The NPM rationale of value creation 
The imperative of reducing public expenditure and increasing efficiency to deliver more value to 
society has been supported by diffusion of the economic rationale as an alternative to the 
instrumental rationale typical of bureaucracy. According to the economic rationale theorised by 
Adam Smith and embedded in NPM reforms, citizens, as well as public managers, are homo 
economicus. Therefore, their actions are driven by the pursuit of their personal interests and not 
the goals set by the organisation. If citizens are homo economicus, value is created only when they 
are able to pursue their interests and to maximise their personal gain. The consumption of public 
service is the result of an economic transaction that happens between a public agency and a citizen. 
Citizens pay taxes to receive public services that satisfy their needs. However, if the taxes to access 
to a public service are higher than the gain of using a service, then value created for citizens is low. 
Therefore, public agencies can create value for the public by maximising the output of public service 
production without increasing public expenditure and hence taxation of citizens. 
The economic rationale embedded in the NPM similarly drives the logic behind private sector 
production, which also seeks efficiency to create more economic value for clients. The major 
industrial example is Ford’s production chains, inspired by Taylor’s scientific management (Osborne, 
Radnor and Nasi, 2013). Ford planned the production of its Model T to maximise available resources 
and deliver more value to clients at lower cost. Ford’s success facilitated the diffusion of this type 
of rationale to other industries. Following the same rationale, Toyota developed the Lean 
production approach,  aimed at increasing efficiency by reducing waste of the production process. 
Due to the economic rationale, the manufacturing principles and strategies developed by Ford and 
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then by Toyota became fundamental in the private sector and then also in public administration to 
improve the efficiency of public services. In fact, the economic rationale embedded in the NPM 
eliminated organisational differences between public agencies and companies. Hence, universities, 
hospitals and police stations became companies, driven by the same economic rationale as Ford or 
Toyota. 
Because public agencies are like companies, there is no distinction between private and public 
managers. Thus, public managers do not only pursue the public good, but as homo economicus, 
they are also driven by the economic rationale. Public managers, in fact, manage the production of 
public services to serve their personal interest and to maximise their gain. Therefore, the 
dysfunctionalities of bureaucracy can be explained and then corrected by the NPM using the theory 
of public choice, principal-agent, and transaction costs theories (Self, 1993).  
Public choice considers politicians and public managers to be rational actors driven by personal 
interests (Hood, 1991; Gruening, 2001). Politicians are elected to represent citizens’ personal 
interests and to compete to protect their position of power. Instead, public managers are driven by 
personal interests and act to maximise their prestige, power, fiscal benefits, and personal wealth. 
The principal-agent theory complements the public choice theory. Furthermore, it explains how 
public managers and politicians can potentially act against the interests of citizens. Public managers 
as agents are able to make decisions on behalf of a citizen, who acts as the principal (Gruening, 
2001). The problem is that the interests of the principal and of the agent might diverge. This type of 
relationship can create moral hazard that occurs when public managers act to pursue their own 
interests, and these interests are contrary to those of citizens. Moral hazard is possible because 
there is asymmetry of information between public managers and citizens. An increase in asymmetry 
of information also has an impact on transaction costs (Hood, 1991; Gruening, 2001). In fact, the 
adoption of the economic rationale tends to consider the consumption of public services as an 
economic transaction between a public agency and the citizens who consume the service passively 
(Cordella, 2007). Coase’s (1937) firm hypothesis postulates that the higher the asymmetry of 
information between sellers and buyers, the higher the transaction cost for the buyer. In the case 
of bureaucracy, the asymmetry of information between citizens and public agencies increases 
searching costs because citizens do not know where they can find the most suitable public service 
to satisfy their needs (Bozeman, 1993). Contracting costs are high because regulation and 
administrative complexities make access to public services complicated (Hope, 1985). Enforcement 
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costs are also high because bureaucracy tends to be slow in public service delivery and can result in 
discrimination, delays and even theft (Guriev, 2004; Fredriksson, 2014). These three theories 
complement each other and explain why the dysfunctionalities of bureaucracy make the traditional 
model of public administration inefficient. However, these theories also help explain how NPM 
characteristics make public agencies more efficient. First of all, public agencies pass from being 
single producers of public services to being supervisors of public services provision. As a result of 
this changed role, public agencies mainly monitor the actions of public managers and contractors in 
order to ensure that those who provide public services on behalf of the government meet certain 
goals and quality standards. The asymmetry of information and the opportunistic behaviour of 
public managers can be limited through contracts described by the principal-agent and public choice 
theories (Althaus, 1997; Kelly, 1998; Alford and O’Flynn, 2009). Contracts set incentives which align 
the personal interests of public managers with the interests of citizens. 
Lower information asymmetry due to contracts, combined with a bigger market for public service 
provision, can also reduce transaction costs. Search costs decrease because market competition 
increases offers of service, and thus it becomes easier to find the most suitable service for citizens. 
Contracting and enforcement costs decrease due to constant surveillance of service providers’ 
performance, which ensures that certain quality standards are reached by everybody (Savas, 1982). 
Because of the reduction of asymmetry of information between public agencies and citizens, and 
the reduction of the opportunistic behaviour of public managers, citizens can better maximise their 
gain without the risk of being exploited or being charged excessively for public service. 
2.2.3 The limitations of the NPM 
The NPM characteristics have helped public agencies to increase the efficiency of the production of 
public services, and have helped national governments to reduce public expenditure (Osborne, 
Radnor and Strokosch, 2016). The shift from input to output controls, together with the constant 
need to measure cost efficiency of public services, have helped public agencies to be more conscious 
about the impact of their choices on production costs (Freiberg, 2005). However, the NPM and the 
widespread drive to pursue efficiency have also had a negative impact on society, and have also 
paradoxically created inefficiencies (Diefenbach, 2009). 
First, the NPM has caused lack of coordination among public agencies because it has disaggregated 
public administration in an archipelago of public agencies in competition with each other. This lack 
of coordination creates duplications, overlaps and redundancy of services (Schuettinger, 1973). 
Although redundancy is desirable to create failsafe systems and increase the reliability of public 
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services (Perrow, 1984; Laporte and Consolini, 1991), it is also true that redundant systems are 
economically inefficient. 
The fragmentation of public administration and the opening of the market have increased the 
number of service providers, but have also reduced accountability - especially for complex public 
services such as healthcare or transportation, where multiple actors are involved in the provision of 
services (Diefenbach, 2009).  Public agencies became organised as units and accountable only for 
their tasks and not for the overall services. This accentuated siloization and pillarization of public 
administration, by creating single-purpose public agencies, specialised in specific services and 
unable to collaborate (Boston and Eichbaum, 2014). 
The decentralisation and fragmentation of public administration through privatisation, outsourcing, 
and semi-privatisation created a dispersed state (Newman and Clarke, 1997). The establishment of 
a dispersed and minimal state decreases direct control of the production of public service (Hoggett, 
1996) and increases opportunities for local manipulation (Hood, 1982; Poggi, 1990). Therefore, 
public agencies also need to review performances, control quality standards, plan inspections and 
conduct audits, in order to retain some control of the decentralised provision of public services 
(Clarke and Clegg, 1999). These new duties and tasks represent an increase in the workload of public 
agencies that harms the efficiency of public service production (Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd and Walker, 
2005). 
Moreover, the market is not always the ideal solution because of the presence of market failures. 
In certain fields, there are only one or a few companies able to compete for the provision of public 
services. Hence, often the monopoly of the state in the production of public services is transferred 
to the monopoly or oligopoly of some private companies (Cordella and Willcocks, 2012). This means 
that the state loses control and the capability to produce certain services without increasing 
efficiency. In addition, the focus on decentralisation, privatisation and outsourcing of the production 
of public service to reduce costs in the short term has exacerbated bureaucratic organisations’ 
typical incapability to innovate. Outsourcing production also means losing operational capabilities; 
hence, it negatively affects the capability of public agencies  to innovate and adapt the production 
of public services according to citizens’ needs (Considine and Painter, 1997; Cordella and Willcocks, 
2010, 2012) 
Another fundamental problem is that public managers act as private managers and pursue only 
siloed performance goals, without caring about citizens’ multiple needs and expectations. Public 
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managers are in fact only accountable for the performances and standards agreed to pursuant to 
the contract.  However, contracts are not always able to address the behaviour of public managers 
and to reduce their opportunistic behaviour. There is empirical evidence that suggests how strategic 
changes necessary to reach these agreed performances are often used by public managers to 
advance the career prospects and salaries of public managers (Diefenbach, 2005a). Moreover, 
performances are measured according to quantitative and technical parameters concentrated on 
only a few areas, and they do not include any intangible and qualitative values (Pollitt, 2000). This 
partial view of the impact of public services can lead to a misalignment between public agencies and 
citizens. Public agencies might assume and demonstrate through their parameters that they are 
performing well even if citizens are dissatisfied with the service. 
Furthermore, because service provision is fragmented and public agencies have a siloed perspective, 
they tend to measure only the efficiency of the service they produce. However, the efficiency of a 
single public service might correspond to major costs for services offered by other public agencies 
(Haque, 2007). For example, declining social expenditure in developing countries has caused 
increases in poverty  and corruption (Batley and Larbi, 2004). Therefore, a reduction in education 
expenditure might increase the cost for policing services and lessen efficiency. 
Performance measurement promoted by the NPM invites public agency to focus on short term 
efficiency without considering the costs incurred in the long terms. If, for example, healthcare 
agencies reduce public expenditure for public health prevention programs, they can increase their 
efficiency in the short term. However, in the long term, they might have more patients and hence 
higher costs for medical treatments in the future (O’Riordan and Fitzpatrick, 2015). 
Therefore, the NPM emphasis on the short term and siloed mentality have created inefficiencies 
across the entire public administration. In order to mitigate the dysfunctionalities of the NPM and 
to create more value for citizens, some countries have promoted joined-up-government (JUG) 
reforms which aim to increase the coordination among public agencies. Increased collaboration 
should help public agencies to better coordinate the production of services and to avoid duplications 
and wasting of resources. 
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2.3.The Joined-Up Government and the collaborative model of public administration 
2.3.1 The JUG and value creation 
As a response to the perceived dysfunctionalities of the NPM, governments reformed public 
administration’s organisation according to the JUG. The JUG approach does not question the 
economic rationale of the NPM, but it emphasises a more collaborative model of public 
administration, pursuant to which public agencies can reduce public expenditure and deliver more 
value to citizens. The JUG approach aims to increase horizontal and vertical coordination across the 
entire public administration to improve the overall system efficiency. Cooperation among public 
agencies is led according to top-down or bottom-up initiatives (Martinson, 1999; Ryan et al., 2008). 
Top-down integration initiatives usually come from the political level, and they impose greater 
coordination among public agencies to reduce the costs of public service provision (Carey, 
Crammond and Riley, 2014). Bottom-up integration initiatives come from public agencies which 
notice potential synergies within the public administration that can help them to better achieve 
their efficiency targets. Integration initiatives can happen at the macro, meso or micro level. Macro-
level integration involves coordination at the ministry level to develop shared strategies and 
policies. The meso level involves the collaboration among public agencies in the same region or city 
which decide to offer some services such as garbage collection or healthcare provision together to 
reduce their expenditures. Micro-level integration is  the result of the coordination of different units 
of the same public agency that, for example, decide to share some administrative services to reduce 
costs (Kodner and Spreeuwenberg, 2002; Keast, 2011). 
The JUG, similarly to the NPM, seeks to create value for citizens by improving the efficiency of public 
service provision. According to Pollitt (2003), the JUG has four main goals to increase efficiency. The 
first goal is to eliminate contradictions between public service deliveries. The single view 
perspective promoted by the NPM incentivises public agencies to only evaluate the impact of their 
public service production on their policy domain, and they do not consider the possible negative 
effects on other public agency domains. For example, reducing the education budget for summer 
school programs might increase criminality among young people and hence increase police costs. 
The second goal is to optimise the use of resources across public administration to avoid 
duplications or overlaps of services. For example, school buildings can be used during the weekends 
to host community activities or social services activities, and thus help public agencies that offer 
these services to reduce public expenditure. The third goal is to improve cooperation between 
public agencies and to develop standard solutions to problems that cut across different policy 
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domains. Pollution is a typical cross-cutting problem that requires a collective solution among all 
the main stakeholders such as public transportation agencies, schools, hospitals and local 
authorities. The fourth goal is to consider citizens’ perspective and produce a more integrated set 
of services. For example, the realisation of a single portal to pay all tax obligations would simplify 
citizens’ experience and reduce the cost of maintenance and management of multiple websites and 
applications to pay taxes. 
The JUG goals aimed at creating a modern public administration also became objects of political 
attraction of the UK’s New Labour Administration (Kavanagh and Richards, 2001; Pollitt, 2003; 
Hodges, 2012). The New Labour encouraged reforms based on the JUG approach to support more 
integrated policies and programs at the local and national levels, and to enhance coordination 
within public administration after years of NPM reforms (Ling, 2002). The JUG reforms were 
especially needed in the UK, New Zealand, and Australia, because of their earlier enthusiastic and 
widespread adoption of the NPM (Pollitt, 2003; Halligan, 2007; Ryan et al., 2008; Keast, 2011). 
However, many western countries also promoted the JUG reforms at different levels of government 
to increase coordination within their public administration and to better improve efficiency (Peters, 
1998; Christensen and Lægreid, 2006). Examples of JUG reforms can be found also at an 
international scale to stimulate cooperation among different national public administrations. For 
example, the European structural funds which provide economic incentives to realise cross-sector 
and cross-country partnerships exemplify JUG reforms on the international scale (Nelson and Zadek, 
2000). 
Although examples of JUG reforms can be found in different types of policies, they all share similar 
characteristics which promote a more unified and cooperative public administration model to 
increase the overall efficiency of public service provision. The first organisational characteristic of 
public agencies involved in JUG initiatives is the selection of shared goals. Common goals aim to 
promote cross-agency projects, reduce the overlap of similar services, share resources, and realise 
economies of scale (Rhodes, 1997; Pollitt, 2003). The selection of shared goals and the creation of 
a common vision can help public agencies to find synergies to avoid overlaps and waste, and to 
deliver more value to citizens at lower costs. The second characteristic is the creation of shared 
accountability over the outcomes of JUG initiatives (Barling, Lang and Caraher, 2002; Considine, 
2002). Once public agencies agree on reaching shared goals, it is essential for them to also decide 
on different responsibilities related to the production of  services and the measurements of their 
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performance and costs. Clear accountabilities are important to ensure efficient utilisation of 
resources. The third characteristic is the existence of solid alliances among public agencies. To be 
durable, partnerships among public agencies require trust, and common norms and values (Davies, 
2002). Shared teams are fundamental to building solid alliances (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid, 
2014). They facilitate management of partnerships by negotiating agreements, managing shared 
budgets, reducing tensions and facilitating the exchange of information. In fact, successful JUG 
initiatives need effective organisational management to reduce production costs and to deliver 
more value to citizens (Ling, 2002). However, shared teams are not enough to guarantee durable 
partnerships. JUG initiatives require public agencies to acquire specific coordination skills necessary 
to manage cross-agency projects (Carey and Crammond, 2015). Public agencies need to become 
active problem-solvers, negotiators and coordinators of projects in order to effectively manage 
relationships with other partners and to protect agency interests. Moreover, each agency has its 
own culture and hierarchy, which might conflict with the ones of the other partners. Less 
hierarchical organisations tend to favour intra-agency communication and collaboration. All these 
characteristics help to overcome NPM problems and to build effective partnerships among public 
agencies which reduce the costs of production of public services. 
Although some authors perceive the JUG as a post-NPM-initiative (Christensen, Fimreite and 
Lægreid, 2014), the same economic rationale that drives the NPM also drives the JUG (Newman, 
2001; Keast, 2011). According to the JUG perspective, lesser public expenditure for public service 
provision corresponds to greater value for citizens. Fewer taxes for citizens are necessary to sustain 
the production of public services and to create more value for them. In fact, JUG initiatives promote 
greater coordination among public agencies to reduce costs and decrease public expenditure. The 
production process is always driven by the economic rationale typical of manufacturing companies, 
but the production inputs come from different public agencies (Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013). 
The output of the production process is the result of collaboration among different public agencies 
that perform specific production tasks according to their competences. The division of labour at the 
public administration level enables public agencies to share their resources and capabilities to 
produce a single output for lesser production costs. As in the NPM, public agencies then remain 
driven by the same economic rationale as companies, which makes cross-agency collaboration not 
easy and sometimes inefficient (Keast, 2011; Carey and Crammond, 2015). JUG problems can be 
then explained according to public choice, principal-agent, and transaction costs theories. 
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2.3.2 The limitations of the JUG 
There are only a few examples of successful joined-up initiatives because a collaborative model of 
public administration based on inter-agency partnerships is difficult to achieve after years of 
reforms that have disaggregated the public administration (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid, 
2014). The main obstacle to the JUG model of public administration is related to the mismatch 
between strategies and goals of public agencies caused by the lack of supportive architecture (Keast, 
2011). Supportive architecture is usually constituted by organisational incentives which prompt 
public agencies to agree on common goals and realise joint projects (O’Flynn et al., 2011). According 
to the public choice theory, public managers that lead public agencies tend to maximise their 
personal interests and positions of power. The JUG initiatives require innovations and changes that 
‘break the rules’ and create alternative incentives, reward structures, and new responsibilities for 
the management (Parston and Timmins, 1998). Therefore, JUG initiatives fail if they threaten or do 
not meet public managers’ interests. Shared teams or task forces are often charged with 
understanding these interests and creating a common architecture of incentives, shared powers 
and goals. However, sometimes they complicate collaboration mainly because they are hybrid 
bodies with no formal authority (Keast, 2011; O’Flynn et al., 2011). Also, the selection of leaders for 
JUG initiatives is difficult because public agencies do not accept outsider leaders imposed by 
politicians or leaders with public administration background who might favour their own public 
agency interests (Lips, O’Neill and Eppel, 2011; Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid, 2014). 
The protection of public managers’ interests and of public agency interests also explains why it is 
challenging to create shared accountability across public administration. The risk for public agencies 
is to share resources without taking credit for the final output of the production process. The unclear 
accountability in cases of success or failure also has an impact on the performance measurement. 
This is usually the case of police operations where different police forces collaborate to solve 
complex criminal cases. Sometimes in such cases it is difficult to distinguish merit and 
responsibilities and to measure performances of each public agency.  
Moreover, although JUG initiatives can create value for citizens, sometimes diverse cultures and 
norms of each public agency can represent an obstacle for collaboration (Giddens, 1984; Davies, 
2002). Public agencies generally tend to develop closed organisational cultures to protect their own 
interests, which according to the principal-agent theory might not be aligned with the interests of 
citizens. Conversely, JUG initiatives mean opening the boundaries of public agencies, and reducing 
the asymmetry of information among public agencies and between public agencies and citizens. The 
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asymmetry of information that public agencies want to protect to retain their power position and 
avoid criticisms can also generate lack of trust among public agencies (Rommel and Christiaens, 
2009). Trust is fundamental for collaboration, especially when public agencies need to exchange 
sensitive information such as medical or personal data which can be misused by other public 
agencies. The lack of trust among partners represents the main weakness of the collaborative model 
of public administration because it presents an obstacle to the sharing of information and resources 
within public administration (Lips, O’Neill and Eppel, 2011). The asymmetry of information that 
causes a lack of trust can also cause production inefficiencies because it limits potential inter-agency 
synergies necessary to reduce public expenditures (Das and Teng, 2001). Furthermore, the more 
actors are involved in the JUG initiatives, the higher the asymmetry of information, which causes 
higher transaction, coordination, and decision-making costs (Exworthy and Hunter, 2011). Search 
costs are higher because it is more difficult to find more suitable partners to produce public services 
together. Contracting costs are also higher because lack of information about other partners makes 
it difficult to understand if they have the capabilities and the resources to produce the service.  
Enforcement costs are also high because lack of information about the credibility of each agency 
fails to ensure that the partners will deliver what they have promised. Higher transaction costs also 
have an impact on coordination costs because it is difficult to favour collaboration among public 
agencies that do not trust each other and that have difficulty in exchanging resources.  Difficulties 
in exchanging resources and information can also increase decision-making costs because it 
becomes more difficult to find agreements and exchange information among all the actors involved 
(Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997). More difficulties in coordinating all the partners can increase 
the costs of production, waste  resources, and thus create less value for citizens. 
Another interesting limitation is that some of the literature about the JUG initiative (Carey, 
Crammond and Riley, 2014; Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid, 2014; Carey and Crammond, 2015) 
limits collaboration in the production of public services only to public actors. Conversely, some JUG 
literature posits that cooperation and coordination go beyond public administration boundaries and 
can also be extended to non-public actors (Pollitt, 2003; Bovaird, 2005; Dunleavy, 2010). The 
involvement of voluntary associations, NGOs and companies in the co-production of services can in 
fact help to further increase the efficiency of public services (O’Flynn et al., 2011). The next section 
critically discusses how a networked production enables public agencies to co-produce public 
services with external actors, and how it can create more value for citizens. 
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2.4.The New Public Governance and the networked model of public administration 
2.4.1Networked production and co-production of public services 
In the recent two decades, the diffusion of the Internet and social networks has reduced 
coordination costs and has favoured a more diffused networked production that involves also actors 
outside the boundaries of the organisation (Benkler, 2007; Kallinikos, 2011). The diffusion of these 
new ways to produce public services challenges previous models of public administration. Public 
agencies are now able to easily collaborate not only with other public agencies, but also with 
external actors such as citizens, NGOs and companies (Linders, 2012; Fishenden and Thompson, 
2013; Zuiderwijk and Janssen, 2014; Toots et al., 2017). The adoption of a more networked 
production of public services represents a change in the traditional value creation process of the 
public sector that has been historically grounded in industrial economy assumptions typical of 
Fordism (Ramirez and Normann, 1993; Patrício et al., 2011). According to this perspective, only 
companies and their suppliers could provide inputs in the value chain, and external actors could 
only consume service and destroy value. This perspective is strongly rooted in  Adam Smith’s (Smith, 
1776) distinction between productive and unproductive work, which implies that some actors do 
not produce value and instead, only consume it. The networked production contradicts this 
economic thought and implies a more open model of production where potentially all actors can 
contribute to the creation of value (Zuboff and Maxmin, 2002; Mazzucato, 2011). Public agencies 
together with a ‘constellation of actors’  provide input to produce public services and to create value 
for the public (Ramirez and Normann, 1993). In a networked production perspective, actors that 
used to be considered peripheral or ‘invaders’ of the production process turned out to be the key 
drivers in the value creation process.  
The networked production is partially or totally situated outside the boundaries of the organisation. 
It is open, less sequential and more interactive than the typical manufacturing production (Ramirez 
and Normann, 1993). Differently from regular suppliers or partners, external actors provide inputs 
at different stages of the production process, and sometimes their contribution cannot be predicted 
or planned. Public agencies that open the production process to third parties do not have full control 
of the inputs they provide. Therefore, public agencies have a limited control over the output 
because they do not know precisely who is contributing, the moment of the contribution, and its 
amount.  
This type of unplanned and multidirectional participation in the production process is known as co-
production. The concept of co-production was originally developed by Ostrom (1972) in her study 
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of the Chicago Police, and defined as ‘the process through which inputs used to produce a good or 
service are contributed by individuals who are not in the same organisation’ (Ostrom, 1972: p.1073). 
In her study, she showed how collaboration between the police and a network of citizens helped to 
improve the safety of their neighbours without additional costs for the police. Citizens’ eyes 
provided an important input in the production of the patrolling service offered by the police, which 
resulted in monitoring criminality in the neighbourhoods without the need to involve more police 
officers (Ostrom, 1972). Co-production has been usually related to citizens’ participation in the 
production of public services (Alford, 2002; Bovaird and Loeffler, 2012; Vamstad, 2012; Verschuere, 
Brandsen and Pestoff, 2012; Parrado et al., 2013; Voorberg, Bekkers and Tummers, 2015). However, 
other external actors like NGOs or volunteering organisations that belong to the third sector can 
also co-produce public services in different contexts (Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006; Pestoff, Brandsen 
and Verschuere, 2013). 
The boundaries of the third sector (which is variously labelled as civil society, non-profit, or 
voluntary sectors) are today more liquid and can also include companies (Voorberg, Bekkers and 
Tummers, 2015; Best et al., 2018). Companies which are often considered profit-oriented 
organisations can co-produce public services and have a social impact (Alford, 2009a; Best et al., 
2018). For example, companies can help to produce environmentally friendly products that reduce 
pollution or offer cheaper solutions for the delivery of public services such as medical treatments or 
public transportation (Porter and Kramer, 2006; Alford, 2009a). 
The involvement of external actors in the co-production of public services is especially fundamental 
in those areas left orphaned by public administration action such as welfare services or in policy 
areas that require considerable resources, such as environmental protection or disaster 
management (Best et al., 2018). Co-production is often discussed as a solution to compensate for 
the lack of services generated by the cuts to public expenditure during NPM reforms (Brandsen and 
Pestoff, 2006; Palumbo, 2016). External actors have played a critical role in the construction of the 
post-war welfare state, and countries like the UK have filled the public service gap caused by 
privatisation and outsourcing of public service production. Public management literature has usually 
underestimated the role of co-production in the creation of value for society, but its impact has 
been in many cases tangible (Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013). For example, non-profit social housing 




Cases of co-production can be found at all stages of the production process and can be summarised 
in three categories: co-governance, co-management, and co-production. The type of co-production 
depends on the nature of the public service. Co-governance refers to the involvement of external 
actors in designing how service should be delivered. Home-care services are often shaped by health 
professionals together with family members (Lindahl, Lidén and Lindblad, 2011; Palumbo, 2016). 
Co-management refers to the active involvement of external actors in the management of public 
services in collaboration with the state. For example, after the disruption caused by the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti, the local government co-managed the disaster relief operation with different 
actors - NGOs, companies, and international aid initiatives (Morrow, N Mock, et al., 2011; Hou and 
Shi, 2012). Co-production, in the restricted use of this term, means the involvement of external 
actors in the material production of the service, such as patrolling the neighbourhood, collecting 
garbage, or reporting crime (Linders, 2012). 
Co-production is also enacted according to three different forms of organisation: self-service, 
person-to-person, and public agency mediated co-production (Voorberg, Bekkers and Tummers, 
2015). The typical self-service co-production is when citizens self-organise to produce a public 
service that they need which is not offered by public agencies. Therefore, in the self-service co-
production, citizens simultaneously cover the two roles of producer and consumer of the service. 
For example, in Scandinavia, groups of parents self-organise additional childcare services where 
parents participate as volunteers or by donating money. The childcare service offered by these 
parents extends the time of the childcare service offered by schools, and helps schools to provide 
more value to citizens without increasing the public expenditure (Vamstad, 2012). The person-to-
person co-production happens when companies, NGOs or citizens offer a service which is not 
directly provided by public agencies. For example, Transport for London (TfL) does not provide an 
app to plan journeys. However, there are many citizens, companies, and NGOs that created more 
than 600 apps like CityMapper or Google Maps that offer this journey planner service directly to 
citizens. Due to the contribution of all these apps developed by third parties, TfL has been able to 
offer value to citizens and to save in total more than £15m-£42m (Hogge, 2016). Under the third 
type, the co-production mediated by public agencies, public agencies can ask external actors to 
provide specific input in the production of a service, which is often a task. NASA, for example, 
created a crowdsourcing platform and involved more than 85,000 volunteers in analysing satellite 
imagery that computers could not read (Shirky, 2010). The involvement of volunteers helped NASA 
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to create more value for society because it was able to produce its service without  increasing public 
expenditure. 
The involvement of external actors as part of a more networked production of public services can 
then help public agencies to create more economic value for citizens without the need to increase 
taxes or to use public resources. 
2.4.2 The NPG and the creation of value 
The diffusion of co-production in the public sector and the rise of a more networked model of 
production of public services are at the basis of the New Public Governance (NPG) management 
approach. The NPG overcomes the limits of the JUG management approach and promotes a more 
networked and open model of public administration where public agencies and external actors such 
as citizens, companies or NGOs can actively collaborate to create more value for citizens (Lindsay, 
Osbrone, & Bond, 2014). According to the NPG approach, the effective coordination among public 
and private actors can generate more value for  society because it increases the output of public 
service production without the need to increase public expenditure and taxes for citizens.  
The pluralistic model of production promoted by the NPG also emerges as a way to optimise the 
decentralised structure created by the NPM that would be difficult to merge and integrate into 
single and vast bureaucratic organisations (Jessop, 2003). The role of public agencies is to mobilise 
this constellation of public and private actors to collectively deliver public services or reach public 
goals that public administration alone is unable to achieve (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006; Osborne, 2010). 
Therefore, contrary to the NPM, the NPG approaches public administration as having an important 
role of mobilising and coordinating public and private actors to produce service or solve societal 
problems (Rhodes 2007). In fact, the state can no longer leave markets to self-govern themselves, 
and public administration needs to actively govern markets and civil society to reach common goals 
or produce public service, while avoiding duplication or negative externalities (Newman, 2004). The 
case of Energiewende in Germany represents an example of the NPG. The German government has 
set the goal to reduce carbon emissions and has developed a set of policies and regulations to 
address the German industry and the civil society to reach this societal goal. Hence, the adoption of 
the NPG management approach does not mean a boundary-less and liquid model of public 
administration, but a public administration able to configure and re-configure public and private 
resources to produce public services or reach specific goals. Public agencies need to organise, enable 
and govern networks of actors, which are also defined as constellations (Ramirez and Normann, 
1993) or ecosystems (Ciborra, 1996).  
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The concept of public administration as a coordinator of a networked production of public services 
has also been discussed in different terms in the economic field (Mazzucato, 2018)  and in public 
management literature (Stoker, 2006; Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013).  However, the three main 
characteristics of the model of public administration proposed by NPG are commonly shared across 
different kinds of literature (Osborne, 2010) and explain how public agencies can produce more 
services for fewer costs and then deliver more value to citizens than under the previous models of 
public administration. The first organisational characteristic of the NPG is the openness of public 
administration, which includes a plurality of interdependent actors that are constantly engaged in 
the process of policymaking and production of public services across all the policy domains 
(Osborne, 2010). The output of the production process is then the result of different public and 
private contributions (Easton, 1965). Citizens, as well as other private actors, are considered to be 
potential co-producers of public services rather than merely passive consumers of services. More 
networked production means more value for taxpayers because public agencies can offer more 
output for fewer production costs. The existence of a collaborative governance is also an essential 
part of the NPG model of public administration. The NPG is characterised by a constant dialogue 
with public and private actors to mobilise resources efficiently and to produce services for fewer 
costs. The NPG reinforces the need to overcome competition and to favour major collaboration 
among all the actors (Torfing and Triantafillou, 2013). Public agencies need to govern networks of 
actors that are not fixed, but instead constantly negotiate and renegotiate their role, positions and 
interests. Centralised control is then not suitable to govern vast network of actors that do not belong 
to the same organizations (Marinetto, 2003). Hence, public administration needs to create soft 
policy instruments that do not focus on imposing decisions but rather, on nudging actors of the 
network to perform specific tasks (Holliday, 2000; Skelcher, 2000).  
A collaborative governance is able to build a shared consensus which aligns all the different actors’ 
interests (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014). A shared consensus and common goals are 
necessary to coordinate all the actors’ contributions, and favour a more effective co-production of 
public services (Salamon, 2002). In fact, collaborative governance enables public agencies to govern 
the different actors’ contributions (Dean, 1999) and avoid duplications or conflicts that might create 
inefficiencies or disruptions (Chatfield and Reddick, 2018). Another essential characteristic of the 
NPG is the management of multiple accountabilities. Although actors can agree to pursue certain 
goals, they still act according to their agencies’ interests. Therefore, in the networked production 
configuration, each actor performs different tasks according to its competences, and remains 
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accountable only for their single contribution and not for the overall output of the networked 
process. Hence, public agency will need to find NGOs, citizens and companies which have similar 
interests or that belong to the same policy field to increase the number of co-producers and produce 
a more efficient public services (Dickinson, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the NPG is still widespread because there are several hidden organisational and 
coordination costs that hinder the collaboration among actors that belong to some network. 
4.3 The limitations of co-production and NPG 
Similarly to both the NPM and the JUG, the NPG is mainly driven by the economic rationale.  
According to this rationale, the co-production of public services helps to create more economic 
value for taxpayers who pay fewer taxes and obtain more value in exchange (Warren and 
Rosentraub, 1982; Eriksson, 2012; Wiesel and Modell, 2014). However, the same coordination 
problems of the JUG also represent a limitation for the NPG. According to the public choice theory, 
public agencies as well as all the actors act to pursue their own interests, and if they are not aligned 
with the ones of the other members of the network, they will not collaborate (Hefetz and Warner, 
2004). Another critical factor is that asymmetry of information is higher in the model of public 
administration proposed by the NPG than in the JUG because the number of actors that co-produce 
services can be incredibly high. The asymmetry of information causes a lack of trust among the 
actors as well as high coordination costs, which represent an obstacle for the adoption of public 
services (Bovaird and Loeffler, 2012). The risks for public agencies to be involved in the co-
production of public services are then higher because a more decentralised production means lesser 
control. Many public agencies are not willing to lose control over the production of public services 
because they cannot control the quality of the output (Shakespeare, 2000). Moreover, the difficulty 
of trying to control the inputs of external actors might also create problems for public agencies and 
produce negative effects for society in other policy domains (Williams, Kang and Johnson, 2016). 
For example, police can patrol neighbourhoods with citizens and offer more hours of policing 
services at lesser cost. However, citizens are not trained for patrolling, and they might for example 
report problems wrongly or use force incorrectly according to their discretion. It is then clear that 
more efficiency does not mean more value for citizens because it might also negatively affect other 
values such as safety or justice (Williams, Kang and Johnson, 2016). 
As also discussed by NPG literature (e.g. Stoker, 2006; Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg, 2014), the 
focus on efficiency is then not sufficient to create value for the society because co-production and 
production of public services have an impact also on other values. The economic rationale that 
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drives the NPM, the JUG and a significant portion of the NPG literature, together with the 
conceptualisation of citizens as homo economicus, has reduced value creation to the simple 
achievement of efficiency. However, citizens are not homo economicus but rather homo politicus 
because they consider not only economic convenience but also other values such as fairness, 
equality, justice, or safety (Dibben, Wood and Roper, 2004).  
Hence, the economic rationale that drives the NPM and JUG reforms and that also drives the NPG 
is unable to fully meet citizens’ needs.  
The public value paradigm presented in the following sections of this chapter overcomes the focus 
on efficiency driven by the economic rationale, and proposes an alternative paradigm to create 
value for citizens. The next section critically reviews literature about public value and the 
characteristics of public value management, and it explains the public value creation process. 
2.5.The Public value tradition and value creation 
2.5.1 Public Value management characteristics 
The public value management approach, rooted in the public value paradigm introduced by Moore 
(1995) and similar to the NPG, promotes the idea of a public administration as coordinator of 
networks. The public value paradigm shares the public administration organisational characteristics 
presented by the NPG about the importance of promoting more networked governance and 
production of public services. However, according to the public value paradigm, public 
administration coordinates networks of public and private actors not only to pursue efficiency, but 
also to achieve other societal values such as transparency, fairness, public health, or safety (O’Flynn, 
2007; Alford and Hughes, 2008). Public administration is not then merely market regulator or 
efficiency seeker, but more a coordinator of collective action to serve all societal values. As 
coordinator, public administration pragmatically covers different roles that are necessary to 
effectively address the action of public and private actors and to create public value for citizens 
(Alford and Hughes, 2008; West and Davis, 2011).  
Nevertheless, public value creation is not as straightforward as it might appear. In order to 
understand the complexity of public value creation it is necessary to discuss the public value 
concept. The opaque theoretical foundations of public value theory have caused different tensions 
in the literature (Morrell, 2009) and have generated two main conceptualisations (Alford and 
O’Flynn, 2009; Dahl and Soss, 2014). The first perspective is grounded in Moore’s understanding of 
public value as the equivalent of corporate value in the private sector.  Bozeman (2007) proposes 
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an alternative perspective, which considers the entire public realm and claims that public value is 
created when a set of public values are simultaneously met.  The difference between the two 
concepts lies in that according to Moore, public agencies create public value when they solve a 
societal problem by improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public services (Hartley et al., 
2017; Mintrom and Luetjens, 2017) while in Bozeman’s tradition,  a public agency needs to 
simultaneously meet different public values to satisfy citizens to create public value (Alford and 
O’Flynn, 2009).  For example, increasing the number of CCTVs in a city can help the police to improve 
public safety but could also decrease citizens’ privacy, which is another collective expectation that 
should be simultaneously met. Therefore, according to Bozeman, the public agency of this example 
can create public value by finding the most suitable production configuration to increase public 
safety and simultaneously protect citizens’ privacy. 
This thesis is based on Bozeman’s perspective; however, both traditions agree with the 
organisational characteristics that enable the entire public administration to create public value. 
The first characteristic is that public agencies need to actively search and explore all the public values 
that are involved in the service production process (Moore, 1995; Broussine, 2003; Stoker, 2006; 
Hartley et al., 2015; Crosby, ‘t Hart and Torfing, 2017).  Public agencies are in fact, ‘explorers 
commissioned by society to search for public value. In undertaking the search, managers are 
expected to use their initiative and imagination. But they are also expected to be responsive to more 
or less constant political guidance and feedback’ (Moore, 1995, p. 299). Public value is collectively 
built and defined during political elections and through other forms of political participation like 
referenda or e-participation that allow citizens to express their collective needs and aspirations 
(Moore, 1995; Prebble, 2012). However, public values are varied and in order to satisfy all these 
expectations the entire public administration has to respond to political and citizens’ feedback to 
adjust public value objectives (Jessop, 2000; Stoker, 2006; Rhodes and Wanna, 2009; Wallis and 
Gregory, 2009). As a searcher of public value, public agencies must consult all the stakeholders, 
companies, and citizens  involved to analyse mutual or conflictual public interests (Bryson et al., 
2017).  Public agencies become coordinators of collaborative networks to reach specific societal 
goals. After careful analysis of the collective expectations involved, they need to build a shared 
public value vision, with specific goals that can consistently address the entire network composed 
of other public agencies and stakeholders such as NGOs, companies or groups of citizens, in order 
to produce specific outcome (Moore, 1995; Luke, 1998; Domberger and Fernandez, 1999; Entwistle 
and Martin, 2005; Prebble, 2012).  
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As Alford and Hughes (2008) highlight ‘It is not who produces it that makes value public. Rather, it is 
a matter of who consumes it’ (p. 131). Therefore, non-public actors such as companies, NGOs and 
citizens are not passive actors. They can actively contribute to defining and creating public value by 
producing or co-producing services that positively impact societal problems (Moore, 1995; Stoker, 
2006; Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg, 2014; Page et al., 2015; Alford and Yates, 2016; Bryson et al., 
2017). However, public agencies remain public value guardians in charge of coordinating and 
addressing all the actors to positively solve societal problems and support public value creation 
(Moore, 1995; Stoker, 2006; Horner and Hutton, 2011; Bryson et al., 2017). Nevertheless, public 
agencies need to manage complex social problems where multiple interests are involved or that 
often require significant operational resources. Hence, the creation of public value requires also a 
high level of pragmatism in selecting the most suitable production configuration to reach societal 
goals according to the circumstances and the interests involved (Broussine, 2003; O’Flynn, 2007; 
Alford and Hughes, 2008; Hartley et al., 2015). Furthermore, as part of its pragmatism, public value 
management focuses on the outcome and not on output (Norman, 2007; Alford and Hughes, 2008; 
Benington and Moore, 2011a). The control of output does not guarantee citizens’ satisfaction 
because it only focuses on the measurement of the production processes. Conversely, the focus on 
outcome invites public agencies to be more accountable for the effects generated by the production 
of public services on citizens’ lives. This radical change of focus highlights that the role of public 
administration is not to produce public services but to ensure that citizens are able to use them to 
satisfy their needs and expectations. 
5.2 The public value creation process: from output to outcome 
The shift of focus from output to outcome promoted by the public value management approach 
corresponds to the adoption of a new value creation logic (Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013; 
Osborne, 2018). According to this alternative production logic, value is not created as a result of an 
economic transaction, but instead value-in-use is co-produced by citizens.  Therefore, public 
agencies can create value not by maximising the output of public service production but by enabling 
citizens to co-create value they need or expect. For example, the police improves public safety not 
when the number of arrests increases, but when citizens feel safe. 
The conceptualisation of value as an output of the production process is strongly rooted in the 
foundations of the economic tradition (Mazzucato, 2017). In the 1600s, Mercantilism economic 
tradition postulated that economic value was created only by increasing exports and decreasing 
imports. In the 1700s, the Physiocratic economic tradition argued that value was created by all the 
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activities related to land agriculture. In the 1800s, the Classic economic tradition, theorised by 
famous economists such as Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and Mill, considered value to be the 
result of the hours of labour. In the 1900s, Neoclassical economic tradition that is still dominant in 
current economic discussions assumed that value is the result of demand and offer market 
dynamics. All these theories share four main similarities: value is the output of a production process; 
value is embedded in goods and services; value is exchanged; and consumers passively consume 
value. 
These four economic beliefs have shaped the good dominant logic of production of goods which for 
decades has driven the production practices of manufacturing companies like Ford and has since 
been extended to the public sector. According to this logic, during the production process, public 
agencies embed value in public goods like roads or public parks and in public services like policing 
or healthcare services, which are then considered the output of the production process (Grönroos, 
2008; Vargo, Maglio and Archpru Akaka, 2008). Public agencies can increase the value of public 
goods or services by increasing the number of inputs in the production process, in order to have a 
more valuable output. When public agencies exchange public goods and services with citizens, value 
is transmitted to them and they passively consume it (Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013; Cordella and 
Paletti, 2018; Osborne, 2018). In order to deliver the right value to clients or citizens, organisations 
are assumed to know what clients need. Therefore, the only way to increase value is by focusing on 
efficiency and then by improving the production processes. The adoption of this type of value 
creation logic was suitable to serve past generations of citizens and clients that had fixed needs and 
expectations (Zuboff and Maxmin, 2002). However, the mass production of standardised products 
is not suitable to satisfy the current generation of citizens, who have more complex and personalised 
needs. This societal change has made more evident an historical misunderstanding in the good 
dominant logic about the role of consumer. 
The term consumer comes from the Latin word consumere, that was originally interpreted as ‘to 
destroy’. This interpretation has influenced the development of the economic theories which have 
considered for centuries consumers as a destroyer of value.  A later review of the meaning 
concluded that consumere means ‘to accomplish, complete’ (Ramírez, 1999).  In fact, value is not 
exchanged or transmitted to citizens through goods but  ‘is latent in the subjective experience of 
each individual, a psychological destination that we call individual space’ and  ‘is realized in the 
individual space, rather than created in the organization space’ (Zuboff and Maxmin 2002, p. 11).  
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This simple change of perspective of the role of clients as well as citizens has drastically changed the 
logic of how value is created. 
The service logic emerges as an alternative of the good dominant logic and explains that value is the 
outcome of the production process and cannot be simply exchanged or delivered (Normann and 
Ramírez, 1995; Osborne, Radnor and Strokosch, 2016). As an outcome of the production process, 
value is created only when citizens use public services or goods to meet their needs (Korkman, 2006; 
Alford, 2009b; Benington, 2011). In fact, when citizens use public transportation, they use an 
arrangement of goods (streets, lights, bus) and services (transportation services, cleaning service) 
that are combined together to offer a value proposition to citizens. The value proposition remains 
a potential value until citizens enact it to meet their needs. Hence, value is the outcome of a co-
production process that happens in the consumer sphere and not within the provider sphere 
represented by the public agency’s boundaries (Alford and O’Flynn, 2009). Although the terms co-
production and co-creation have the same meaning and often are used as synonymous (Bendapudi 
and Leone, 2003; Voorberg, Bekkers and Tummers, 2015), it is important to highlight that co-
production in the consumer sphere is always necessary to create value for users, while co-
production with external actors in the provider sphere is not fundamental but can help public 
agencies (the main providers) to improve the value proposition (Vargo and Lusch, 2008; Grönroos, 
2011; Grönroos and Voima, 2013). For example, public transportation value proposition is 
constituted by bus and tube services, typically provided by public agencies, and it can be improved 
by ridesharing and bikes sharing services, typically provided by non-public actors. 
Although the service logic of value creation has been discussed in the private and public sector 
contexts (Grönroos and Voima, 2013; Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013), it is necessary to specify 
that companies’ aim is to create private value, while public administration’s goal is to create public 
value. Moore (1995, p. 47) clarifies that public value is created ‘partly in terms of the satisfaction 
of individuals who [enjoy desirable outcomes], … and partly in terms of the satisfactions of citizens 
who have seen a collective need, fashioned a public response to that need, and thereby 
participated in the construction of a community….’ Therefore, public value is created when public 
services enable citizens to co-create positive outcome for them as individuals and as members of 
a community with shared collective needs and expectations  (Bovaird and Loeffler, 2012). 
Public agencies can make a public value proposition that is different from a normal value 
proposition because it takes into account the different public values involved. Hence, public 
agency has to assemble different tangible (goods) and intangible (knowledge) resources to produce 
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a public value proposition to citizens (Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013). For example, in the offer of 
public transportation service, the public value proposition must meet the values of efficiency, safety 
and environmental sustainability. If the public value proposition does not meet all citizens’ needs, 
then the risk is that citizens would not use the service or would co-create negative value for 
themselves, and the entire process would result in a negative outcome (Osborne, Radnor and 
Strokosch, 2016). For example, if the bus is not on time, citizens cannot use the bus to reach their 
destination, and they would be unable to co-create value.  
Public agencies then need to reassemble the public value proposition to propose a new 
configuration of the public service until it enables citizens to co-produce value for themselves and 
for the collectivity (Grönroos, 2011). The role of public agencies is then that of the facilitator of 
public value creation. They can only create a public value proposition because public value is created 
in the subjective experience of each citizen as a member of the community (Chandler and Vargo, 
2011).  
The problem is that the role of the facilitator is not easy because public agencies need to serve  many 
needs and expectations. The production of a public value proposition that can potentially meet all 
citizens’ needs and expectations can become a challenge. This is the reason why it is so difficult to 
create public value. 
2.5.3 The limitations of Public Value 
The management of the public value creation process represents a challenge for public agencies for 
two main reasons. The first reason is that public value creation is uncertain because ‘the nature of 
public value is not fixed’ (Moore, 1995, p. 55), and can evolve and change rapidly. Citizens’ 
aspirations and needs are highly mutable. Even governments within a few years of having been 
elected might not anymore represent people’s needs and expectations (Zuboff and Maxmin, 2002; 
Moore and Khagram, 2004; Bruijin and Dicke, 2006). For example, the Fukushima nuclear disaster 
raised strong political pressures in Germany for the extension of the lifespan of the country's 17 
reactors, and forced Chancellor Angela Merkel to change German energy policy and shut down all 
the country’s nuclear power plants by 2022 (Huenteler et al., 2012). As highlighted by Benington  
(2007), the instability of the public value definition is also the result of the constant dialogue 
between citizens and politicians or public managers that reshapes the public value definition and 
the organisational goal of public agencies. In recent years, citizens, NGOs, and think tanks have 
participated in the discussion of the public value through referenda, e-participation and policy 
papers, to contest and to address public values represented by the government. For example, in 
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Germany, the green movement composed of the Green party and other associations led the German 
government to create the Energiewende agenda to incentivise the adoption of green energy 
(Mazzucato, 2018). Hence, the evolving and continuous construction of public value makes public 
value creation uncertain (Meynhardt, 2009).  
The second reason that makes public value creation a challenge is that public values are varied and 
sometimes conflictual (Moore, 1995; De Graaf, Huberts and Smulders, 2016). Public agencies usually 
deal with conflicts among public values according to a public interests hierarchy that is not fixed and 
that can be contested (De Graaf, Huberts and Smulders, 2016). For example, in France, after the 
terrorist attack at the Bataclan on November 13, 2015, the security of the country became the most 
critical priority. Hence, the government declared a state of emergency, which suspended 
fundamental civil rights and freedoms in order to facilitate the work of the police to avoid other 
possible terrorist attacks. Although in the French case it was easy to predict the impact of the state 
of emergency on other values such as personal freedom or privacy, sometimes it is difficult for public 
agencies to recognise a conflict among public values and to be able to predict the impact of a public 
service on citizens’ lives (O’Flynn, 2007; Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg, 2014; Williams, Kang and 
Johnson, 2016). 
In fact, public agencies have an imperfect knowledge of the different policy domains as a result of 
the asymmetry of information among all the private and public actors involved in the production of 
public services (Williams, Kang and Johnson, 2016). Before defining their policy goals, public 
agencies search for all the possible public interests involved. However, they have limited knowledge 
of other policy domains. Each public agency is competent in a specific policy area and has specialised 
knowledge only in that area. Thus, it has a limited capability to predict the potential impact on other 
policy domains. Discussions with other actors can mitigate the asymmetry of information among 
the actors; however, the impossibility to individuate all the public interests involved might also limit 
the involvement of all stakeholders (Alford and Hughes, 2008; Page et al., 2015; Williams, Kang and 
Johnson, 2016). 
The asymmetry of information increases according to the number of actors and interests involved. 
The bigger is the network or ecosystem of actors involved in the production and co-production of 
public services, the more difficult it is too coordinate and address actions of the network to reach 
common goals and generate public value. In fact, the networks managed by each public agency are 
not siloed but are overlapped or mutually shared among public agencies (Loreau, Mouquet and Holt, 
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2003). Hence, the complexity of managing different networks and the difficulty of predicting the 
impact on each policy domain increase the difficulty of creating public value.  
Despite similarities shared with the NPG literature, the public value literature (Bryson, Crosby and 
Bloomberg, 2014; Dahl and Soss, 2014; Osborne, Radnor and Strokosch, 2016; Mintrom and 
Luetjens, 2017) has not discussed the impact of co-production and a more networked model of 
public administration on the creation of public value. The NPG literature has explained how co-
production and a more open model of public administration can clearly improve efficiency, but it is 
not clear if this open model of public administration and of public service production can also 
address the limitations and complexities of public value creation. The diffusion of technology in 
public administration requires the contextualisation of this issue within e-government literature. 
The next chapter presents how the different public management traditions have influenced the 
adoption of e-government systems, and it explains the impact of e-government systems on the 




CHAPTER 3 The impact of e-government systems on the creation of value 
for the public 
 
Public administration has adopted Information and communication technologies (ICTs) to support 
and enhance the production of public services and to create more value for citizens (Bellamy and 
Taylor, 1998; Fountain, 2001a; Gil-García J. et al., 2005; Cohen and Kamarck, 2007). As explained in 
the previous chapter, the conceptualisation of how public agencies create value for citizens has 
changed. This chapter critically reviews e-government literature and discusses how the role of 
technology has evolved to serve different value creation conceptualisations. The first part describes 
how, in line with the traditional model of public administration driven by the instrumental rationale, 
it has adopted ICTs as tools to enhance the impartiality and homogeneity of public service 
production and to better serve democratic values (Bovens and Zouridis, 2002; Bryson, Crosby and 
Bloomberg, 2014). The second section explains how the corporate model of public administration 
driven by the economic rationale of the NPM reforms has focused on the development of e-
government systems that could improve the internal efficiency of public agency (Dunleavy et al., 
2008; Cordella and Bonina, 2012). The third section explains how the collaborative model of public 
administration proposed by the JUG reforms has similarly conceived of ICTs systems as tools that 
can increase efficiency by facilitating coordination among public agencies (Cordella and Iannacci, 
2010; Henning, 2018). The fourth section discusses how the networked model of public 
administration proposed by the NPG has led the adoption of ICTs systems conceived according to 
the Government as a Platform characteristics which can further improve the efficiency of public 
service production by enabling a more open production of public services and collaboration among 
private and public actors (O’Reilly, 2011; Janssen and Estevez, 2013). The final section explains that 
ICTs systems also have an impact on public value creation and that, although the GaaP system helps 
to improve public service efficiency more than other e-government systems, its impacts upon public 
value creation are not clear. 
3.1.Bureaucracy and e-government 
3.1.1 ICTs, bureaucracy and value creation 
The instrumental rationale of bureaucratic organisations that drives the traditional model of public 
administration has led to the conceptualisation of ICTs as tools to enhance democratic values and 
to deliver more value to citizens (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014). Database management 
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systems, decision support systems, and office automation software are examples of ICTs-mediated 
solutions to automatise production tasks and support bureaucratic organisations. The deployment 
of ICTs reinforces the bureaucratic mechanisms which guarantee the impartiality and homogeneity 
of the bureaucratic production process (Willcocks and Mason, 1987), and which are fundamental to 
serve democratic values such as transparency, fairness and equality. 
The conceptual lens of functional simplification and closure can help to understand how the 
regulative proprieties of technology have enhanced the impartiality and homogeneity of the 
production process (Bovens and Zouridis, 2002; Kallinikos, 2005). The concept of functional 
simplification describes how technology is designed to embed logics of productions, procedures and 
relational interdependences. ICTs reduce the complexity of a set of operations and produce some 
specific effects that satisfy determined requirements (Kallinikos, 2006a). Functional closure refers 
to the isolation of the sequential set of operations from the external interface (Kallinikos, 2006a). 
Like a black-box, functional closure of ICTs artefacts hides operations behind the interface. For 
example, when a police officer checks a driving licence on police computer, after a few seconds, it 
shows information about name of the driver. The driving licence software interface does not show 
all the operations necessary to check the validity of the driving licence. ICTs thus simplify the 
complexity of administrative procedures, but they also hide the decision making process from public 
officials. Public officials are clearly alienated from the execution of certain administrative steps 
because they can only control data inputs and communicate the data outputs. In bureaucratic 
organisations, ICTs are designed according to the instrumental rationale, and their role is to better 
address administrative actions to pursue public agencies’ goals. As a result, ICTs further reduce 
public officials’ discretion (Berg, 1998) because personal factors cannot affect the administrative 
process. The improved neutrality of production mediated by ICTs helps public agencies to deliver 
more value to citizens because it increases the impartiality and homogeneity of the administrative 
process.  
Public officials and especially ‘street-level bureaucrats’ cannot manipulate information or product 
operations because the production of the service is partially and in some cases, entirely, out of their 
control (Snellen, 1998). ICTs decrease the need for street-level officials to meet citizens because 
ICTs become the new intermediaries between citizens and public administration (Snellen, 1998; 
Zuurmond, 1998). The disintermediation of street-level public officials by ICTs help public agencies 
to create more value for citizens by guaranteeing the homogenous and equal implementation of 
policies without the risks of misinterpretations or misconduct of public officials (Bovens and 
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Zouridis, 2002). Software and predefined algorithms partially or fully replace the decision making of 
front-line officers. Mediation by ICTs ensures that public agencies treat all citizens equally and avoid 
any discrimination based on subjective factors. 
Moreover, public officials are unable to modify the administrative process embedded in e-
government systems. This enhances the impersonality of administrative action, and it additionally 
ensures that public services are lawfully performed according to the protocols. This impossibility 
that personal factors could influence the output of the administrative processes helps public 
agencies to create more value because it guarantees an objective treatment of all cases. 
Moreover, ICTs can help public agencies to create more value to citizens because they reduce the 
asymmetry of information between public officials and citizens. Citizens can access to the data, 
documents and investigate how public officers take decisions. Public officials have access to more 
information about citizens because they can get more data about individuals. The two-way 
transparency ensures the fairness of public service production, and it avoids disparate treatment of 
citizens (Buffat, 2015). E-participation is also an opportunity for public agencies to increase the 
transparency of the administrative process (Jaeger, 2005). Citizens can use social media to interact 
with public agencies and to ask for information about past administrative processes or seek 
clarification about the services public agencies offer (Bonsón et al., 2012). An example is the 
Freedom of information (FOI) process in the UK that allows citizens to obtain information held by 
British public agencies. The possibility to access data and to speak directly to decision-makers forces 
public agencies to improve the accountability of the administrative actions (Pina, Torres and Royo, 
2007). More transparency also helps to reduce corruption and increases efficiency because it is 
possible to better monitor the accountabilities of each public agency (Bertot, Jaeger and Grimes, 
2010). In fact, transparent administrative processes help to better understand the responsibilities 
and the organisational performance of each public agency. Public agencies can then use e-
government systems to improve the transparency of the administrative process and to deliver more 
value to the public. 
ICTs do not only enhance control over the production process but also improve the efficiency of 
public service provision. ICTs help to offer more services for fewer costs and hence improve 
efficiency (Nohria and Berkley, 1994; Dunleavy, 2005; Cordella, 2007). For example, certain public 
services such as the booking system for medical appointments are offered 24/7 or wholly 
automatised. Therefore, public agencies can offer more value to citizens by increasing the public 
service provision at no additional production costs. 
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It is then clear that ICTs reinforce the ability of bureaucratic organisations to deliver impartial and 
homogenous services, and thus enable public agencies to offer more value to the public. 
However, public agencies can adopt ICTs to reach different goals and sometimes they can also create 
negative value for citizens. 
3.1.2 The limitations of ICTs in bureaucratic organisations 
The instrumental rationale that drives bureaucratic organisations considers ICTs as instruments to 
pursue certain goals according to the principles of impartiality and homogeneity. ICTs are not 
neutral tools that can be simply deployed to automatise certain procedures. Rather, they represent 
a way to enframe different logical sequences of actions to address actors to perform several types 
of procedures (Ciborra and Hanseth, 1998; Luhmann, 2005). ICTs regulate the way in which 
processes are performed according to any organisational logic and to reach different organisational 
aims. Regulative properties of technology enhance the impartiality and homogeneity of the 
production configuration, but they can also be deployed to pursue non-democratic values. 
Moreover, the adoption of e-government systems can also paradoxically increase the discretional 
power of public officials and favour discrimination and lack of transparency. The switch from street-
level to screen-level bureaucracies seems to directly lead to less impartial and homogenous 
decisions (Buffat, 2015)  and then leads public agencies to create less value for citizens. Not all the 
provision of public services can be automated by e-government systems and street-level 
bureaucrats such as teachers, nurses, or policemen will probably retain discretional decision-making 
powers because algorithms cannot substitute their tasks. In addition, the data provided to support 
their tasks can often provide a partial understanding of administrative cases and can lead to 
misunderstandings and wrong decisions (Jorna and Wagenaar, 2007). The mediation of ICTs and the 
artificial reality described by data can also negatively affect the accountability of public agencies: 
because of the quality of supervision over public officers’ actions, it can paradoxically decrease. For 
example, the introduction of remote control through software to measure the quality of public 
officials’ tasks limits the direct control of supervisors only to what data can capture (number of 
controls, time per control, etc.) and it can increase discretion of street-level officers regarding the 
fields not measured by data (Buffat, 2015). 
Furthermore, ICTs do not substitute for the decision-making process of street-level bureaucrats, but 
rather complement it. ICTs are, in fact, not the only one of the elements that shape discretion. The 
decision-making process still depends on how ICTs are used or interpreted in the production process 
of public services (Jorna and Wagenaar, 2007). For example, in France, street-level bureaucrats 
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understood that satellite data on farmers’ parcels were incorrect, and corrected their decision 
accordingly to produce more fair decisions (Buffat, 2015). Therefore, front line public officials can 
play an essential role in professional bureaucratic processes because they can still oppose 
automated decisions and use their own judgements (Hansen, Lundberg and Syltevik, 2018). The 
context and other organisational elements such as the skills of agents or the tasks they need to 
perform are still able to affect the output of the decision making process that cannot be entirely 
disintermediated by technologies (Taylor and Kelly, 2006). Thus, ICTs can increase the discretional 
power of public officials and generate inconsistent or wrong decisions that create negative value for 
citizens. Moreover, complete automation of certain public services is not suitable to meet all 
citizens’ needs. In fact, usually, citizens who have complex cases tend to avoid the mediation of ICTs, 
and speak directly to public officials in order to overcome the rigidities of ICTs systems which are 
often unable to address the complexities of certain administrative cases (Breit and Salomon, 2015). 
In addition, the excessive automation of administrative procedures can increase the rigidity of the 
‘iron cage’ of bureaucratic organisations (Hansen, Lundberg and Syltevik, 2018). ICTs can freeze the 
evolution of production configuration and force public officers to perform tasks according to a 
precise sequence that is difficult to modify. As a consequence, public agencies have difficulty 
evolving or adapting public services to meet citizens’ needs and to create value for them. The 
inability to change administrative processes can lead to frustration or even alienation of public 
officers from the goals of the agency because they become mere executors and have no power to 
adapt or change the process to better serve citizens (Gregory 1998).  
Furthermore, the rigidity of ICTs-mediated production process does not always ensure more 
legality. It is sometimes complicated for developers to embed regulations and laws in algorithms 
and lines of codes of information systems because the majority of developers do not have 
competencies to interpret the law (e.g. Gillingham 2015a, 2015b; see also Henman 2010). 
Therefore, the automation of certain public services might be the result of how developers have 
interpreted the law, rather than a direct transposition of law and regulations into technology. 
The lack of digital skills is also a problem for citizens. Past generations of citizens lack digital skills or 
do not have the means (internet connections, laptops etc.) to access digital services. The digital 
divide in the population can represent an indirect discrimination of those citizens who are not able 
to access public services, and can consequently generate inequality of how citizens are served (Çilan, 
Bolat and Coşkun, 2009; Helbig, Ramón Gil-García and Ferro, 2009; van Deursen, Courtois and van 




The availability of open data and open resources from YouTube, social networks etc can enhance 
the asymmetry of information because public agencies can manipulate information and only show 
what is convenient for them. Public officials can decide which data should be open to the public and 
then modify the perception of how administrative process is performed (Janssen, Charalabidis and 
Zuiderwijk, 2012). In addition, data can be open to the public according to formats or standards 
which not all citizens can read and understand. Sometimes data are open but accessibility remains 
a challenge. Therefore, public agencies might create false transparency, and enhance the 
asymmetry of information between citizens and public agencies, thus generating negative value for 
society (Conradie and Choenni, 2014). The abundance of data about citizens can also enable public 
officials to know more about citizens, and it can potentially increase incidents of discrimination.  
Moreover, the automation of public services through the deployment of ICTs can generate more 
complexities, system inefficiencies, and a consequential rise of public expenditure. For example, the 
need to fill electronic forms to access public service decreases the discretional power of street-level 
officers. However, for complex cases, it can increase processing times, favour input mistakes or 
generate an unnecessary overload of information which increases production costs or, in the worst 
cases, result in the collapse of the production process (Jorna and Wagenaar, 2007). The expansion 
of the administrative apparatus under the pressure of welfare policies, together with the attempt 
at digitalisation of many bureaucratic procedures to better serve democratic values, have 
dramatically increased production complexities (Malone et al., 1987; Ciborra, 1993). The application 
of transaction costs theories has shown that the bureaucratic organisation and its conceptualisation 
of e-government systems are not suitable to address complex and interdependent organisational 
structures and can cause a rise in public expenditure (Williamson, 1985; Cordella, 2007). 
Therefore, the perception of ICTs as instruments to enhance impartiality and homogeneity have 
limitations because e-government systems cannot always ensure that public agencies  meet 
democratic values and then deliver value to the public (Buffat, 2015). Moreover, according to the 
economic rationale, the conceptualisation of ICTs in a bureaucratic organisation has caused 
inefficiencies and has raised public expenditure. The need to control public expenditure is at the 
core of the NPM reforms which focus on improving efficiency instead of democratic values. The next 
section explains how the NPM management approach conceives of ICTs  as tools to decrease 
administrative complexities and to create more economic value for citizens because they can reduce 
the production costs of public services.  
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3.2.The NPM and e-government systems 
3.2.1 The NPM: technology as a tool to increase efficiency 
Similarly to the instrumental rationale that drives bureaucratic organisations, the NPM reforms are 
driven by the economic rationale, which perceives technology as a tool. However, according to the 
economic rationale, ICTs are not tools to reach agency’s goals but to increase production efficiency 
and to deliver more economic value to citizens for fewer costs (Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987; 
Ciborra, 1993). Following private sector digital practices, public agencies have conceived ICTs as 
instruments to re-engineer or to rationalise the production of public services (Bekkers and Zouridis, 
1999; Dunleavy, 2005).  The underlying assumption of the NPM reforms is that public agencies 
should implement e-government systems to automatise tasks and procedures in order to reduce 
production costs and deliver more economic value to citizens (Andersen et al., 2010).  
E-government systems are also able to reduce transactions costs among actors and thus to increase 
the economic value of public services for citizens (Cordella, 2007). The bounded rationality of 
economic agents and the asymmetry of information among ‘buyers’ and ‘sellers’ cause high 
transactions costs and generate inefficiencies in the production of public services. ICTs are able to 
provide more information and reduce the asymmetry between units of the same public agency. 
Especially in complex and large scale organisations, ICTs can help to decrease searching costs 
because they help each organisational unit to know the resources or services that other units have 
available. Contracting costs are also decreased because it is easier to have information about the 
services and resources other units offer. Enforcement costs are also decreased because it is possible 
to have enough information about the responsibilities of each unit in a specific transaction. Due to 
the reduction of transaction costs, different units can collaborate and work more efficiently and 
thus offer more value to citizens. 
ICTs also decrease transaction costs between citizens and public agencies (Cordella, 2006). ICTs help 
to reduce searching costs because they help citizens to find the most convenient public service 
option. Contracting or negotiation costs are also decreased because citizens can access more 
detailed information about public services provided by public agencies. Also, enforcement costs are 
reduced because ICTs increase the accountability of public managers and avoid the principal-agent 
problem (Persson and Goldkuhl, 2010). More symmetric information between public agencies and 
citizens can also avoid opportunistic behaviour of public managers and potentially also of citizens, 
who would otherwise defraud public administration and hence increase public expenditure (Bertot, 
Jaeger and Grimes, 2010). 
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Moreover, the literature (Dunleavy et al., 2008; Persson and Goldkuhl, 2010; Cordella and Bonina, 
2012) shows how ICTs have strengthened the NPM characteristics described by Hood (1995), and 
have enabled public agencies to be more efficient. The adoption of ICTs systems like CRM (Customer 
relationship management) and ERP (Enterprise resource planning) typical of private sectors has 
helped public agencies to facilitate communication and to reduce the typical hierarchical barriers of 
bureaucratic organisations (Persson and Goldkuhl, 2010).  
CRMs have reduced the distance between public officers and citizens, and have facilitated a more 
customer-centric focus. CRM systems help to follow each administrative case better and enable 
public agencies to be more responsive to citizens’ needs. Usually, CRM systems power websites or 
interfaces that improve service delivery. However, CRMs are connected with ERP systems which 
connect different datasets inside public agencies. ERP systems decrease inefficiencies because they 
favour better vertical integration among the services offered by the different units (Layne and Lee, 
2001). ICTs can become a cure to the rigidity of procedures, and instead favour more professional 
management able to effectively adapt the production of public services to meet citizens’ needs 
(Chen, 2010).  
The diffusion of information systems typical of private sectors has also facilitated the diffusion of 
ICT business standards to measure production performances. For example, many CRM systems also 
embed standards to measure citizens’ satisfaction with e-government services, and to force public 
agencies to be more customer-oriented when they offer public services (Nambisan and Nambisan, 
2013). A stronger focus on customer satisfaction has led CRM and ERP systems to improve control 
over the output which is necessary to monitor possible inefficiencies and to deliver more economic 
value to clients. The implementation of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) standards 
typical of corporate organisations in public agencies systems also reinforces attention to efficiency 
of the production process. The XBRL is a machine-readable data standard that helps public agencies 
to process big quantities of financial information efficiently and to improve the accountability of 
public agencies (Chen, 2012).  
The NPM has promoted a more decentralised and disaggregated development of ICT systems to 
overcome the risks of developing large ICT systems across public administration. In fact, the failure 
to develop large e-government projects across different public agencies has often caused a loss of 
public funds without improving public services and without creating value for citizens (Fountain, 
2001b; Cordella and Willcocks, 2012).  
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The disaggregation of ICTs’ development has reduced risk of failure and has enabled each public 
agency to develop and to evolve its own ICTs systems according to that agency’s needs (Dunleavy 
et al., 2008). However, public agencies have a shortage of skilled IT staff and do not have enough 
funding to develop from scratch ICT systems to support the production of public services (Moon et 
al., 2016). The solution to this problem is the outsourcing of e-government systems. Competition 
among ICTs providers enables the  reduction of costs and provide the best ICT systems that public 
agencies need (Heeks, 1999). Outsourcing of digital services to experienced vendors able to propose 
the most suitable digital solution increases public agency efficiency without the need to risk ICT 
development failure (Chen and Perry, 2003). Many of the ICTs providers sell to public agencies the 
same ICTs solutions developed for private organisations. Hence, the adoption of ICT systems typical 
of the private sector is often combined with private management practices and standards which 
further increases public agency efficiency and the ability of public agencies to deliver value to 
citizens. For example, when acquiring ERPs, many public agencies also adopt the security practices 
typical of corporate fields such as the BCP (Business Continuity Process) practice which ensures that 
companies have a plan for the continuation of production services in case of disruption of the ICTs 
systems (Pérez-Castillo et al., 2012). BCP is critical for IT security and to ensure the ability of public 
agencies to produce public service efficiently, without the risk of being affected by possible 
disruptions.  
The collaboration between public agencies and ICT providers in the development of e-government 
services has also enhanced the diffusion of other private management approaches in the e-
government field that similarly purse the realisation of more efficient services. Six Sigma and 
Business Process reengineering (BPR) methods became common methodologies for developing e-
government services (Pande, Neuman and Cavanagh, 2000; Mansar, 2006). Total Quality 
management also became a widespread practice for the development of customer-driven services, 
especially in the fields of healthcare or education which require particular attention to the quality 
of public services (Teicher, Hughes and Dow, 2002; Pagliari, 2007). Lean methodologies have also 
become common in the development of sophisticated, complex e-government service, which often 
requires substantial public investments (Janssen and Estevez, 2013). These development 
methodologies enhance the ICT capability of public agencies and enable them to deliver more value 
to citizens by offering more services for lower production costs. 
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The above characteristics explain how technology has helped public agencies to improve public 
service delivery and deliver more value to citizens. However, the influence of the NPM in e-
government projects has also had negative impacts on public service provision, which have 
contributed to the creation of negative value for society. 
3.2.2 The limitations of the NPM reforms in e-government  
The economic rationale embedded in NPM reforms has prompted public agencies to invest in e-
government services as a way to reduce economic costs and to deliver more value to citizens. 
However, many e-government projects have failed (Fountain, 2001b). For example, in 2007 in the 
UK, IT expenditure reached 14 billion a year with only 30% rate of success (Collins, 2007). E-
government projects have failed to reduce public expenditure and failed to deliver value to citizens 
for several reasons.  
The first reason is that the siloed view of public agency has caused the disaggregation of e-
government services. Each public agency developed its own ICTs systems to support the production 
of its services according to different standards. This siloed perspective has become a barrier to 
collaboration and the exchange of data among public agencies. For example, hospitals developed 
their Electronic Health Records (EHR) which collect data on patients’ health. However, the EHR of 
each hospital has a different type of data which cannot be easily exchanged with other hospitals 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2010). The inability to communicate patient data to other hospitals causes delays 
in medical treatments and duplication of analysis, which correspond to higher costs for healthcare 
and then less value for citizens (Miller and Sim, 2004). The exchange of data is also necessary across 
different countries for other kinds of services. For example, in the EU, each member state has 
different standards for the electronic registry of residents, which impedes the exchange of data and 
consequently increases the asymmetry of information among different actors and generates 
inefficiency. Therefore, disaggregation of ICTs development has created isolated systems unable to 
communicate, which causes several problems of coordination and the duplication of services 
(Peristeras et al., 2008). 
The second reason is due to the competition promoted by NPM reforms. Public agencies have 
generally tended to look at e-government solutions offered by the market, instead of collaborating 
with other public agencies and developing shared e-government systems (Cordella, 2007; Margetts 
and Dunleavy, 2013). However, the outsourcing of many e-government services has caused more 
inefficiencies and then less value for citizens. The IT market was not mature enough to guarantee 
competition of large IT projects and only few private suppliers had the operational capabilities to 
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provide ICTs systems for the public sector and to lower costs to a minimum. Therefore, in many 
cases, public agencies created monopolies in the market, which increased costs for the state and 
also damaged the creation of a more competitive market (Cordella and Willcocks, 2010). 
Moreover, ICT providers used to develop e-government systems according to proprietary standards 
which locked in public agencies with specific ICTs systems for decades (Cordella and Willcocks, 
2012). Another problem related to outsourcing is the poor strategic vision of public agencies which 
often outsource their core competencies and lose control over the production of public services 
(Cordella and Willcocks, 2012; Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013). Problems related to IT outsourcing 
are mainly related to the lack of public agency skills to write IT contracts and to monitor vendor 
performance, which can increase the asymmetry of information between public agencies and ICT 
contractors.  
Another important reason that has caused dysfunctionality is that poorly managed ICTs can 
paradoxically increase the asymmetry of information and generate higher transaction costs within 
the same public agencies (Cordella, 2006). More information can increase searching costs for the 
different organisational units of public agencies which might have difficulty to find what they are 
looking for. An overload of information would also increase contracting costs because it would be 
more difficult to find out the characteristics of the available services or resources. The same applies 
to enforcement costs: too much information can conceal the responsibilities and the duties of each 
unit or department. 
More information increases the asymmetry of information between public agencies and citizens, 
who would have more difficulty in finding public services they are looking for. Contracting and 
enforcement costs would also increase because more available information does not mean more 
transparency, but instead may increase complexity for citizens (Janssen, Charalabidis and 
Zuiderwijk, 2012). An overload of information can also lead to public agencies’ not being able to 
protect their interests, result in corruption and inefficient production, and consequently raise public 
expenditure (Scholl and Klischewski, 2007). 
Moreover, the direct adoption of ICTs systems designed for business-oriented production processes 
such as e-commerce also imported standards and incentives typical of the private sector (Margetts 
and Dunleavy, 2013). The adoption of these standards and incentives has improved internal 
production but it has also reinforced the perspective of citizens as clients. The misleading 
conceptualisation of citizens as clients has led public agencies to focus only on economic efficiency, 
without considering the impact on other values or other sectors (Fountain, 2001a; Cordella, 2007). 
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Underlying the focus on citizens as clients is the idea that public agencies should behave as 
companies in a market and should focus only on the service they produce and on the immediate 
economic return. As a consequence, similarly to corporate investment, e-government investment 
tends to focus on short-term results and on the impact only on their policy domain (Dunleavy, 2010). 
Moreover, the NPM explains why the deployment of ICTs in bureaucratic organisations does not 
deliver value according to the transaction costs theoretical framework. According to this framework, 
the deployment of ICTs can only ensure the creation of economic value, but ICTs can also impact 
other democratic values. For example, in Chile, the e-procurement platform Chilecompra has helped 
to reduce public expenditure, but it has also enhanced transparency and accountability of the 
procurement process, which are typical democratic values served by the traditional model of public 
administration (Avgerou et al., 2005). Therefore, ICTs can have an impact on different values, and 
the bureaucratic and the NPM conceptualisation of ICTs do not exclude each other. They only 
represent different perspectives of what is valuable for citizens and of  how ICT can support value 
creation. 
Nevertheless, the focus on economic value and on the transaction-costs theoretical lens promoted 
by the NPM have remained dominant also in the post-NPM e-government reforms. The next section 
discusses JUG reforms rooted in the same economic rationale of the NPM. However, the JUG 
management approach attempts to overcome the siloed and short term view of NPM, in order to 
avoid systemic inefficiencies and to deliver more economic value to citizens. The JUG reforms also 
consider ICTs as tools that can create economic value not by automatising production processes and 
improving internal agency cooperation, but by enabling the coordination among public agencies.  
3.3.The JUG and e-government systems 
3.3.1 E-government systems as tools to enable coordination 
The economic rationale drives JUG reforms which consider ICTs as tools that can help the creation 
of economic value for citizens by enabling public agencies to collaborate, share resources and 
eradicate production inefficiencies caused by the siloed organisational structure promoted by NPM 
reforms. Therefore, both the NPM and JUG aim at creating more economic value for citizens by 
reducing costs of production, but through different policy approaches and conceptualisations of 
technology. 
An example that can clarify the different role of ICTs in the NPM and JUG is the Criminal Justice 
system in the UK. The NPM reforms fragmented and separated the investigative functions led by 
the Police and the prosecutorial functions led by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) (Cordella and 
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Iannacci, 2010). Hence, the Police and the CPS designed their separate ICT systems to increase 
internal efficiencies of their functions and not to collaborate. However, this separation between 
public agencies generated delays in the criminal justice service and economic inefficiencies. As part 
of the JUG reforms, the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 promoted strong inter-agency cooperation 
among all the actors in the criminal justice system. The policy addressed the development of a new 
ICTs system to improve collaboration and to eliminate delays, waste, and duplications of the 
criminal justice service. Hence, the JUG reforms have helped to create more economic value than 
the NPM reforms because they have promoted the deployment of e-government systems to 
decrease coordination costs and to enable major collaboration not only within public agencies but 
also among them. 
In fact, ICTs can connect different actors and facilitate the exchange of information (Clemons and 
Row, 1992; Hengst and Sol, 2002). The more information that becomes available, the lower the 
transaction costs (Clemons and Row, 1992). Lower transactions costs correspond to lower 
coordination costs (Becker and Murphy, 1992). More symmetric information among public agencies 
enhances trust within public administration and facilitates coordination to pursue economic 
transactions (Becker and Murphy, 1992; Hengst and Sol, 2002). For example, lower contracting costs 
and enforcement costs can facilitate cooperation between two public agencies that can better 
understand what they offer and ensure that they are reliable partners to produce public services or 
exchange resources (Hengst and Sol, 2002). Lower coordination costs result in more opportunities 
to exchange and collaborate, and thus more opportunities to produce additional services for citizens 
for fewer costs. 
Hence, similarly to the private sector, public administration has started to adopt new ICTs 
architecture to facilitate collaboration among public agencies to lower coordination costs and 
deliver more value to citizens for a minor public expenditure (Ramon Gil-Garcia, Chengalur-Smith 
and Duchessi, 2007; Janssen and Estevez, 2013). Enterprise architecture typical of the corporate 
field represents a model for many e-government ICT systems that aim at improving the 
interoperability among several public actors (Janssen, 2012). This type of architecture refers to the 
organisation of multiple agencies that work together and have an extensive portfolio of applications. 
Enterprise architecture involves some fundamental technical components such as integration 
brokers, adapters, inter-application communications and the deployment of messaging 
middleware, which favour the internal exchange of data (Lam, 2005; Scholta et al., 2019). This 
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architectural model represents a shift in focus from internal efficiency of a single unit to large scale 
efficiency (Janssen and Van Veenstra, 2005).  
 
Enterprise architecture is also combined with the diffusion of common standards for interoperability 
(Otjacques, Hitzelberger and Feltz, 2007; Janssen, 2012; Henning, 2018) because it is critical to 
technically enable interoperability among public agencies and to guarantee the evolvability of e-
government services. Countries like the US, the UK, France and Italy had committed in their past 
years' frameworks and standards to favour better interoperability among different public agencies 
(Otjacques, Hitzelberger and Feltz, 2007). The lack of interoperability due to different standards also 
represents a barrier for collaboration at the international level (Otjacques, Hitzelberger and Feltz, 
2007). For example, European countries have had significant differences about technical standards 
for digital identity, and the European Union launched a framework called eIDAS42 in 2014 to set 
common European standards and simplify the interoperability of national identity services across 
Europe.  
The realisation of e-government services for more interoperability within the public administration 
can be the result of top-down or bottom-up political initiatives. Examples of top-down initiatives 
are when central governments or national public agencies invest in national ICTs system, 
frameworks or policies to fill interoperability gaps in e-government services provision. For example, 
national governments in countries like the UK or Italy have directly invested in shared e-government 
systems to offer fundamental interoperability services such as digital payments and identification. 
The platform GOV.UK.Pay43 is an example of shared ICTs systems that facilitate interoperability 
because it enables all public agencies to receive payments online without creating their own 
payment systems. Another example is SPID44, the ICTs system developed by the Italian government 
to provide a shared identification system for all e-government services without the need for each 
public agency to develop its own identification system. Due to these shared e-government systems, 
public agencies avoid having to invest in similar ICTs systems and hence are able to generate more 
economic value for citizens. 
Local governments and public agencies can lead bottom-up initiatives to promote smaller-scale e-
government interoperability projects according to different forms of collaboration which aim at 
 
42 https://www.eid.as/home/ 




helping the public agencies involved to reduce coordination costs and to produce more value for 
citizens at lesser cost (Ferro and Sorrentino, 2010). The first form of collaboration is the convention, 
that is, a formal agreement among public agencies which is legally enforceable and allows the 
offering of e-government service produced by a public agency also to other public agencies. The 
second one is a framework of agreement, that is, a purchasing contract for digital services shared 
among different agencies. The third form of collaboration is the creation of a public body that is a 
new public agency in charge of producing digital services for all the agencies that need that service. 
A new public agency is usually created when the entire public administration needs to carry out a 
new service function such as digital payments. A consortium is another form of collaboration by 
agencies to develop a digital service which they all need to better pursue their administrative 
functions. Another form of collaboration for the development of digital service is the creation of a 
limited company owned by all the public agencies that need a service. Unlike a consortium, a limited 
company acts according to market dynamics and can sell digital services to other public and private 
actors (Juell-Skielse, Lönn and Päivärinta, 2017). 
Top-down and bottom-up interoperability e-government initiatives are fundamental to realising ICT 
systems that facilitate the exchange of information and decrease the asymmetry of information. 
Less asymmetry of information increases trust among public agencies and enables shared 
governance across public administration (Gil-García J. et al., 2005; Luna-Reyes, Gil-Garcia and Cruz, 
2007; Karlsson et al., 2017). Therefore, the development of e-government systems that promote 
interoperability decreases coordination costs and facilitates the establishment of solid alliances 
based on mutual trust (Scholl and Klischewski, 2007). Shared governance and collaboration are also 
essential to facilitate public agencies’ ability to continually meet multiple stakeholders’ interests 
(Pardo, Gil-Garcia and Burke, 2008; Nakakawa and Namagembe, 2019). Specific governance 
mechanism embedded in ICTs systems should encourage shared accountability, and the 
individuation of common goals, roles and responsibilities (Ojo, Janowski and Estevez, 2009), which 
are all necessary to reduce coordination costs and ensure that partnerships among public agencies 
endure. The development of ICTs systems for collaboration is often gradual, and accompanied by 
project leaders that provide a shared vision, goals and needs (Scholl, 2005). Leaders and digital 
champions have a critical role in e-government interoperability projects because they have to 
individuate barriers that hinder collaboration within public administration and use ICTs to reduce 
the asymmetry of information and to improve trust. Leaders of shared e-government projects 
should also be able to strategically think about the planning and the impact of cross-boundary 
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projects, and to mitigate incompatibilities and resistance to change (Gil-García J. et al., 2005) in 
order to lower coordination costs and facilitate interoperability. 
 
However, ICTs systems are not always able to reduce coordination costs. Moreover, sometimes they 
can increase information asymmetry and increase coordination costs, which generates more 
inefficiencies and less economic value for the public.  
3.3.2 The limitations of the JUG reforms in e-government 
The conceptualisation of e-government systems as a tool to reduce coordination costs and to create 
more economic value for citizens has certain limitations. E-government projects promoted by JUG 
reforms have not always been successful in enhancing interoperability with public administration, 
and their failure has increased public expenditure and generated more inefficiencies (Pardo, Nam 
and Burke, 2012; Fan, 2018). In order to understand why public agencies have failed to reduce 
coordination costs, it is necessary to reflect on the economic rationale that drives public agencies. 
Through the theoretical lens of public choice, principal-agent theory, public agencies are seen as 
economic agents that tend to maximise their economic return and protect their interests (Hood, 
1991; Grube, 2012). The asymmetry of information among public agencies and between public 
agencies and citizens allows public agencies to pursue their interests even if they differ from the 
ones of other public agencies or citizens. This form of opportunistic behaviour disappears when 
public agencies start exchanging information with all the actors (Warkentin et al., 2002). In fact, 
ideally, e-government systems facilitate  symmetry of information among all the actors and 
consequently improve trust (Mpinganjira, 2015).  
Nevertheless, ICTs can paradoxically increase the asymmetry of information and decrease trust 
among actors (Cordella, 2006). First of all, this is because public agencies act strategically and share 
information with other public agencies according to their own interests (Scholl and Klischewski, 
2007). The most crucial information is retained or partially released. Hence, sometimes public 
agencies are able to meet policy and legal requirements even if the data exchanged are useless.  
From a strategic point of view, information is power, and many public agencies tend to protect their 
information to retain power and protect their interests. On the other extreme, too much available 
data can generate an overload of information, which increases the asymmetry of information. 
Higher asymmetry of information corresponds to higher transaction costs and coordination costs 
(Cordella, 2006). Thus, both scarcity and abundance of exchanged information can lead to higher 
coordination costs and  inefficiencies, which results in less economic value for citizens.  
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Moreover, there are barriers that hinder the interoperability of e-government initiatives and 
increase coordination costs. The first type are technical barriers. Years of NPM reforms have created 
an archipelago of closed ICTs systems with different development frameworks, and the use of 
proprietary technologies, which have generated a high level of complexity and incompatibility of 
software and hardware components (Ramon Gil-Garcia, Chengalur-Smith and Duchessi, 2007; 
Pardo, Nam and Burke, 2012). Different types of technical standards of ICTs systems represent an 
additional technical barrier that is difficult to overcome, especially because many public agencies 
are locked in with proprietary standards imposed by contractors (Greenhalgh et al., 2010; Cordella 
and Willcocks, 2012; Henning, 2018). Public agencies are also locked into inflexible legacy systems 
characterised by archaic programming languages, lack of documentation, ageing filed formats, and 
deployment of monolithic architectures (Robertson, 1997). Different security models represent 
another barrier for interoperability and also a critical factor that can negatively influence trust 
among actors that share information (Warkentin et al., 2002). Applications that have evolved 
independently rather than as part of the same architectures have different levels of security which 
are sometimes incompatible or overlap each other (Volchkov, 2001). 
Organisational barriers also constrain interoperability. Public agencies have different strategic goals 
that serve different policy domains (Scholl and Klischewski, 2007), and the combination of multiple 
interests is challenging. Sometimes public agencies’ priorities differ or conflict and there are no 
apparent benefits for everybody. Moreover, collaboration might represent a cultural shock for 
public agencies which have to rethink their internal structure and interoperability. Significant 
diversity in organisational cultures can also cause resistance to collaboration with other public 
agencies (Lam, 2005). Different organisational cultures and regulations can also generate funding 
problems for interoperability projects. Public agencies are responsible for their funding and 
accountable for how their budget is spent.  Participation in shared projects where they have partial 
and indirect control represents a financial risk which limits possible collaboration initiatives. Another 
risk of interoperability projects is the misuse of shared information (Ramon Gil-Garcia, Chengalur-
Smith and Duchessi, 2007). Public agencies prefer to not share data with other public agencies, not 
only to protect their position but also because of the lack of clarity in privacy or usage policies 
between specific government agencies (Tillman, 2003).  
The lack of multidimensional governance represents a barrier for JUG e-government systems 
(O’Flynn et al., 2011). JUG initiatives often focus on technical aspects that affect governance of 
shared e-government systems, and underestimate the political and organisational aspects that 
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favour intra-agency collaboration (Cordella and Iannacci, 2010; Keast, 2011; Carey, Crammond and 
Riley, 2014). In fact, common regulations and administrative procedures for data collection, use, 
dissemination, storage, privacy and security are fundamental for defining and regulating 
interoperability among different actors (Scholl and Klischewski, 2007). The lack of understanding of 
the different dimensions that influence cross-agency collaboration has led to setting over-ambitious 
e-government milestones for public administration collaboration (Lam, 2005), which have often 
failed (Pardo, Nam and Burke, 2012; Eriksson and Goldkuhl, 2013; Sharma and Panigrahi, 2015). 
Therefore, the JUG management approach requires us to consider different dimensions to 
successfully decrease coordination costs among public agencies and to deliver more value to 
citizens. 
Finally, another missed opportunity of the JUG reforms to further deliver more value to citizens is 
related to the narrow conceptualisation of interoperability (Hodges and Grubnic, 2010; Margetts 
and Dunleavy, 2013). JUG reforms have restricted the scope of interoperability only to public 
agencies. However, public agencies could create more value co-producing services with third 
parties. In fact, the more actors involved in the production of public services, the lower the 
production costs and public expenditure, and the bigger the value for citizens. The next section 
discusses how the NPG—following the same economic rationale of the NPM and JUG—conceived 
e-government systems as a tool to reduce coordination costs not only between public agencies but 
also between public agencies and third parties. In the NPG, the role of ICTs transforms from being a 
tool to enable interoperability only within the boundaries of public administration to being a tool to 
facilitate collaboration with private actors. 
3.4.The networked production  
3.4.1 ICTs-mediated co-production and the GaaP 
The NPG management approach is also driven by the economic rationale, and it considers ICTs as 
tools which can help to create more value for citizens by enabling both the interoperability among 
public agencies and the co-production of public services with non-public actors (de-Miguel-Molina, 
2009). According to Margetts and Dunleavy (2013), this is possible due to the second wave of 
government digitalisation, labelled Digital Era Governance 2 (DEG2), which blurs conventional public 
administration boundaries between public and private sectors. This second wave of digitalisation 
refers to the diffusion of the internet and social networks which have reduced coordination costs 
and have favoured the adoption of a more networked model of production (Benkler, 2007; Hodges 
and Grubnic, 2010; Kallinikos, 2011). Public agencies can now deploy ICTs to involve citizens and 
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companies to co-produce more services for fewer costs and hence deliver more economic value to 
citizens (Linders 2012; Zuiderwijk and Janssen 2014; Fishenden and Thompson 2013; Toots et al. 
2017). ICTs have drastically reduced the costs of involvement and coordination of third parties not 
only in the policymaking process (Peristeras et al., 2009; Linders, 2012; Medaglia, 2012; 
Panagiotopoulos, Bowen and Brooker, 2017) but also in the production process of public services 
(Linders, 2012; Marjanovic, Fry and Chataway, 2012; Janssen and Estevez, 2013; Panagiotopoulos, 
Bigdeli and Sams, 2014; Alford and Yates, 2016; Klievink, Bharosa and Tan, 2016; Gascó, 2017; 
Cordella and Paletti, 2018). Therefore, due to Internet-based technologies, the NPG has become a 
more supportable management approach for the organisation of the networked model of public 
administration and the co-production of public services. 
ICTs-mediated co-production of public service is the result of top-down or bottom-up initiatives. 
Public agencies lead top-down co-production initiatives at different levels of government, and aim 
at involving unknown contributors to perform specific production tasks to reduce costs and deliver 
more value to citizens. For example, the San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District (SRVFPD) in the 
USA struggled to offer an effective emergency service to citizens suffering heart attacks (Walravens 
and Ballon, 2013). An ambulance should arrive in four minutes to save a person having a heart 
attack; this means that, in order to provide a prompt emergency service, many ambulances and 
paramedics are needed. The SRVFPS did not have enough internal resources to provide the expected 
service. Therefore, in 2009, the SRVFPS developed the app PulsePoint45, which provides a platform 
to crowdsource first aid service. PulsePoint is a platform that uses a geolocation service to alert 
citizens who have been trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) about an emergency in the 
area where they are. Once they receive the emergency call, they can intervene to provide prompt 
life-saving assistance to victims of sudden cardiac arrest while awaiting the arrival of an ambulance. 
PulsePoint made the SRVFPS able to provide a more effective emergency service without hiring 
more paramedics or buying more ambulances (Walravens and Ballon, 2013). Due  to ICTs-mediated 
co-production, SRVFPS has been able to provide more efficient public service without increasing 
public expenditure. 
Networked production can also be the result of bottom-up initiatives led directly by citizens, NGOs 





minimal involvement of public agencies (Linders, 2012). For example, Ushahidi46 is a platform 
developed by Kenyan volunteers to crowdsource reports about violence in the aftermath of Kenya’s 
crisis of 2007. The crowdsourcing platform was also used during  disaster relief operation in 2010 in 
Haiti. The platform Ushahidi crowdsourced 3,596 reports, which helped different international 
public agencies to respond more effectively to the disaster without directly deploying their 
resources (Gao et al., 2011; Morrow, Nancy Mock, et al., 2011). 
The rise of ICTs-mediated co-production of public services encouraged by the NPG is the results of 
the investment of e-government systems able to sustain a more networked production of public 
services. ICTs systems that support a more networked model of public administration are not built 
according to a precise plan such as used in the construction of a cathedral, but instead, like bazaars 
(Raymond, 2005) open to collective and unplanned contributions of external actors. The platform 
architecture typical of companies like Apple, Amazon or Google supports and enables this 
alternative way to develop e-government services, and it represents a model for many e-
government systems that aim at co-producing public services with third parties and also at better 
coordinating with other public agencies (Fishenden and Thompson, 2013). The platform’s 
architecture facilitates interactions between multiple groups of actors (Evans, 2003) that are 
unplanned and decentralised and which evolve autonomously. All actors can establish a different 
relationship on the platform and be simultaneously customers and producers of services. O’Reilly’s 
(2011) proposes the concept of Government as a Platform (GaaP) to explain how platform 
architecture can be beneficial to supporting a more networked model of public administration and 
production. In his seminal work, he outlines the characteristics that make GaaP in the public sector 
more efficient than other organisational models.  
The platform architecture is based on a modular structure and a system of standards that lower 
transaction and coordination costs and simplify interoperability (O’Reilly, 2011; Janssen and 
Estevez, 2013; Brown et al., 2017). Modularity allows private and public actors to integrate new 
services, improving the offer of public services without the need to increase production costs. 
Modularity also avoids the need for public agencies to remain locked into inflexible legacy systems 
or into monolithic architectures (Janssen, Wagenaa and Wagenaar, 2004; O’Reilly, 2011). The 
modularity of GaaP allows public agencies to easily reconfigure the production of public service by 





Rabaiah and Vandijct, 2011). Modularity reduces the risk of failure because each module is 
independent from the rest of the architecture (Rabaiah and Vandijct, 2011). If the development of 
a module which embeds a new service fails, the failure is limited to that service and not to the entire 
ICTs system. Hence, a modular structure decreases the risk of wasting public investment more than 
in monolithic architecture (Heeks, 2003; Rabaiah and Vandijct, 2011). Lower risks of development 
can also facilitate experimentation and innovation of new e-government services. 
Application program interfaces (APIs) are another important technical characteristic of GaaP 
because they enable e-government systems to replace, connect or develop new modules from 
scratch. APIs are a set of routines, protocols and development tools which are necessary to enable 
collaboration among public agencies, which can use them to develop joint services, sometimes 
without the need to obtain formal permission (Lněnička and Máchová, 2015). Therefore, APIs are 
fundamental to reducing coordination costs, simplifying collaboration and producing more value for 
citizens. APIs are organised in catalogues available in data portals, which are essential to 
disseminate open data according to different standards (Attard et al., 2015). An example is the 
London Data Store47, the data portal of London that collects open data about education, 
transportation and public expenditure which can be accessed by all actors without restriction. 
However, not all data are open to the public. Some data are only shared among public agencies that 
are authorised to use them. Moreover, open data can be provided by public agencies as well as by 
external actors such as NGOs or companies. All these data represent an incredible resource to create 
more economic value for society because they encourage external actors to develop more options 
of public services or entirely new services for the public (Attard et al., 2015; Lin, 2015; Chatfield and 
Reddick, 2017). 
The GaaP architecture facilitates the exchange of information among public and private actors and 
thus reduces the asymmetry of information among public and private actors. Lower asymmetry of 
information reduces transaction costs and increases trust. Trust among private and public actors is 
fundamental to enable the networked model of public administration described by the NPG. 
3.4.2 The limitations of GaaP e-government systems 
The NPG conceptualisation of e-government systems as tools to enable co-production and to create 





coordination and transactions costs and supports an open model of public administration. However, 
the realisation of platforms cannot directly ensure the creation of more economic value (Hagiu and 
Yoffie, 2009).  
In order to create value, GaaP requires public agencies to exchange data which are necessary to 
develop services. Although the number of agencies that disclose their data has increased, the 
publication and consumption of data are still limited. The barrier for interoperability within and 
beyond public administration boundaries is limited by technical, policy, legal, economic, financial, 
cultural, and organisational barriers (Conradie and Choenni, 2014; Zuiderwijk and Janssen, 2014). 
The heterogeneity of data standards, the diversity of data structures and the diversity of tools used 
to present and visualise data also represent important barriers for interoperability. Public agencies 
are unwilling to publish their data because it would decrease the asymmetry of information and 
expose public agencies to critics of their production performances (Attard et al., 2015) 
The reluctance of many public agencies to exchange data is a threat to networked production 
enabled by GaaP and promoted by NPG. The creation of value through GaaP is related to the 
interaction between platforms and networks of actors that co-produce services. Nevertheless,  if 
the network is small, the platform risks falling into the liquidity trap or central market 
defense  (Clemons and Weber, 1996).  According to the liquidity trap, if the network is small, there 
will be less interaction and the potential to create value will decrease. Hence, if GaaP does not reach 
critical mass necessary to enable a valuable exchange of data, then other actors will avoid joining 
the platform (Janssen et al., 2009) and no value for citizens will be created. The failure to build a 
platform without a valuable network represents a waste of public investment and decreases value 
for citizens.  
The risk for public agencies to invest in platforms that are unable to reach critical mass of actors 
necessary to generate value for citizens is high because of the diffused decentralisation of e-
government policies which has caused the development of similar platforms and the duplication of 
digital services. For example, in many countries, like Italy or the UK, there is no  national Open Data 
platform, but there are several platforms usually developed autonomously by each city (Attard et 
al., 2015). The decentralised offering of Open Data has generated more economic inefficiencies 
because it has increased transaction and coordination costs. Decentralisation increases searching 
costs because developers have more difficulty in finding the data they need to develop new services. 
Platforms also have different standards and regulations which increase contracting costs for co-
producers. Data provision is also uncertain. Governance of each Open Data platform is siloed, and 
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sometimes datasets or APIs can be suddenly closed or regulations can change. The uncertainty of 
data provision increases enforcement costs, especially for complex e-government services based on 
data coming from different platforms. 
The inability of the existing platforms developed by public agencies to reduce transaction costs 
related to co-production of services has reinforced the success of platforms owned by companies 
that have bigger networks and are therefore more valuable (Janssen and Estevez, 2013). For 
example, each country has developed its own identification system for e-government services. The 
European Union launched a regulation called eIDAS48 only in 2014 to simplify the interoperability of 
national identity services across Europe, and it is still not fully effective. Conversely, the 
identification services of Facebook and Google are already available and diffused worldwide, 
especially for digital services. This is the reason why companies and users tend to use Facebook or 
Google identification services rather than national identification services, which are not diffused 
and are often difficult to implement.  
The lack of ownership of platforms like Google or Facebook identification services can appear 
economically convenient for public agencies because they create value for citizens without the need 
for any public investments in the development and management of the platform. However, the lack 
of ownership of these platforms can potentially generate inefficiencies. For example, if the 
Facebook identification service stops working, all the digital services that have adopted it will stop 
working as well, and the digital economy will be damaged. Because the government does not have 
any control over private platforms, there will always be an opportunity for both companies and 
external actors to generate economic inefficiencies for the public.  
Relevant literature has explained only how GaaP impacts production efficiency (O’Reilly, 2011; 
Janssen and Estevez, 2013; Walravens and Ballon, 2013; Brown et al., 2017). However, e-
government systems have an impact not only on efficiency, but also on multiple values. It is not 
clear how GaaP also impacts other values such as transparency, public safety or fairness, which are 
usually embedded in the concept of public value. 
3.5 Public value creation in e-government 
A big portion of e-government literature and of GaaP literature has evaluated the impact of ICTs 
systems by looking at efficiency-driven measures such as cost reduction and cost per unit of output 





focuses on the deployment of e-government systems like GaaP as tools to improve efficiency. 
However, the fundamental weakness of this dominant perspective in the e-government field is that 
ICTs have an impact on multiple values and not only on efficiency (Bannister, 2002). 
Technology can serve multiple values because the deployment of ICTs in public administration is not 
neutral, but is influenced by the organisational, social and political contexts that determine the set 
of values that public agencies should achieve (Fountain, 2001a; Bekkers and Homburg, 2007). Public 
agencies can conceive ICTs systems as tools to create value by serving other needs and expectations 
such as transparency or trust (Avgerou and Walsham, 2000; Fountain, 2001a; Contini and Lanzara, 
2008; Twizeyimana and Andersson, 2019). Many studies show how ICTs can positively impact 
citizens’ trust (Avgerou et al., 2005). Other studies have shown how ICTs can help to improve 
participation and democracy (Avgerou et al., 2005; Jaeger, 2005), transparency (Bertot, Jaeger and 
Grimes, 2010; Lin, 2015), food security (Nakasone and Torero, 2016), public safety (Silva, Wuwongse 
and Sharma, 2012; Paletti et al., 2016), public health (Gustafson et al., 2005) or education (Ruiz, 
Mintzer and Leipzig, 2006).  
Even if the above studies do not explicitly refer to public value theory, they are in line with the public 
value framework because they show how ICTs deployment in public sectors can support different 
production processes and have an impact not only on efficiency but also on different values. The 
public value paradigm represents an alternative perspective for analysing how ICTs systems 
contribute to creating value for citizens. Nevertheless, the adoption of the public value perspective 
implies several complexities for e-government systems.  
The first complexity is that to create public value public agencies need to create e-government 
systems able to serve multiple needs and expectations which are often conflictual. However, 
because public agencies serve different policies, domains and groups of citizens (public employees, 
families, companies, etc), they contain different clusters of interests that might conflict (Pang, Lee 
and DeLone, 2014). For example, the adoption of facial recognition can help police to efficiently 
monitor tube stations and improve public safety. However, facial recognition can also present a 
threat to citizens’ privacy (van Zoonen, 2016). The other complexity highlighted by the public value 
perspective is that it is challenging to predict ex-ante the impact of e-government systems because 
ICTs can unintentionally impact other related values (Smith, 2011; Karunasena and Deng, 2012). For 
example, ICTs deployed to improve the efficiency of public services can have a positive impact on 
public trust (Smith, 2011). As pointed out by Cordella (2007), the adoption of ICTs can improve the 
efficiency of service, and at the same time, it can negatively impact other values, such as 
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impartiality and equality. For example, public services available only digitally might discriminate 
against citizens who have technological or knowledge gaps. In fact, according to the public value 
perspective, the success of e-government systems depends on how citizens perceive the overall 
value that is created (Scott, DeLone and Golden, 2016). Hence, secondary and often unintentional 
impact on other values complicates the public value creation process mediated by e-government 
systems.  
 
Public value creation adds a layer of complexities in the deployment of ICTs systems. In order to 
create public value, public agencies need to adapt and evolve the production of services according 
to different values and various social, legal, political and technical factors to minimise negative 
externalities and conflicts among policy domains. However, as a result of past e-government 
reforms, three main barriers have emerged that can impede the creation of public value. 
The first barrier is that public agencies struggle to adapt or evolve their e-government systems to 
serve new needs and expectations. Public agencies often cannot build ICTs systems ex-novo. Some 
components of e-government systems cannot be changed because they are the result of 
technological stratification of past organisational or political reforms. These stratifications create 
technical, legal, political and organisational path dependencies that influence the production 
configuration of new e-government services (Klievink and Janssen, 2009; Lanzara, 2009; Aanestad 
et al., 2017). Therefore, the creation of value by certain public agencies is wholly or partially frozen 
and cannot easily evolve. For this reason, the ICTs-mediated production of public services can 
become an obstacle to public value creation because public agencies cannot change their 
production configuration. 
The second barrier is that each public agency has focused on  customer-oriented development of e-
government systems, and has tailored digital services on the basis of supply and demand dynamics 
and the maximisation of economic value. As a consequence, public agencies produce services only 
in the forms that are economically convenient for public agencies, and without considering the 
impact on other values. For example, some public agencies have completely digitalised many public 
services to reduce public expenditure and to create more economic value. However, they have also 
discriminated against those citizens who are not familiar with relevant technologies or who cannot 
access to digital services. The customer-oriented development of ICTs systems has only focused on 
profit maximisation and has narrowed down the complexity of meeting several values to generate 
public value.  
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The third barrier is the lack of interoperability among public agencies. Focus on efficiency has 
underestimated the importance of interoperability within public administration to meet other 
public values. Public agencies driven by economic efficiency prefer to not collaborate with public 
agencies or other external actors if the collaboration does not positively impact economic efficiency. 
Hence, many e-government systems have remained closed to third parties or partially open only to 
economically convenient partnerships. 
 
Public value perspective increases the level of complexity of value creation for the public, and the 
existing barriers currently represent an obstacle for many e-government systems to create public 
value. The diffusion of co-production enabled by e-government systems based on GaaP 
characteristics has helped to improve the efficiency of public service production. Nevertheless, it is 
not clear if the diffusion of co-production enabled by GaaP can help the creation of public value and 
if GaaP characteristics can solve the above complexities and barriers to public value creation. 
The next chapter presents the theoretical framework which explains how this study conceptualises 
technology, and how the characteristics of GaaP architecture can overcome the above barriers and 
potentially enable public value creation. Furthermore, it also explores the necessity of a governance 





CHAPTER 4 Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. The first section briefly summarises 
different perspectives about the impact of e-government systems on value creation and discusses 
the socio-technical perspective adopted for this study. The second section describes how the 
interaction of the organisational and technical dimensions of the GaaP enables public agencies to 
adapt their production configuration and create value by constantly meeting citizens’ new needs. 
The third section discusses an important limitation of GaaP in the creation of public value. By 
comparing the differences between digital infrastructures, platforms, and GaaP from a control point 
of view, it emerges that GaaP might paradoxically constrain public value creation.  
4.1. E-government perspectives 
Different research philosophies have informed research on e-government.  Heeks and Bailur (2007) 
have clustered them along a continuum where at its extremes, we can find positivism and social 
constructivism. Clustering literature along this continuum has been a common exercise in 
information systems literature since it helps to better identify how researchers in the field have 
framed the role of technology and organisations in shaping the outcome of ICTs-led reforms 
(Easterby-Smith, R and Lowe, 2002; Guba, 2002). E-government literature, similarly to information 
systems literature, has been strongly dominated from the beginning by a positivist approach (Meijer 
and Bekkers, 2015). The positivist approach is driven by the assumption that the nature of the 
phenomena under investigation is objective. This positivist stance leads researchers to search for 
precise variables which can help to discover causal rules to predict general patterns that shape any 
given context (Alkhalifah, 2017).  Most often, positivist research holds a realist and objective 
ontology (Meijer and Bekkers, 2015; Alkhalifah, 2017). In the context of e-government research, this 
means that a single reality exists and that all the variables in e-government projects such as 
technology, work procedures, organisational culture, and skills have their own independent 
existence (Heeks and Bailur, 2007; Aliyu et al., 2014). Therefore, the impact of e-government 
systems on the creation of value as well as the value experienced by citizens are objective and can 
be pre-determined a priori by looking at how the different variables interact (Vargo, Maglio and 
Archpru Akaka, 2008) and shape each other. By identifying the path of interdependences shaping 
different variables, it is possible to identify patterns that apply to all cases. Hence, generalisation of 
findings is possible. This leads researchers interested in the study of e-government to identify 
technological features that shape public sector action and to be able to pre-determine the specific 
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technological features that will lead to precise outcomes when deployed in public sector 
organisations. Indeed, the analysis of how specific functionalities designed in the technological 
artefact shape the outcome of its adoption in organisations and hence, of how organisations get 
redesigned by ICT systems, is very valuable to appreciate fundamental transformations that are 
brought about by ICT systems.  However, the positivist stance tends to undermine multiple factors 
which are not objective but rather constructed in the subjective sphere of the individuals involved 
in e-government projects. 
 The investigation of the social involvement in the creation of technology is not new. Some early 
studies (e.g., Mumford, 1934; L. Winner, 1977) have researched how choices of human agents can 
affect the development, design or construction of technology social factors. Technology is 
considered as a social artefact that is subjective to the interpretation of relevant social groups (Pinch 
and Bijker, 1984; Meikle and Bijker, 1997).  However, the social constructivist framework stresses 
the importance of contextual dynamics in the social shaping of technology, which implies that social 
factors shape technology in specific and subjective contexts (Kallinikos, 2004a). In fact, the social 
constructivist approach is based on the subjective interpretation of reality and the meaning given 
by each individual to a particular material or immaterial variables. Individuals and groups build their 
subjective interpretation of reality in a specific context. This approach focuses on the identification 
of a set of variables, relationships and interdependencies which are dependent on interpretation of 
the actors involved in the construction of the reality and on the interpretation of researchers. The 
social constructivist stance leads researchers to investigate particular constructions and meanings 
that an individual or groups of individuals have about variables which describe or explain specific 
phenomena (Van den Bulck, 1999; Heeks and Bailur, 2007). Frequently, social constructivist study 
holds a subjective ontology, and hence its findings cannot be generalised to other contexts.  In the 
field of e-government research, this perspective contrasts the positivist stances. The claim is that a 
single reality does not exist and that all the variables of e-government projects such as ICTs 
architectures, work procedures, legal procedures, or organisational structure are shaped and 
interpreted according to the needs and convictions of situated agents. Therefore, the impact of e-
government services on value creation cannot be pre-determined because it is influenced by  the 
contextual and subjective choices of the individuals involved in the design, adoption and 
configuration of ICT systems that shape the production of e-government services (Suchman, 1987; 
Williams and Edge, 1996; Heath, Knoblauch and Luff, 2000; Orlikowski, 2000).  
143 
 
Moreover, the value created by e-government services cannot be predicted because what is 
valuable for citizens is not objective and cannot be simply delivered, but instead is constructed in 
the subjective sphere of each individual when he or she interacts with the e-government service 
(Osborne, 2018). This leads e-government researchers to assume that the impact of ICTs systems 
on value delivered to citizens has no objective existence and that generalisation is not possible. 
Indeed, it is very valuable to study how the interaction of social and technical variables shapes the 
impact on the value created by fundamental ICTs system transformation through the design or 
redesign of e-government production configurations. However, the meaning of the variables is 
ultimately in the subjective sphere and constructed by each of the individuals involved. Therefore, 
the researcher might seek to investigate what the production configuration means to public 
servants, what value they aim to create through a specific production configuration, and what they 
think are the relationships among the variables that affect the production configuration. 
Nevertheless, e-government researchers do not usually mention concepts of research philosophies 
even if it is possible to infer the influence of the above research philosophies from the way in which 
researchers treat technological and social variables, and from how they conceive technological 
impact on value creation. Some studies (e.g., Bellamy & Taylor, 1998; Layne & Lee, 2001) under the 
implicit influence of the positivist approach are inclined to believe that technology has some 
inherent and objective features which can directly impact production configuration and then the 
creation of value. The direct association of technology with impacts on value creation is usually 
considered part of the technological determinist perspective. The technological determinist 
perspective leads researchers to concentrate their studies mainly on the technical dimension of e-
government systems and tends to explain how certain technical and objective characteristics of  ICTs 
systems generate specific value outcomes (Layne and Lee, 2001; Yang, 2003). Accordingly, an 
analysis of the elements that belong to the technical dimension can explain the failure or success of 
e-government services in delivering value. Once some causal laws that associate the adoption of 
specific technology with certain value outcomes are identified, researches can develop models 
which can explain e-government impact in any context (Layne and Lee, 2001).  
Generally, in these models, the more advanced the technology adopted by public agencies, the 
higher the stage of e-government development and the bigger the value delivered to the public 
(Gauld, 2009). Models that describe e-government development stages consider citizens’ 
perception of value as generalisable and easily determined and measured by looking at general 
efficiency parameters of services such as processing time, costs, or number of hours of work (Fleck, 
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Webster and Williams, 1990; Bellamy and Taylor, 1998). Due to these models, the impact on the 
value experienced by citizens can be pre-determined a priori by looking at the effects that certain 
technical arrangements have had in another context (Bellamy and Taylor, 1998). These models are 
usually used by public agencies to assess their current e-government stage of development (Layne 
and Lee, 2001; Torres, Pina and Acerete, 2005) and to guide them towards/in the adoption of certain 
ICTs systems sufficient to reach the desired outcome (Andersen and Henriksen, 2006). However, the 
focus on the technological aspects of e-government systems represents the main limitation of the 
technological determinism perspective, which fails to explain how the political, organisational, and 
administrative dimensions shape a specific technical configuration (Jessop, 1996). By focusing 
primarily on the technical dimension of e-government initiatives, the technological deterministic 
perspective risks underestimating the importance of the organisational dimension where political, 
organisational, and administrative elements interact to define goals and address the development 
of technical functionalities (Cordella and Iannacci, 2010). 
Studies (e.g., Fountain, 2001; Schellong, 2007) that consider political, organisational and 
administrative elements as the major factors that shape value generated by e-government projects 
are usually categorised as social determinist, to emphasise the importance of the organisational 
dimension in e-government systems. These studies claim that the impact of e-government services 
largely depends on the administrative, political or organisational changes which shape e-
government configuration and the creation of value for citizens (Williams and Edge, 1996). 
Accordingly, the development of e-government services is seen as not driven by an inner technical 
logic but is instead the result of organisational, political, and administrative choices. These choices, 
whether they are intentional or not, frame the design of e-government technical functionalities, 
shape the trajectory of digital transformation in public agencies, and affect the value delivered to 
citizens (Yang, 2003; Gil-García J. et al., 2005).  
The socio deterministic perspective highlights that at every stage of e-government development, 
the actors involved in the digital transformation have a number of design options available. The 
available options are not prearranged but socially shaped by the interaction between certain 
cognitive, cultural, social and institutional variables that belong to the organisational dimension 
(Fountain, 2001a; Schellong, 2007). Therefore, the outcome of the e-government system cannot be 
easily predicted a priori because there are no clear e-government development paths. Changes in 
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the political or social environment imply changes in the organisational dimension of e-governments 
systems (Fountain, 2001a).  
Hence, the failure or success of e-government projects in creating value depends on how the 
variables within the organisational dimensions interact and lead to the selection and configuration 
of elements that belong to the technical dimension (Picazo-Vela, Fernandez-Haddad and Luna-
Reyes, 2016). It is then possible to explain the impact of e-government services by looking at the 
interdependences of the variables that belong to the organisational dimensions of e-government 
systems (Sanjeev and Riggins, 2005; Helbig, Ramón Gil-García and Ferro, 2009). While the socio 
deterministic approach to studying the impact of  e-government deployments on the value created 
for the public is very valuable to accounting for important cognitive, cultural, social and institutional 
variables,  it  also underestimates the power that technical elements have in shaping e-government 
systems and on e-government services’ impact on value creation. To overcome the limitation of the 
techno-deterministic and the socio-deterministic approaches, scholars have increasingly looked at 
how both variables, the technological and the organisational, shape e-government deployments and 
the values they create. 
Accordingly, the sociotechnical perspective, which is usually considered a midpoint between the 
technological and the social determinist perspectives, has gained increasing interest among e-
government scholars. Studies that adopt the sociotechnical perspective (e.g., Cordella & Iannacci, 
2010; Janssena et al., 2009) explain the impact of e-government system on value creation as a result 
of the interaction of the organisational and technological dimensions. The interaction between 
technical and organisational dimensions of e-government services shape e-government 
configuration and affect the production of public services and the creation of value (Helbig, Ramón 
Gil-García and Ferro, 2009). Production configuration is then the result of a negotiation between 
the technical and organisational dimensions that reciprocally shape each other (Luna-Reyes et al., 
2005; Heeks and Bailur, 2007; Lanzara, 2009). Organisational factors shape the technological 
features which in turn may reshape the organisational dimensions. The value delivered by e-
government projects is not the outcome of planned and sequential evolutionary phases, but 
emerges as the result of a complex set of technical and organisational relationship (Cordella and 
Bonina, 2012). The technical and social dimensions merge into a socio-technical regime that shapes 
the development of ICTs systems for the public sector (Luna-Reyes et al., 2005; Janssen et al., 2009) 
. The process of negotiation and mutual shaping is continuous. The value delivered by e-government 
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initiatives is then the result of the on-going interplay of the organisational and technical dimensions 
(Cordella and Iannacci, 2010).  
Moreover, often  public agencies do not configure the production of public service ex-novo or from 
scratch. E-government services are configured through the mediation of previous production 
configurations which have their own logic that can enable or constrain how the new production 
configuration is shaped (Kallinikos, 2004a; Lanzara, 2009). The negotiation with existent technical 
and organisational configurations can potentially lead to sub-optimal production configurations and 
an unexpected value outcome (Antonio and Francesco, 2012). Accordingly, the socio-technical 
perspective suggests that researchers should mainly focus on the interaction between the 
organisational and technical dimensions of an e-government system to explain how it impacts  value 
creation (Bekkers and Homburg, 2007; Cordella and Bonina, 2012). However, this explanation 
cannot be generalised because the way in which technical and social variables interact and impact 
value creation is influenced by the situated context (Heeks and Bailur, 2007). Socio-technical 
systems exist within their own environments, constituted by variegated needs and expectations 
(Bostrom and Heinen, 1997). If the political, social or technical environment changes, the system 
has to adapt to meet emerging needs and to create value. Therefore, the process of adaptation is 
reciprocal and continuous not only within the e-government system but also between the e-
government system and the environment where it is embedded (Janssen et al., 2009). 
This study follows that stream of research and explains how the socio-technical regime of the GaaP 
configuration impacts public value outcomes. Specifically, this work builds on Moore’s (1995) 
strategic triangle for public value creation, to analyse how GaaP configurations impact the way in 
which public sector’s agencies create public value. The strategic triangle is still considered a valid 
conceptual framework to explain and analyse the peculiarities of the public value creation process, 
which is composed of three distinctive stages (Moore and Khagram, 2004; Alford and Hughes, 2008). 
The first stage is the definition and evaluation of citizens’ needs and interests that must be satisfied 
to create public value. The second stage is the assessment of the political, legal, administrative and 
social factors which constitute the authorising environment that formally or informally authorises 
the production of services under specific terms and conditions. The third stage is the evaluation and 
configuration of the operational capabilities necessary to produce the service and to achieve the 




Figure 1 Strategic triangle of public value creation (Moore, 1995) 
This strategic triangle is often considered a framework to operationalise public value creation 
(Moore and Khagram, 2004), but it also represents a change of the value creation paradigm 
(Meynhardt, 2009).  In fact, the public service production configuration that impacts public value is 
the result of the interaction of multiple organisational, political or technical dimensions that 
mutually affect each other at different stages of the process. The public value creation process 
described by the strategic triangle of Moore (1995) shifts where value for the public is defined from 
public organisations’ boundaries to the authorising environment constituted by political, legal, and 
institutional elements which are often external to public agencies and which represent multiple 
citizens’ needs and expectations (Panagiotopoulos, Klievink and Cordella, 2019). The environment 
within which public agencies operates then shapes the production configuration (Stoker, 2006). 
Within the public administration boundaries, there are a set of technical and organisational 
elements, known in the strategic triangle as operational capabilities, which mutually mediate each 
other and also shape the impact upon the creation of public value. The impact on public value 
cannot be predefined because it emerges as part of the process of negotiation between the 
technical and organisational dimensions of the operational capabilities, and is also mediated 
through past production configurations (Cordella and Bonina, 2012; Panagiotopoulos, Klievink and 
Cordella, 2019). The public value outcome of the service produced has an impact on citizens, and 
can potentially lead to changes to the authorising environment and to the production configuration 
(O’Flynn, 2007). The process of negotiation within organisational boundaries and between the 
organisation and the external environment continually shapes the production configuration and the 










enable the production configuration of public services are built and then mediated by GaaP 
characteristics. The GaaP literature (Brown et al., 2017) has already individuated in the IS literature 
the characteristics of the organisational and technical dimensions of GaaP. The next section 
describes how GaaP characteristics enable public agencies that constitute public administration to 
configure the production of public services and to create public value. 
4.2. GaaP’s characteristics 
As already discussed in chapter 3, the GaaP literature (O’Reilly, 2011) considers the platform 
architecture typical of companies like Google or Amazon as a valid alternative for public 
administration to overcome its monolithic structure and to create more value for citizens by 
supporting a more networked and adaptable production of public services.  Indeed, GaaP has a 
direct impact on the operational capabilities of the entire public administration because it enables 
public agencies to configure the production of public services and to create public value. In order to 
understand how GaaP can change the way in which public agencies produce public services and 
create public value, it is necessary to understand the organisational and technical characteristics of 
GaaP. 
Differently from previous studies (O’Reilly, 2011; Janssen and Estevez, 2013; Brown et al., 2017), in 
this research GaaP is conceived not as a simple large platform but as ‘platform of platforms’ 
developed by public agencies autonomously or in partnerships with other public agencies to fill 
common service gaps (e.g., identification service) or to serve specific policy domains (e.g., electronic 
medical healthcare records). This architecture of platforms supports a modular structure of 
interdependent components similar to a LEGO structure, which enables public agencies to assemble 
and disassemble their production configurations an infinite number of times and to constantly meet 
citizen’s needs (Ciborra, 1996; Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). The platforms that constitute GaaP 
serve different purposes and can be distinguished within three typologies identified by Gawer and 
Cusumano (2002) which offers a different level of control over the service production.  
The first type of platform are the ‘internal platforms’ which provide fundamental services that 
increase the internal efficiency of public agencies or facilitate the coordination among public 
agencies in the same policy domain. The hospital electronic medical healthcare system is an example 
of an internal platform that facilitates the exchange of medical data within the department at the 
same hospital. Modular services such as software for medical data analysis can be plugged into and 
un-plugged from the platform. This modularity guarantees the evolvability of the production 
configuration (McGrath, 1995; Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997; Muffatto and Roveda, 2002) which can 
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adapt rapidly to policy or legal changes without the risk of remaining locked in with previous 
configurations.  The internal platform supports in-house production of public services and offers a 
high level of control overproduction, which is usually suitable to producing services such as medical 
or judicial service that deal with sensible data. The second type are the ‘supply chain platforms’ 
which offer fundamental services to public agencies of different policy domains. The objective of 
this type of platform is to avoid duplication of similar platforms and to facilitate the exchange of 
data across public administration. GOV.UK.Pay is an example of a shared platform that offers public 
agencies the possibility to accept digital payments without the need to build their own payment 
infrastructure. Supply chain platforms improve efficiency across the entire public administration 
because they offer fundamental services like identification or payment services that all public 
agencies need. The supply chain platforms offer a high level of control but are designed to support 
joined-up or shared services across public administration. The third type are the ‘industry platforms’ 
which are platforms that enable collaboration across public administration and with third parties. 
The industry platforms serve as a base for third parties to develop additional services or modules. 
An example of an industry platform in the public sector is the TfL open data platform that enables 
more than 600 applications like CityMappers or Google Maps, which co-produce complementary 
services of information about transportation (Cordella and Paletti, 2018). The industry platform 
offers a low level of control because it is difficult to predict or control which services third parties 
will develop. Hence, it is suitable for services which do not require a high level of control, such as 










Table 10 Types of platforms and mode of production 
Public agencies develop, manage and maintain the platforms to serve policy domains under their 
competence. However, these platforms are often combined by other public agencies across public 
administration to offer complex digital services. Therefore, different types of platforms often coexist 
and interplay within the same production configuration. These platforms constitute GaaP and 
determine the organisational and technological dimension of the public administration operational 
capability, which is indeed the ‘result of the confluence or intertwining of ICT and organisational 
features’ (Zammuto et al., 2007, p. 752). Hence, the study of the organisational and technical 
characteristics of GaaP is necessary to understand how the operational capabilities offered by public 
administration impact public value creation. 
The most important characteristic of the organisational dimension is the existence of a holistic and 
consistent representation of public administration as a platform in any of its organisational features 
(Eaton et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2017). The shared view of public administration as a platform ready 
to evolve and adapt according to political or social changes is inevitably linked to the existence of 
one or more participatory ecosystems that enable public agencies and third parties to co-produce 
public services (O’Reilly, 2011; Brown et al., 2017). The success of an ecosystem is mainly affected 
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by a set of regulations, policies and fundamental services (e.g., identification, payments, fiscal 
management system) offered by material and immaterial platforms (Baldwin and Woodard, 2008; 
Olleros, 2008) which constitute the stable and centralised core of GaaP.  A strong and efficient 
centralised core is fundamental to ensure stability of the ecosystems and to support the creation of 
value (Olleros, 2008; Yoo, Henfridsson and Lyytinen, 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013; Eaton et 
al., 2015).  
 
 
Figure 2 GaaP as implemented platform of platforms 
GaaP is organised and perceived as composed of multiple platforms and ecosystems (figure 2) that 
coexist and interact to offer services, similarly to companies like Apple, Amazon or Google (Baldwin 
and Woodard, 2008; Boudreau and Lakhani, 2009; Eaton et al., 2015). The multiple ecosystems 
represent different policy domains such as healthcare, defence or education. Each ecosystem is then 
regulated ad hoc through boundary resources, which are ‘the software tools and regulations that 
serve as the interface for the arms-length relationship between the platform owner and the 
application developer’ (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2012, p. 174).  
Boundary resources evolve as a result of policymaking activity and are used by public agencies to 
address and constrain generativity of ecosystems (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2010; Yoo, 
Henfridsson and Lyytinen, 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013; Eaton et al., 2015). Through 










is usually populated by selected public agencies, contractors and external actors, while an open 
ecosystem is open to any actor (Olleros, 2008). 
 
All these GaaP organisational features that belong to the organisational dimension are deeply 
intertwined with the technical dimension. Technical components of the platform make GaaP 
evolvable, scalable and interoperable (Katz and Shapiro, 1994; Ulrich, 1995; Baldwin and Woodard, 
2008; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2012). The architecture of GaaP is based on modules (Cusumano 
and Gawer, 2002) enabled by a set of material and immaterial platforms and by different 
ecosystems (Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne, 2006; Baldwin and Woodard, 2008; Tiwana, Konsynski 
and Bush, 2010). Modules are material or immaterial components that embed services and, when 
connected to the platform, add a functionality (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Woodard, 
2008). The strength of the modular interlinking among modules creates loose or tight coupling 
among platform components, which affects the level of modularity of GaaP (Nielsen and Aanestad, 
2006) and its ability to evolve or adapt. Ideally, the GaaP modular architecture should enable its 
components to be changed without affecting the whole function of the system (Tiwana, Konsynski 
and Bush, 2010).  The evolution and interoperability of the modular architecture is controlled 
through a system of APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) and other standardised interfaces, 
design rules and interoperability standards (Jin and Robey, 2008; Helmond, 2015) which are 
fundamental for interoperability (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). 
At the core of the  GaaP technical dimension lie three main technical characteristics which are 
necessary to guarantee the adaptability and evolvability of production configuration (Baldwin and 
Woodard, 2008): 
a. Decomposition. It should be always possible to decompose and break down hierarchically 
constituent parts of the platform.  Decomposition helps to minimise the complexity of the 
GaaP architecture and breaks down all the interdependences among the different 
components. 
b. Modularity. Each module is standalone and independent from the other modules.  Changes 
in the combination of modules do not affect service offered by the module or its technical 
characteristics. 
c. Design rules. A set of protocols, rules and standards which instruct developers during the 
creation of modules. Design rules are strategic for the generativity and the correct 
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functionality of the platform. They should be stable but also versatile to not constrain GaaP 
evolution in the long term. 
 
Figure 3 Organisation and technical characteristics of GaaP 
From a public value perspective, the operational capability offered by the interaction of GaaP’s 
organisational and technical characteristics enables public agencies to configure public services to 
create public value.  The modularity of the GaaP architecture allows public agencies to assemble an 
infinite number of production configurations (Ciborra, 1996; Baldwin and Woodard, 2008) to meet 
citizens’ needs and expectations (O’Reilly, 2011; Brown et al., 2017) or to respond to changes in the 
authorising environment. The possibility to compose and decompose the production configuration 
like a construction made of LEGO bricks (Baldwin and Clark, 2006; Tiwana, Konsynski and Bush, 
2010) into its atomic functionalities allows public agencies to ensure that production configuration 
produces services which meet all the needs of the public. Moreover, GaaP allows public agencies to 
govern the generativity of the ecosystems under their competencies through boundary resources 
(Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2010; Eaton et al., 2015)  which can ensure that third parties co-
produce options of public services that create positive value for their policy domain. 
However, the high level of control of public value creation offered to public agencies by the GaaP 
approach is only apparent. The modularity of GaaP architecture and the generativity of its 
ecosystems hide a complexity which may also reduce control over the value creation process and 
may threaten public value creation.  These GaaP limitations become more apparent if we look at 
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154 
 
GaaP as platform of platforms and not as a single platform. The next section discusses this limitation 
by looking at different levels of control offered by digital infrastructures, platforms and GaaP. 
4.3. From Infrastructure to GaaP: how control has changed 
The introduction of platform architecture in the e-government context is a novelty, and it has direct 
implications on the control that public agencies have over the production of public services. Public 
agencies have traditionally developed standalone information systems which were not designed to 
evolve or exchange data with other public agencies, but were intended to only automatise internal 
procedures and deliver specific values (Cordella and Bonina, 2012; Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013). 
JUG reforms, driven by the need to overcome the siloed development of e-government services 
promoted by the NPM approach, led to the realisation of digital infrastructures such as e-health or 
e-justice systems which were conceived as interconnected systems based on shared standards that 
involve multiple public and private actors (Braa et al., 2007; Cordella and Iannacci, 2010; Cordella 
and Willcocks, 2012). The development of digital infrastructures has been extensively discussed in 
e-government literature (Janssen et al., 2009; Cordella and Willcocks, 2012; Henfridsson and 
Bygstad, 2013; Klievink, Bharosa and Tan, 2016). Conversely, the adoption of platform thinking is 
recent, less discussed, and related to the historical pressure on public administration to use 
technology to ‘do more with less’ (Janssen and Estevez, 2013). Platform thinking embedded in the 
concept of GaaP is an alternative to the failure of JUG reforms (Cordella and Bonina, 2012; Margetts 
and Dunleavy, 2013) to solve three chronical problems that affect the e-government field: the quasi-
impossibility to adapt or evolve digital services, the duplication of similar digital infrastructures at 
national and international levels, and the difficulty to effectively enable external actors to co-
produce public services (O’Reilly, 2011; Janssen and Estevez, 2013; Walravens and Ballon, 2013; 
Brown et al., 2017).  
Although the terms ‘platform’ and ‘infrastructure’ are sometimes considered synonymous, in the 
information systems literature, they indicate two different types of architectures (De Reuver, 
Sørensen and Basole, 2018). The main difference between the two architectures is the level of 
control that the owner exercises on the creation of value, which is higher in platform than in digital 
infrastructures (De Reuver, Sørensen and Basole, 2018). 
Public administration has historically built and governed physical infrastructures such as railways, 
highways, and power grids, which have provided fundamental services for society and have 
contributed to the development of the economy. The recent need to drive and sustain the digital 
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market has led the state to invest also in digital infrastructures to provide basic facilities such as 
identification, payment services, or public registries (Janssen et al., 2009) and also more complex 
infrastructures such as e-health systems (Braa et al., 2007; Aanestad et al., 2017) and e-justice 
systems (Cordella and Iannacci, 2010). The problem is that building a highway is different from 
building a digital infrastructure (Plantin et al., 2018). For example, highways can be connected to 
other highways, and they can form an evolving infrastructure network developed by different local 
and international actors according to precise plans. Control of how third parties use highways is 
difficult but not complex, and can be effectuated. Conversely, digital infrastructures often evolve 
without a precise plan, and they have a low level of control on how third parties use them (Beniger, 
1988). The Internet is a typical example of digital infrastructure that enables a big and complex 
number of interactions which are incredibly difficult for any government to monitor (Hanseth and 
Lyytinen, 2008). 
The complexity of digital infrastructures is the result of multiple and shared systems that make the 
organisational boundaries difficult to define, and which resemble interconnected coalitions of 
systems (Sommerville et al., 2012). Digital infrastructures are conceptualised as a collection of 
technological and human components (Tilson and Lyytinen, 2006; Braa et al., 2007), and their 
evolution is the result of their interactions (Plantin et al., 2018). Digital infrastructures are in fact 
sociotechnical, shared and unbounded networks that involve heterogeneous social and technical 
components at different levels of government which cannot be fully controlled and managed 
(Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2008). The interaction of a multitude of heterogeneous technical and 
organisational components that act to reach their own goals generates a high level of complexities 
which reduces control over the development of the infrastructure (Ciborra et al., 2001; Braa et al., 
2007).  Infrastructures are sociotechnical systems that initially are centrally designed and controlled 
by a public agency or a company. Once the infrastructures become diffused, they start changing and 
designers lose control over their development. Users and developers can in fact modify or extend 
the infrastructure as they prefer without the need for any permission. This decentralised 
development is possible due to some interoperability standards that act as gateways which connect 
physical and digital elements with a potentially infinite number of heterogeneous elements (Egyedi, 
2002; Lanzara, 2009). 
Interoperability standards are fundamental for the evolution of physical and digital infrastructures 
(Aanestad et al., 2017; Plantin et al., 2018). Physical infrastructures such as railways, shipping 
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networks and roads have expanded due to common standards such as International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) standard shipping containers which are an example of a gateway. Similarly, 
expansion of the internet was possible due to its open architecture based on interoperability 
standards such as Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), common transaction protocol (HTTP) 
and naming scheme (URI), which act as gateways that guarantee scalability and interoperability, and 
enable a decentralised development. 
However, the existence of interoperability standards does not imply that the development of 
infrastructures is always decentralised (Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2010). When infrastructures are 
initiated, interoperability standards are only used by few actors and therefore there is high control 
over their development. For example, the internet was developed by a public agency limited to few 
public agencies and universities. Only after some years, it expanded in a network of heterogeneous 
computer networks, and the original central control vanished. Integration with heterogeneous and 
peripheral components generates complex ecologies of actors that continually adapt, evolve, and 
can specialise in different paths outside the original design (Graham, 2001; van der Vleuten, 2004). 
The control of infrastructure development become weaker as the result of the complex and 
decentralised negotiation among numerous actors which often have dissimilar interests (Weill and 
Broadbent, 1998; Sahay, Aanestad and Monteiro, 2009).  
Digital infrastructures grow organically without central coordination (Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2010; 
Constantinides and Barrett, 2015; Plantin et al., 2018) and are the result of a mix of planned and 
emergent action (Bygstad and Hanseth, 2016). It is thus difficult to design, implement and manage 
digital infrastructures both from a technical and an organisational point of view. From a technical 
point of view, this is because actors that interact during the development of digital infrastructures 
have different ICT capabilities and resources. From an organisational point of view, this is because 
there are different actors that use digital infrastructures to pursue different goals. These two 
elements generate a high level of complexities (Shapiro and Varian, 1998). Because of this 
complexity, digital infrastructures cannot be built as standalone systems with a complete set of 
requirements. Digital infrastructures evolve autonomously, and designers can only think about 
standards, rules and design principles that can nudge and address the self-development of digital 
infrastructures (Walls, Widmeyer and El Sawy, 1992; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Markus, Majchrzak 
and Gasser, 2002). Therefore, digital infrastructures cannot be truly designed, but instead, can only 
be remotely addressed through standards and design principles (P. Edwards et al., 2007). The 
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absence of a common development strategy, together with the difficulty of establishing a 
coordination mechanism, generate parallel pathways of evolution which can foster innovation but 
also create negative value for society (Ciborra and Hanseth, 1998; Janssen and Estevez, 2013).  Lack 
of control over the development and the usage of infrastructures can potentially generate episodes 
of social chaos - such as urban blackouts in the case of grid infrastructure or major internet outages 
in the case on the Web (Graham, 2001; P. Edwards et al., 2007). 
Moreover, the lack of control over digital infrastructures is stronger in the public sector because 
public agencies have developed weak e-government infrastructures (Cordella and Bonina, 2012; 
Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013). The wave of neoliberal reforms that have inspired the NPM approach 
has changed the role of public administration from an infrastructure builder to a regulator (Janssen 
and Estevez, 2013). The NPM framework has also promoted decentralisation of competencies about 
digital services and has provided public agencies with the option to develop their own 
infrastructures (Dunleavy, 2005; Janssen et al., 2009). Because of their limited capabilities, public 
agencies have often outsourced the creation of digital infrastructures (Cordella and Willcocks, 2012) 
or have collaborated with private organisations to create and manage infrastructures. The results 
of these reforms can be summarised in three main trends which have made the level of control 
weaker. 
The first trend is that public agencies have shifted their attention to focus on the development of 
dedicated e-government services that automatise some public services, such as booking medical 
checks, applying for a passport or enrolling at a university. These digital services are not digital 
infrastructures, but instead applications with a precise and limited scope clearly determined a priori, 
for specific user groups (Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2010).   
The second trend is that diffusion of competition within public administration has induced public 
agencies to create numerous and overlapping digital infrastructures at national and international 
levels (Cordella and Bonina, 2012; Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013; Carey, Crammond and Riley, 2014). 
As a consequence, there are many e-government national infrastructures that offer identical 
services and are unable to reach sufficient critical mass to become valuable (Evans and 
Schmalensee, 2010). For example, in the EU, there are many e-health infrastructures offered by 
member states such as the UK or Italy to facilitate internal and external exchange of medical data, 
but none of them is diffused enough to achieve critical mass and become the national or European 
infrastructure for e-health (Fragidis and Chatzoglou, 2017). 
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The third trend is that public administration has lost control over some policy domains because 
some companies have built digital infrastructures that enable many public services. The existence 
of digital infrastructures that provide public service owned and controlled by private companies 
limits the possibility for public administration to control the production and co-production of public 
services (Plantin et al., 2018), and can potentially limit the creation of value for society.  For example, 
in 2004, Google introduced Google Maps that filled a gap in the digital market and soon became an 
important infrastructure for cartography. In fact, the digital market needed infrastructure for digital 
cartography which national governments were unable to provide, and the only accessible maps 
required specialised geographic information systems. Applications like UBER are today built on 
Google Maps and are part of its ecosystems, which are standardised environments that facilitate 
control over the production of public service (Brown et al., 2017). Due to Google Maps, in some 
countries today Google has more power than public administration on mobility services. 
The case of Google also shows the important transition from digital infrastructure to platforms 
architecture, and it clarifies why platforms tend to have more control than digital infrastructures. 
Google Maps was initially a standalone infrastructure based on Javascript. Because Javascript is an 
interpretative code, it acted as a gateway and allowed third parties to use Google Maps to develop 
their services (such as HousingMap.com) without any permission or control from Google (O’Reilly, 
2011, p. 31). Consequently, in 2005, Google Maps realised its APIs to enable co-production of 
services, and also to get control back over how third parties create value on the platform. This novel 
approach transformed Google Maps into a platform. According to Bogost and Montfort (2009), 
platforms’ essential characteristic is programmability. Programmability permits users to go beyond 
the original designers’ project and to generate more value for clients. The APIs structure enables 
the modular architecture of platforms to lower the costs of innovation, to favour ‘mashups’ of two 
or more data sources (O’Reilly, 2005), and to avoid the development of standalone systems to 
support a new product (Baldwin and Woodard, 2008). However, programmability through the APIs 
structure typical of platform architecture also enables organisations to control the development of 
ecosystems (Bogost and Montfort, 2009; Plantin et al., 2018). APIs are like electrical sockets which 
allow developers to plug in their programs and exchange data with platforms.  APIs also act as 
gateways, but they create a two-way flow of data. On the one hand, APIs allow developers to easily 
develop apps and services and seemingly connect them to the open web architecture. On the other 
hand, APIs lock developers into a limited ecosystem which restricts and controls what developers 
and users can do. The ecosystems then work as private ‘walled gardens’ where developers can act 
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under precise boundaries (Helmond, 2015). In fact, APIs enable programmability and the 
development of public services, but differently from interoperability standards typical of 
infrastructures. APIs work as a tap and thus they represent an instrument of control of the data 
flow. Therefore, organisations that own the platform can decide according to their discretion on 
how to adjust ‘the tap’ to regulate the flow of data, and consequently can govern the development 
of services.  As a platform, Google Maps became a programmable ICT architecture that has helped 
Google to simultaneously boost innovation and increase control over the production of services, 
while avoiding unauthorised and uncontrolled development of services (Hanseth and Lyytinen, 
2010; Plantin et al., 2018). 
The success of companies like Google has boosted the ‘platformisation’ of digital services in the 
private sector (Helmond, 2015), where developers moved the development of their services from 
Internet infrastructure to digital platforms like Facebook or Google which provide APIs (Plantin et 
al., 2018). Looking at companies like Google, Tim O’Reilly (2011) noted in his seminal article how  
platform architecture can help public administration to solve some chronic problems of inefficiency 
and to get the control back. The adoption of platform architecture can help public agencies to 
produce and co-produce more services for less investment and lesser costs, and thereby generate 
more economic value (Janssen and Estevez, 2013). The ecosystems of services facilitate a two-way 
exchange of data that favours the collection of data about platforms’ users (Plantin et al., 2018). 
Due to such data, the organisation that owns the platform can decrease the asymmetry of 
information, and better know what citizens want and need and what services third parties develop. 
Lower asymmetry of information also corresponds to lower transaction costs and hence more 
economic value generated by the organisations (Cordella, 2006). Moreover, the possibility to own 
information and govern production within the ecosystem through APIs enables public agencies to 
control and address the value creation process and to avoid negative externalities (Ceccagnoli et al., 
2012). Hence, platforms are not neutral but can affect how ecosystems evolve and generate value 
for society (Plantin et al., 2018). 
However, the number of platforms in the public sector is increasing and paradoxically, GaaP 
conceptualised as a platform of platforms undermines public agencies’ control  over value creation. 
Public agencies have started investing in platforms to substitute their digital infrastructures and 
enhance their control over value created for the public. Each platform has its own ecosystem that 
is used by public agencies to better control how open data are used by third parties (Dawson, 
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Denford and Desouza, 2016). Moreover, public agencies have also started digitalising physical 
infrastructures like highways and grids, which are becoming digital platforms (Avital et al., 2019). 
The platformisation of physical infrastructures allows public agencies to better control activities that 
third parties develop on top of their material or immaterial platforms. For example, digital highways 
connected with vehicles can control in real-time the speed of vehicles or the kinds of goods 
transported by vehicles. Therefore, due to platform structures, each public agency can increase its 
control over the value creation process within its ecosystem. 
The GaaP modular architecture also enables each public agency to assemble (mashup) the data 
offered by different platforms to configure their public service production. Thus, platform 
architectural characteristics can help public administration to easily develop public services by 
simply connecting APIs offered by the available ecosystems (Janssen and Estevez, 2013). 
The problem related to the platformisation of digital services is that each public agency governs and 
addresses its ecosystem according to a siloed perspective to reach its policy goals.  Public agencies 
enable co-production and enhance the number of interactions with heterogeneous actors to create 
value in their policy domain. However, they have no control over how their data can affect other 
policy domains. Although the APIs structure can enable them to control their ecosystem, the 
creation of multiple platforms and ecosystems enhances the asymmetry of information among 
public agencies, generates more complexity, and paradoxically reduce control over the production 
of public services (Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2008). For example, the Ministry of Transportation can 
open the APIs of detailed maps of tube stations to enable third parties to develop better 
transportation apps. However, because the Ministry of Transportation is managed by experts in 
transportation who are responsible only for this policy domain, they have limited knowledge and 
little interest about the possible impacts on other policy domains. In fact, tube station maps can be 
used to plan terroristic attacks, which negatively affects the defence policy domain. Because the 
Ministry of Defence has no control over data released by the Ministry of Transportation, they have 
no control over the value co-created in that ecosystem. In fact, public agencies tend to govern their 
ecosystems as to reach their policy goals, which can conflict with the policy goals of other 
ecosystems. These conflicts can co-create negative externalities like terroristic attacks or privacy 
violations which can generate negative value for society. 
Hence, public administration that adopts the GaaP architecture to create value for society faces two 
important elements of complexity.  The first one is that GaaP is not constituted only by one platform, 
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but by many platforms. Thus, paradoxically, each public agency has low control over value created 
by third parties across different ecosystems.  The second one is that public value is not fixed and 
public agencies have to meet several public interests to create public value. Therefore, the challenge 
for public agencies is in finding the most suitable production configuration mediated by GaaP to 





 CHAPTER 5 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This chapter discusses the main contributions of the PhD and its implications. The first section 
summarises the gap in the literature, the main research question and the three related research 
propositions discussed in the three papers that compose the PhD. The second section presents the 
contributions of the thesis to public management, e-government and information system literature. 
The third section presents a future research agenda. The last section presents the study’s 
limitations. 
 
5.1. Research context and gap in the literature 
Over the past century, the perception of what is valuable for the public has changed and has led 
public administrations to evolve public services production configuration to meet citizens’ needs. 
Moore’s Strategic Triangle (1995) invites us to envision the production process as a series of 
activities and resources which are connected together to constitute a public value chain (Benington 
and Moore, 2011b; Osborne, 2018).  The possibility of adapting or changing production 
configuration to shape the public value chain and create value for the public depends on the 
operational capabilities that determine what public agencies can or cannot produce (Moore and 
Khagram, 2004; Benington and Moore, 2011b). More resources correspond to more operational 
capabilities and consequently, more possibilities to adapt or change public value chains (Moore, 
1995; Alford and O’Flynn, 2009; Johnson and Galea, 2009; Benington and Moore, 2011a). Based on 
available operational capabilities, public agencies  can configure the public service production 
process to create what they perceive as valuable for the public.  
During the 19th and 20th centuries, public administration considered citizens’ needs and 
expectations as predictable, stable and objective needs (Zuboff and Maxmin, 2002). Citizens 
perceived as valuable their access to public welfare (public health, education, safety, etc.), and in 
certain countries, also the application of fundamental democratic principles of equality, 
transparency and fairness. Therefore, through conspicuous public investments, public agencies 
gained the operational capabilities to  configure public service production processes capable of 
meeting standardised needs and creating value for the public. The production process was 
configured according to the bureaucratic model of production which is particularly suitable to mass 
produce public services and also to ensure fairness and equality (Zuboff and Maxmin, 2002). In this 
organisational context, public agencies adopted ICTs systems to reinforce control over production 
163 
 
and guarantee equal services for everybody. Thanks to the regulative properties of technology 
(Kallinikos, 2005), ICTs systems help public agencies to reduce public officers’  discretionary power 
over the output of the administrative process. However, the same ICTs systems and bureaucratic 
procedures which reduce the discretionary power of street-level public officers have become an 
iron cage (Cordella, 2007; Cordella and Tempini, 2011; Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013; Simonet, 
2015), which has constrained innovation (Merton, 1957; Crozier, 1964; Burns and Stalker, 1994), 
caused dysfunctionalities, and increased democratic disaffection (Bonina and Cordella, 2009; 
Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013) and public expenditure which in many countries became an 
unsustainable burden (Dunleavy, 2005). 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the need to reduce public expenditure and reach economic efficiency 
became the paramount imperative of public administrations in many western countries that started 
to associate value for the public with creating economic value for individuals. The supremacy of 
economic value creation for individuals over the achievement of value for the public reduced the 
difference between public agencies and private companies to the minimum. De facto, the new 
organisational model of public administration summarised by the NPM aligned the operational 
capabilities of public agencies and companies (Stoker, 2006). The operational capabilities typical of 
the private sectors enable public agencies to configure public service production to create more 
economic value for clients by offering more outputs for lower costs (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; 
Hood, 1995). The introduction of new operational capabilities combined with the principles of 
private sector led to the reorganisation of the traditional model of public administration as an 
archipelago of public agencies (Stoker, 2006) in competition with each other to create more 
economic value (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Hood, 1995). Under the influence of NPM principles, 
public agencies adopted ICTs systems typical of the corporate sector such as CRM and ERP systems, 
increasing internal production efficiency and delivering more economic value to citizens (Bekkers 
and Zouridis, 1999; Dunleavy, 2005). However, the adoption of siloed ICTs systems focused on 
internal efficiency caused duplications and overlaps of services at the public administration level, 
generating systemic inefficiencies (Pollitt, 2003; Boston and Eichbaum, 2014). 
As a response to the inefficiencies caused by NPM reforms, governments reformed public 
administration, configuring the production of public services according to the JUG. Similarly to the 
NPM, the JUG approach associates creation of value for the public with the reduction of public 
expenditure, but is rooted in the idea that economic efficiency can be further improved by 
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establishing a more collaborative production of services across the entire public administration 
(Bovaird, 2005; Dunleavy, 2010; Carey, Crammond and Riley, 2014; Christensen, Fimreite and 
Lægreid, 2014; Carey and Crammond, 2015). The JUG reforms change the operational capabilities 
promoting the sharing of resources, such as ICTs systems, among public agencies. The will to 
improve collaboration across entire public administration led to the adoption of e-government 
systems based on enterprise architecture characteristics usually adopted by multinational 
companies to coordinate several units in different provinces or countries (Janssen, 2012). Thanks to 
the diffusion of new Internet-based technologies, it has become possible to extend collaboration 
outside public administration boundaries and to create more economic value. 
According to the NPG management approach, non-public actors' involvement in the co-production 
of public services can help public agencies gain potentially infinite operational capabilities (Osborne, 
2010; Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere, 2013; Lindsay, Osbrone and Bond, 2014). The 
configuration of a more networked production of public services has become possible due to the 
diffusion of ICTs systems that enable co-production of additional options of services (Benkler, 2007; 
Hodges and Grubnic, 2010; Kallinikos, 2011). The combination of public and private resources to co-
produce public services can create additional economic value for the public by producing more 
services at lower costs (de-Miguel-Molina, 2009). Nevertheless, the creation of public value is not 
limited to the satisfaction of economic interests, but also of other public interests such as health, 
safety, or education(Bozeman, 2007). When citizens use public services, they consider efficiency 
and other values such as fairness, quality of life, security, justice, freedom, and human dignity 
(Wilenski, 1988; Pollitt, 1990; Haque, 1999; Diefenbach, 2005b; Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd and Walker, 
2005; Michael, 2005). Public agencies have to produce public services that simultaneously meet 
variegated needs and expectations that often belong to other policy domains to create public value. 
Therefore, the main research question of this PhD thesis is how does ICTs-mediated co-production 
impact the creation of public value? The research question aims to explain how ICTs-mediated co-
production impacts the overall public value process described by Moore (1995).  
ICTs systems which enable co-production are often described as digital platforms (Anttiroiko, 2012). 
Building on the success of digital platforms in the private sector, O’Reilly (2011) introduced the 
concept of GaaP and explained how the adoption of platform architecture and organisation could 
help entire public administration to be more efficient. The modularity of the GaaP architecture and 
organisational model increases the operational capabilities of all public agencies that are part of 
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public administration to easily change or adapt public service production configuration and to 
collaborate with public and non-public actors (Fishenden and Thompson, 2013). The GaaP approach 
can thus be clearly beneficial for the creation of economic value because it helps public 
administration to avoid duplications or overlaps of services among public agencies and to facilitate 
co-production of public services on a large scale across the entire public administration (Fishenden 
and Thompson, 2013; Janssen and Estevez, 2013; Brown et al., 2017).  
Upon initial analysis, the research proposition was that co-production mediated by digital platforms 
(GaaP) can help public administration improve public services production efficiency and ensure the 
creation of public value.  
The main research proposition was built on three related research propositions: 
• Paper 1. ICTs-mediated modes of co-production (Crowdsourcing and Opensourcing) are the 
best production configurations to produce public services because they allow public 
agencies to produce more or better public services 
• Paper 2. The adoption of ICTs-mediated co-production can then help public agencies to 
satisfy all citizens’ needs and to create public value  
• Paper 3. The entire public administration configured as a platform will provide the 
operational capabilities that all public agencies need to co-produce services on a large scale 
and to contribute to the creation of public value 
The three research propositions have driven three different and related studies described in the 
PhD papers. The studies have unveiled several complexities in the co-production of services through 
ICTs and in the public value creation process which the literature has underestimated. The next 
section summarises the three PhD papers' main contributions to public management, e-
government, and information systems literature.3 
5.2.Thesis findings and contributions 
The thesis has contributed to advancing knowledge of public management, e-government, and 
information systems literature. The first finding contributes to e-government literature and explains 
why ICTs-mediated co-production is not suitable for producing all public services but only for those 
that require a low level of control. The second finding demonstrates that the level of control over 
the public value creation process is mediated by ICTs systems, which enable or constrain production 
configuration and hence, the public value creation process. This finding contributes to public 
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management literature by adding technology as the fourth dimension of the Strategic Triangle of 
Moore. The third finding is that public agencies choose the public service production configuration 
that reaches the most suitable level of control over all the public interests involved in the production 
process. This third contribution has enriched both e-government and public management literature, 
explaining that public agencies configure the production process by considering different contextual 
public interests. The fourth finding explains that GaaP is constituted by several platforms and 
ecosystems, and this finding contributes to information systems and e-government literature. Based 
on this finding, GaaP’s architecture can help public agencies configure and reconfigure production 
configuration ad infinitum. However, GaaP’s mediation can also increase the difficulty of controlling 
co-production services.   
Literature Knowledge before the thesis Thesis findings Paper 
E-government ICTs-mediated co-production 
is the most suitable way to 
produce more public services 
for lower costs. 
ICTs-mediated co-
production is  not suitable 
to produce those services 
which require high level of 





Technology is a neutral 
operational resource. ICTs 
systems with more advanced 
technical characteristics 
increase the operational 
capabilities and help to 
create more public value. 
Technology is not neutral. 
ICTs systems can enable 
and constrain certain 
production configurations 
and then affect the level 
of control over the 
creation of public value. 




Public agencies choose ICTs-
mediated co-production 
because it helps to gain more 
operational capabilities and 
create more public value. 
Public agencies choose  
ICTs-mediated production 
as well as other 
production configurations 
to ensure a suitable level 
of control over all public 
interests involved. 




GaaP provides all public 
agencies with the operational 
capabilities necessary to 
create public value and, at 
the same time, also a high 
level of control over co-
production.  
As shown by the GaaP 
case, an architecture 
constituted by several 
platforms and ecosystems 
offers lower control over 
public value creation than 






No specific governance 
mechanism of GaaP 
mediated co-production. 
The GaaP mediated co-
production requires the 





called public value 
orchestration. Public value 
orchestration entails 
finding the right 
technological and 
organisational 
configuration in order to 
produce public services 




5.2.1  E-government literature contributions  
The first contribution of this thesis is to e-government literature, and explains that  ICTs-mediated 
co-production is not suitable to produce those services which require high level of control over the 
final outcome. The initial research proposition was that ICTs-mediated modes of co-production 
could help public agencies to create more economic value for citizens (Linders 2012; Zuiderwijk and 
Janssen 2014; Fishenden and Thompson 2013; Toots et al. 2017).  Application of the theoretical lens 
of the two value creation logics discussed by Vargo and Lush (2004) has helped to explain how the 
different operational capabilities offered by the four production configurations (in-house, joined-
up, crowdsourcing and opensourcing) lead to different value creation processes. The more 
operational capabilities come from external actors, the more open is the value creation process, 
and the lower is control over the production outcome. The importance of control over the 
production outcome represents a novelty in the production logics diffused among many public 
agencies, which have often looked at the input/output ratio to configure the production process 
and to create economic value. 
According to this logic, defined as manufacturing logic because it describes the manufacturing 
process typical of manufacturing companies like Ford, public agencies assemble and transform a 
series of inputs (e.g. resources, task, design) into value embedded in goods. Driven by this logic, 
public agencies' main focus is to improve the value creation process by increasing the number of 
inputs in the production process to generate a more valuable output (Grönroos, 2008; Vargo, Maglio 
and Archpru Akaka, 2008). The production process output can be public goods such as public parks 
or roads or public services such as education or healthcare.  When public agencies exchange public 
goods and services with citizens, value is transmitted to them, and they passively consume it 
(Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013; Cordella and Paletti, 2018; Osborne, 2018). According to the 
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manufacturing logic, a more open public service production such as crowdsourcing or open-sourcing 
would correspond to more value for the public. External actors could add their inputs in the 
production process and help public agencies to produce a bigger output for lower or same costs.  
For example, TfL decided to enable third parties to co-produce  the information service about public 
transportation. Thanks to this decision, TfL was able to offer a bigger information service proposition 
combining its internal channels (TfL personnel, website, SMS service, screens, email etc.) with more 
than 700 smartphone applications developed by third parties with their resources (Deloitte, 2013). 
According to Hogge (2016), TfL's decision to enable co-production of third party apps rather than 
developing them in-house has contributed to saving 15£-42£m of public expenditure.  
The main limitation of the manufacturing logic of production derives from the perception, rooted in 
most economic theories, that public agencies are the creator of value for the public. This value is 
embedded in public services or goods, which are later delivered to citizens who passively consume 
them. This perception derives from an incorrect interpretation of the term ‘consumer’ that comes 
from the Latin verb consumere, which was originally interpreted as ‘to destroy’. This interpretation 
led public agencies to conceive of citizens as passive consumers of the value embedded in products 
and services, ‘destroying’ them through their utilisation. Later scholarship concluded that 
consumere means ‘to accomplish, complete’ (Ramírez, 1999). In fact, value is not produced and then 
transmitted to citizens through goods, but ‘is latent in the subjective experience of each individual, 
a psychological destination that we call individual space’ and  ‘is realised in the individual space, 
rather than created in the organisation space’ (Zuboff and Maxmin 2002, p. 11). This later view, that 
is also present in public value literature (e.g. Norman 2007; Kelly, Mulgan, and Muers 2004), invites 
public agencies to refocus their attention from the output (e.g., number of arrests) to the outcome 
(e.g., citizens feel safe) (Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013; Osborne, 2018). This change of focus 
represents a radical transformation because the focus on outcome invites public agencies to be 
more accountable for the effects generated by the production of public services on citizens’ lives.  
 
The service logic of value creation emerges as an alternative to the manufacturing logic (Lusch and 
Nambisan, 2015; Osborne, 2018). At the base of this alternative logic, value is the outcome and not 
an output of the production process (Normann and Ramírez, 1995; Osborne, Radnor and Strokosch, 
2016). According to this alternative production logic, value is not the sum of inputs of the production 
process but instead, it is value-in-use co-created by citizens (Chandler and Vargo, 2011). Therefore, 
public agencies can create value not by maximising the output of public service production, but by 
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providing citizens the right resources and services to co-create value they need or expect. According 
to this logic, public agencies can only assemble a public value proposition to citizens that is 
constituted by public services or goods needed to facilitate the value creation process. Then, citizens 
would create value for themselves only when they actually use public services or goods to meet 
their needs (Korkman, 2006; Alford, 2009b; Benington, 2011).   
 
The focus on outcome has led public agencies to not focus exclusively on the improvement of the 
input/output ratio, but also on the level of control granted over the value proposed to citizens 
(Norman, 2007; Alford and Hughes, 2008; Benington and Moore, 2011a). Public agencies have to 
ensure the creation of positive value for the public. Therefore, they have to control how the 
contributions of public and private actors to the public service proposition impact certain public 
interests when used by citizens. Not all public interests require the same level of control in all 
contexts. Often, public interests like public health and safety require a higher level of control over 
the production process than education or mobility, which are usually co-produced with external 
actors. In fact, open production configurations (e.g. crowdsourcing and opensourcing) often 
represent an opportunity for public agencies to increase the value proposition to citizens, but at 
the same time offer a lower level of control than closed production configurations (in-house, 
joined-up). Therefore, public agencies tend to choose the production configuration based on the 
most suitable level of control to achieve particular public interests.  For example, TfL opted for an 
open production configuration to co-produce information service about public transportation. This 
type of service does not require a high level of control because the risk that third parties co-produce 
services that provide wrong information about the journey planning was low. TfL decided instead 
to adopt a closed production configuration to manage and sell Oyster cards directly. In fact, this 
type of service requires a higher control over the delivery because third parties could use card 
payments data to defraud citizens.  
Hence, the adoption of ICTs-mediated co-production can help public agencies create more 
economic value. However, it is not always the most suitable mode of public service production to 
generate a public value proposition that can create public value when used by citizens. 
Nevertheless, public agencies are not free to decide how to configure the production of public 
services. As explained by the Strategic Triangle of Moore (1995), public agencies need to consider 
legal, political and operational aspects that affect the process of  production configuration and the 
level of control over the public value creation process. The next section presents the second thesis 
170 
 
finding that contributed to expanding public management literature about public value, adding 
technology as an additional contextual dimension that can enable and constrain public production 
configuration and control over public value creation. 
 
5.2.2  Public management literature contributions 
The second contribution of this thesis invites readers to look at how ICTs-mediated co-production of 
public services impacts public value creation according to the socio-technical perspective (Cordella 
and Iannacci, 2010; Panagiotopoulos, Klievink and Cordella, 2019). Based on this perspective, 
technology represents the fourth dimension of the Strategic Triangle of Moore (1995) and can 
influence the process of negotiation of the production configuration and thus, affect the public value 
creation process. However, a modification of the Strategic Triangle is graphically difficult because 
technology is not a dimension that can be clearly distinguished from the other three. Technology 
embeds citizens’ needs, political interests and regulations, and is deeply intertwined with all the 
organisational elements which compose operational capabilities (Lanzara, 2009).  
 
The initial research proposition was that the adoption of ICTs which enable co-production on a large 
scale would have helped public agencies to acquire all the operational capabilities to produce 
services necessary to fully meet citizens’ needs and create public value (Moore, 1995; Moore and 
Khagram, 2004; Benington and Moore, 2011a; Bryson et al., 2017).  The impact of ICTs on the public 
service production configuration is often assessed according to a technological deterministic 
perspective (Bellamy and Taylor, 1998; Layne and Lee, 2001). According to this perspective, public 
agencies determine the value added by e-governments systems to the production process by 
looking at their technical features. The adoption of e-government systems with more processing 
power, a higher speed of communication and greater storage capabilities will automatically improve 
efficiency and thus, generate more value for citizens. Hence, following this view, the adoption of e-
government systems that offer the technical capabilities to enable co-production on a large scale 
can create more public value.  However, e-government studies have revealed that technology is not 
a passive tool, and its influence on the public service production configuration cannot easily be 
predicted or generalised (Bonina and Cordella, 2009; Cordella and Willcocks, 2010; Scott, DeLone 




Technology embeds citizens’ needs, political views, interests and regulations, and is deeply 
intertwined with all the organisational elements which compose operational capabilities (Lanzara, 
2009). For example, SPID is a platform of Italian public administration that enables an ecosystem of 
selected identity providers to co-produce different identification service options. By adopting SPID, 
public agencies implicitly start identifying citizens according to the same security, cybersecurity and 
GDPR guidelines embedded in SPID’s configuration. At the same time, thanks to the mediation of 
SPID, the Ministry of Interior can ensure a high level of control over identification services in all 
public agencies. In fact, SPID hides from public officials the logics or goals embedded to identify 
users, and forces them to perform only few specific tasks, leaving no opportunity to manipulate the 
process (Bovens and Zouridis, 2002; Kallinikos, 2005). Thus, the automatisation of certain steps of 
the identification process increases both the efficiency (no need to develop an in-house 
identification service) and the level of control public agencies have over the achievement of certain 
public value goals (e.g. anti-corruption, transparency, security) because it reduces at the minimum 
the discretionary power public officials have on the identification process. The level of control is a 
critical aspect of the public value creation process, because public agencies need to ensure they are 
creating value for the public (Benington and Moore, 2011a; Panagiotopoulos, Klievink and Cordella, 
2019). Nevertheless, control over the public value creation process does not depend only on ICTs 
systems, but also on how public agencies have configured public service production (Lanzara, 2009; 
Cordella and Iannacci, 2010). 
 
As became evident from the hypothetical cases of production configuration discussed in the Italian 
public administration study, the level of control mediated by ICTs over public value creation is not 
fixed, but depends on continuous interactions between the organisational layer (constituted by 
regulations, policies, and protocols etc.) and the technological layer (Helbig, Ramón Gil-García and 
Ferro, 2009). The two layers are deeply intertwined, and any change in one leads to changes in the 
other, modifying the overall production configuration (Luna-Reyes et al., 2005; Heeks and Bailur, 
2007; Lanzara, 2009). The production configuration continuously mutates because the creation of 
public value is negotiated according to what citizens want, the different interests, the resources 
available and what e-government systems can support (e.g., Cordella & Iannacci, 2010; Janssena et 
al., 2009). Based on how public agencies reshape the public service production configuration, 
control over the production process can change. Therefore, a public agency can adopt identical e-
government systems with embedded logics, regulations, etc., but can change the initial production 
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configuration to pursue other interests. For example, the authorising environment changed after a 
new hypothetical e-government reform allowed all Italian  public agencies to identify citizens 
through SPID only for highly sensitive public services (e.g. accessing healthcare records) while for 
other digital services (e.g. renewal of the mobility pass), agencies remained free to develop in-house 
solutions or to use other identification services offered by companies like Google or Facebook. In 
this new context, public agencies continue to use the same e-government system SPID but in 
combination with other identity platforms managed by third parties, which mediate the 
identification service according to different logics. Therefore, the new production configuration 
offers  lower control over the identification service than the original configuration when the 
production process of all public services  was mediated only by SPID. 
Moreover, past public service production configurations can affect the level of control over public 
value creation. Public agencies usually do not configure the production of public services from a 
tabula rasa but rather, based on pre-existing regulations, political interests, organisational resources 
and e-government systems. While production configurations that do not involve technology can be 
changed, the one mediated by e-government system often might remain frozen in ICTs systems' 
architecture (Kallinikos, 2004a; Lanzara, 2009). Therefore, an e-government system designed 
according to past political decisions that no longer respond to citizens’ needs can still condition 
existing production configurations and the level of control over the public value delivered to citizens. 
The e-health systems of many countries represent a typical and tangible example of how past e-
government systems can lock in public service production changes. Most of the existing e-health 
systems were initially designed as silos. Today, this design represents the main barrier to the 
configuration of a more centralised and interoperable healthcare service (France, Taroni and 
Donatini, 2005; Robertson et al., 2011). Therefore, e-government systems are not neutral 
operational resources, but represent an enabler and constrainer of public services production 
configuration, which can influence achieving the desired level of control over the public value 
creation process. 
Furthermore, according to Bozeman (2007), public value is created when a set of public values is 
simultaneously met.  Therefore, the level of control mediated by technology to create public value 
should be suitable to reach all public interests involved. The third contribution of the thesis to public 
management and e-government literature is that to create public value, public agencies should 
choose the ICTs-mediated production configuration that ensures a suitable level of control over 
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values that belong to multiple policy domains. In fact, public agencies usually tend to choose the 
ICTs-mediated co-production and other production configurations without considering negative 
externalities on interests served by other public agencies (O’Flynn, 2007; Alford and Hughes, 2008). 
However, public agencies create public value when they choose a production configuration that 
ensures a suitable level of control over all the public values that might be involved in public service 
production (Bozeman, 2007; Alford and O’Flynn, 2009). Public agencies should overcome the siloed 
view of value creation typical of the corporate field, and should instead guarantee a sufficient level 
of control over the effects on the policy domains served by other public agencies. For example, 
suppose SPID’s identity providers do not offer a registration mode accessible to people with visual 
handicaps. In that case, all public agencies that adopt SPID risks provide a safe and efficient value 
proposition, but also discriminate against a certain category of citizens. Therefore, the adoption of 
technology is not neutral, and affects the overall public value creation. 
Technology represents an enabler, a medium of control, and a constrainer over public value creation 
(Cordella and Iannacci, 2010). However, not all ICTs systems mediate the production process in the 
same way. Digital platforms more than other ICTs systems seem to be suitable for creating public 
value because they allow pubic agencies to easily reconfigure the production process, co-produce 
public service with third parties, and enact a high level of control (O’Reilly, 2011; Brown et al., 2017). 
The next section presents the third contribution of the thesis that explains that GaaP is constituted 
by different platforms rather than by one. Therefore, GaaP risks to decrease the level of control over 
the public value creation process. 
5.2.3  Information systems contribution 
The third thesis contribution is that GaaP’s architecture is not constituted only by a single platform, 
but rather by several platforms and ecosystems. This finding, which represents a contribution to e-
government and information system literature, has unveiled that the existence of multiple 
platforms and ecosystems decreases control over value creation and potentially increases negative 
externalities. Looking at GaaP literature (O’Reilly, 2011; Janssen and Estevez, 2013; Brown et al., 
2017) and at the preliminary TfL data, the initial research proposition was that GaaP configuration 
could provide the operational capabilities public agencies require to satisfy citizens’ needs and to 
control the public value creation process. Moreover, based on information systems literature (De 
Reuver, Sørensen and Basole, 2018; Jacobides, Cennamo and Gawer, 2018; Plantin et al., 2018), 
GaaP as a digital platform can also better control how third parties co-produce public services and 
consequently address public value creation.  
174 
 
According to the socio-technical view, digital platforms are not neutral. Their impact on the value 
creation process cannot be predetermined by looking at their technical characteristics because they 
are constituted by organisational or technical layers intertwined together (Tilson, Sørensen and 
Lyytinen, 2012). Each digital platform embeds organisational components such as rules, goals, and 
business models, which belong to the organisational context where the platform is situated. As a 
consequence, the process of plugging two or more platforms to configure the production of public 
service is not straightforward, but the result of socio-technical negotiations. Platforms embed 
different organisational and technical properties that need to be aligned and combined to 
interoperate (Tiwana, Konsynski and Bush, 2010; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2015). The process 
of integration is mediated through some resources, such as APIs and SDKs, defined as boundary 
resources (Eaton et al., 2015). The platform owner inscribes in APIs and SDKs the rules, goals, and 
protocols that regulate the interaction with other platforms.  Therefore, APIs are not simply 
technical standards but also an instrument of control about how the platform interoperates with 
other platforms or ICTs systems.  The public agency or company that owns a platform can influence 
the current and future functioning of other platforms or ICTs connected to its APIs by changing how 
the platform core service works or by modifying related regulations or technical standards. For 
example, pagoPA could suddenly decide to change how the payment service works by accepting 
only debit cards from few selected payment providers to increase its reliability. This decision would 
also affect the overall production configuration and the public value creation process of public 
agencies that have adopted pagoPA as a payment platform. They will be unable to accept payments 
from citizens with debit cards from service providers that pagoPA considers not reliable. Therefore, 
the GaaP modular architecture helps public agencies to assemble production configuration to 
produce services able to create public value. Nevertheless, production configuration based on 
multiple platforms is also dependent on  the technical and organisational changes of policies, 
interest, logic etc. embedded in the platforms. Thus, a production configuration constituted by 
several platforms can reduce the level of control over the public value creation.   
 
The platform’s APIs can also connect and enable modules developed by third parties that add 
functionalities to the core platform service. To co-produce services, external actors need to adapt 
and align their modules to the APIs and SDKs technical and organisational requirements; otherwise, 
they would not be able to connect to the platforms and co-produce products and services (Eaton et 
al., 2015). Therefore, the platform owner can affect the platform's generativity by modifying 
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boundary resources (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013). If the APIs and SDKs’ requirements are too 
strict and offer only limited access to data, the level of co-production of services will be weak. 
Differently, more open and less regulated APIs will facilitate co-production of services. Hence, APIs 
enable public and private organisations to govern a platform’s generativity and enact the desired 
level of control over co-production of services (De Reuver, Sørensen and Basole, 2018; Jacobides, 
Cennamo and Gawer, 2018; Plantin et al., 2018). The problem is that public agencies have limited 
control capabilities over wide ecosystems and do not know how third parties could use that data. 
Properties of data are not fixed but are negotiated and arranged by those actors that use digital 
platforms (Kallinikos, Aaltonen and Marton, 2010). Within the technical and regulatory boundaries 
mediated through the platform’s APIs, external actors are free to co-produce any service and pursue 
any goal. For example, as discussed in the Italian case, if the Ministry of Health would release real-
time data about public hospitals’ waiting lists to enable third parties to co-produce a mobile 
application, it could indicate where citizens should have  a medical check. The inability to predict all 
the negative effects related to the release of this data induced the Ministry of Health not to adopt 
a particular restriction. With no particular restrictions, certain private hospitals might use this data 
to dynamically change prices of their treatments based on public hospitals’ waiting lists and to 
maximise their profits. If few private hospitals were to use this data, the Ministry of Health might 
be able to find out this harmful use of its data. However, suppose thousands of hospitals use this 
data to develop a set of different services. It becomes difficult for the Ministry of Health to control 
such a case if all actors are contributing positively to public value creation. 
 
Therefore, GaaP as a ‘platform of platforms’ offers valuable operational capabilities to all public 
agencies to create public value. However, some criticalities might threaten public value creation. 
The Italian case revealed a mechanism of governance that mitigates the complexities of GaaP and 
helps public agencies configure production of services to meet all public interests to create public 
value. The next section discusses this mechanism and presents the overall contribution of the thesis. 
 
5.2.4. Overall thesis contribution 
The overall thesis contribution takes a comprehensive view of all the above findings to answer the 
main PhD research question, explaining that the GaaP mediated co-production can create public 
value if public agencies orchestrate the public service production configuration to mitigate the 
complexities of the GaaP and public value creation. This PhD research started under the assumption 
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that ICTs-mediated co-production could provide the operational capabilities public administrations 
need to create public value. Later, during the research process, the ICTs system that enables co-
production was defined as GaaP. The decision of countries such as the UK, Sweden or Italy to 
develop e-government systems based on the GaaP’s characteristics has shown the diffused interests 
of many public administrations to develop e-government systems based on digital platforms. Hence, 
the study has mainly focused on how GaaP mediates operational capabilities that public agencies 
use to configure the production of public services to create public value. Based on literature about 
platforms (De Reuver, Sørensen and Basole, 2018; Jacobides, Cennamo and Gawer, 2018; Plantin et 
al., 2018) and on what emerged from the TfL case, the primary assumption was that GaaP could 
help public agencies to create positive value for the public. However, the Italian public 
administration study demonstrated that several platforms constitute the GaaP e-government 
systems. 
Therefore, the public service production process is mediated by many platforms combined together. 
Each digital platform embeds the political interests, logics, values, and regulations that affect the 
public value creation process (Antonio and Francesco, 2012). The platform’s owner can change the 
platform's design to meet new interests and consequently affect all the other public agencies that 
have adopted that same platform as part of their production process. Moreover, digital platforms 
often enable ecosystems populated by services and products developed by third parties. Each public 
agency tends to govern its ecosystem to ensure that public and private actors serve its policy 
domains. Thus, the existence of multiple ecosystems governed by different public agencies 
decreases control over value creation and potentially increases the creation of negative externalities 
(Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2008). Hence, third parties might intentionally or unintentionally co-produce 
services that create negative externalities in other policy domains served by other ecosystems. 
The possibility to create negative public value depends on the level of control over the final outcome 
(Moore, 1995; Luke, 1998; Domberger and Fernandez, 1999; Entwistle and Martin, 2005; Prebble, 
2012). The adoption of GaaP can cause a reduction of control over the production process and raise 
the risk for public agencies of creating negative public value. Therefore, GaaP mediated production 
and co-production can represent a threat to the creation of public value. However, the Italian case 
demonstrated a governance mechanism defined as public value orchestration. Public value 
orchestration entails finding the right technological and organisational configuration to produce 
public services able to ensure a suitable level of control over public value creation. Depending on 
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how public service production is configured, the mediation of GaaP can reinforce or address some 
values instead of others. Hence, the level of control offered by the GaaP is not fixed but is variable 
and is the result of situated negotiations between the technological and organisational layers. 
Following the process indicated in the Strategic Triangle of Moore (1995), public agencies first set 
public value goals, then assess all the interests involved, and finally assemble the production process 
with the available operational resources which, in the case of GaaP, will be likely mediated by digital 
platforms offered by other public agencies. This process is continuous and leads public agencies to 
orchestrate public value in two phases: the ex-ante production and ex-post production phases. The 
process of orchestration is enacted horizontally and vertically in both phases. The horizontal public 
value orchestration consists of managing the interoperability with other platforms by disassembling 
and reassembling the public service production configuration to meet all public interests and to 
create public value. The vertical public value orchestration consists of modifying how public 
agencies or external actors can use the platform. This last form of orchestration deals mainly with 
the tension between openness and control of the public value creation process (Boudreau, 2010). 
The more open the production process, the bigger the public value proposition, but the lower the 
control over the final outcome. 
In the horizontal public value orchestration case, public agencies orchestrate public value by 
connecting or disconnecting their systems with other platforms' APIs to assemble or disassemble 
services or functionalities of the production configuration. However, as previously discussed, 
connection to a platform through an API is not straightforward.  If external or public actors do not 
accept the technical and legal rules of APIs, they would not be able to use the platform and co-
produce services (Eaton et al., 2015). Horizontal public value orchestration is enacted ex-ante and 
ex-post the production process. The mobility example discussed in the Italian case can clarify these 
two phases. A local mobility agency aims to improve public transportation service by digitalising the 
entire mobility service according to the principles of Mobility as a Service (MaaS). After reviewing 
all the interests involved, the ex-ante orchestration starts when the public agency assembles the 
two platforms to configure the mobility service: OpenTrasporti and pagoPA. The platform Open 
Trasporti, owned by the Ministry of Transportation, collects data from mobility companies and then 
provides them to applications like Moovit or CityMapper, which help citizens plan their journeys. 
Instead, the platform pagoPA, owned by AgID, offers the same payment system for all mobility 
providers and applications. Thanks to this production configuration, the local mobility agency can 
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provide a more efficient and integrated mobility service. Citizens can use any mobility app, plan 
their multimodal journeys and pay a single price for  a multimodal trip. 
The ex-post phase of public value orchestration emerges when public agencies are already 
producing a service but need to reconfigure production and then modify the production process to 
ensure proper control over the achievement of a new public interest. For example, for security 
reasons, the Ministry of Interior asks all mobility companies to identify their passengers to reduce 
the risk of a terrorist attack. Therefore, the local mobility agency has to add two additional platforms 
(CIE and SPID) to the original production configuration to identify citizens when they book a trip 
through any mobility app. The new configuration meets the new public interest. However, the 
production will likely be orchestrated again because this production configuration does not allow 
access to mobility service to those people who cannot have SPID and CIE, such as immigrants or 
tourists.  The rules embedded in the design of CIE and SPID platforms then negatively affect mobility 
service production, which is not universal anymore by being restricted to Italian citizens only. This 
new configuration will likely generate negative value for the public and lead to other production 
configuration changes. In fact, ex-post public value orchestration is continuous because public 
interests change (e.g. security becomes a priority) and digital platforms mediate their contribution 
according to logic embedded by their owners (e.g. by law, CIE and SPID are only for Italians).  
In the vertical public value orchestration case, public agencies that own a digital platform enact 
control over public value creation through APIs and SDK, which set the rules and the boundaries of 
how public agencies or third parties can use a digital platform’s core service (Plantin et al., 2018). 
Once public value goals and all the public interests are identified, public agencies design the APIs 
and terms and conditions that mediate the services' utilisation. An example of ex-ante vertical public 
value orchestration is the TfL’s API about bus stops. TfL designed this API to provide list of the 
locations and names of all the bus stops, and combined it with terms and conditions which regulated 
how third parties have to use the data and the TfL brand. The design and regulations limit the co-
production of services within certain boundaries. However, APIs can also be used to enable ex-post 
vertical public value orchestration. After the API is published and is already used by several actors, 
public agencies can modify the boundaries within which external actors co-produce services to meet 
certain public interests and create public value. Ex-post orchestration can consist of modifying the 
API’s design and the terms and conditions or, in the most extreme case, to block APIs' access. For 
example, in case of a blizzard, the Ministry of Transportation could block the APIs of all scooter 
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sharing and bike-sharing services in its ecosystems to protect citizens’ safety. In this case, the 
Ministry of Transportation would orchestrate public value by modifying the flux of data that enables 
the booking of these services to improve public safety, which is considered an interest superior to 
mobility. However, in this case, public value orchestration is not straightforward because the 
utilisation of APIs is regulated by formal channels such as contracts or organisational arrangements 
such as governance commission that can delay or present obstacles to ex-post orchestration. As 
shown by the Italian case, public value orchestration is also mediated through informal institutional 
channels. Public agencies can informally ask other public agencies to close or limit certain APIs' 
access because their interests might be damaged.  
Finally, GaaP mediated co-production can create public value if it is combined with the adoption of 
public value orchestration mechanisms. The public value orchestration mechanism unveils the need 
of a dedicated model of governance to address the creation of public value mediated by GaaP. Thus, 
this PhD research opens a gap in literature, showing the need to research a governance model 
dedicated for GaaP. 
5.3.Research Agenda 
This PhD research has found that the GaaP technical and organisational arrangement offers the 
operational capabilities public administration requires to create public value. However, this study 
has also unveiled that GaaP is a platform of platforms. This configuration generates some 
complexities that reduce control over the production process and risk to create negative value for 
the public.  It is, therefore, necessary to develop a dedicated governance model to mitigate these 
complexities and create public value. The term governance etymologically derives from a Greek verb 
(kubernao) and means ‘to steer’ (Groves, 1844).  Any governance model should help the 
government to address public service production to create  public value through an articulation of 
formal and informal governance structures and mechanisms that influence public and private 
actors’ behaviour (Stoker, 1998; Fukuyama, 2013; Gorwa, 2019).  In the Italian case emerged public 
value orchestration governance mechanism. However, it is not clear if public value orchestration 
alone is sufficient to govern GaaP complexities and prompt public administration and civil society to 
create public value.  
 
Following the perspectives of Tiwana, Konsynski, and Bush (2010) about platform’ governance, 
three different and complementary governance aspects should be studied to understand the GaaP 




In an organisation based on multiple platforms and ecosystems is particularly important to 
individuate who has the right to decide what. Based on the position and power of the actors that 
make decisions, the governance system can be centralised or decentralised. Centralised GaaP 
governance would imply the existence of a single authority that decides the evolution and 
governance of all the platforms (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2008; Tiwana, Konsynski and Bush, 2010). 
This type of governance is ideal because it ensures high control over all production of public services, 
but cannot manage a system composed of several platforms and ecosystems. In the Italian case, 
AgID is the central authority that supervises, coordinates and regulates the process of digitalisation 
of the country to create public value.   Decentralised GaaP governance instead delegates governance 
to platform owners, who, as discussed in this research, should govern the production process by 
looking at all the public interests involved. The GaaP governance system will likely be a mixture of 
both perspectives. All public agencies would continue to govern the platform they own to create 
public value. But not only AgID but possibly a group of Independent Authorities would centrally 
monitor the public value creation process. Most of these independent authorities already exist to 
regulate certain policy domains such as ‘market’ and ‘communication’, but today they tend to 
monitor the non-digital world. However, in recent years, the Italian competition and antitrust 
authority (AGCM) has also started to regulate digital aspects of its policy domains as indicated by its 
investigation of Google’s market behaviour 49. 
 
Once the actors that govern GaaP are individuated, it is necessary to understand and explain the 
governance mechanisms they enact to ensure a suitable level of control over public value creation. 
Based on the Italian case and current literature, the assumption is that public agencies would govern 
public value creation mediated by GaaP through two main governance mechanisms discussed in 
literature. The first mechanism is public value orchestration, which has been widely discussed in the 
previous section and which is enacted by a public agency that acts as the coordinator of the 
orchestration process (Janssen and Estevez, 2013).  The second mechanism of governance is public 
value choreography. This mechanism is known in information technology literature and refers to a 
collective, collaborative effort based on a shared process or regulations (zur Muehlen, Nickerson 
and Swenson, 2005; Singhal, Sakthivel and Raj, 2019). Choreography does not need a central 





governance mechanism is particularly suitable to create public value when public agencies have no 
instrument to enact a suitable level of control over public value creation. For example, given the 
impossibility to control how different organisations manage private data on Internet Infrastructure, 
the European Union in 2018 provided clear requirements to all organisations about how to process 
personal data through the GDPR with the threat of enormous penalties for noncompliance. All 
organisations in the EU gradually started to configure the production of their services according to 
GDPR rules to behave according to the prescription of the European authorities (Almeida Teixeira, 
Mira da Silva and Pereira, 2019; Li, Yu and He, 2019). 
 
The third governance aspect is the ownerships of platforms that constitute the GaaP configuration. 
Platform ownership depends on how the platforms and ecosystems are configured (Boudreau and 
Hagiu, 2009). The more open is the platform architecture, the higher is the power co-producers 
have over the platform owner. From the Italian case, it emerged that there are two types of platform 
ownership: single ownership and shared ownership (Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne, 2006). 
An example of single platform ownership is the ANPR owned and managed by the Ministry of 
Interior that produces the registry service delegating data entry tasks to a closed ecosystem of 
registry offices managed by local municipalities. In this case, the Ministry of Interior has high-level 
control over the production process and can therefore address service production and platform 
evolution autonomously. However, ownership of platforms like SPID can be more complex and 
mostly shared with external actors. For example, AgID regulates and officially owns the SPID 
platform; however, the majority of the identity service production process is co-produced by a 
restricted ecosystem of identity providers. The high level of involvement of the identity providers in 
the service production gives them the power to affect SPID governance and its evolution. For 
example, the pricing list for companies that want to use SPID as an identification system resulted 
from negotiations between Government and Identity providers. In the last two years, the Italian 
Government has attempted several times, with no success, to reform SPID governance by moving 
the majority of SPID production tasks under the complete or partial control of the Government, 
largely to mitigate against conflict with the CIE, which similarly offers digital identity. 
 
Once the GaaP governance model's three characteristics are clarified, it is necessary to explain how 
the model of governance impacts public value creation. In the public value creation process 
described by the three dimensions of Moore’s triangle (1995), the GaaP governance model would 
182 
 
mainly affect the authorising environment. However, as found in this research, technology 
represents an additional dimension that mediates all the dimensions of public value creation. 
According to the socio-technical perspective, GaaP governance would be embedded in the design 
of GaaP’s platforms and directly affect  production configuration (Cordella and Iannacci, 2010).  As 
previously discussed, the design and regulation embedded in APIs and SDKs help public agencies to 
reach the desired level of control over the production process and to ensure public value creation 
(Eaton et al., 2015). Nevertheless, once the governance structure is embedded in ICTs systems, it 
might remain frozen in ICTs' architecture and constrain possible governance changes (Kallinikos, 
2004a; Lanzara, 2009). As a result, the governance model is often not created ex-novo but is 
negotiated within the existing forms of governance embedded in the GaaP’s organisational and 
technical arrangement. 
 
Further studies should explore and compare how other countries have conceptualised and 
configured GaaP. For example, in Italy, the GaaP architecture is based on platforms owned by public 
agencies, while countries like China are developing a hybrid architecture of GaaP based on multiple 
platforms developed by public agencies at different levels of government (Ma, Chung and Thorson, 
2005) and on private platforms such as WeChat or Weibo (Medaglia and Zhu, 2017; Yang, 2017). 
The existence of a hybrid architecture of GaaP might complicate public value creation process 
because companies will gain control over some policy domains and the generativity of their 
ecosystems. Therefore, future research should reflect on the existence of different GaaP 
configurations, which might also imply an alternative governance model for the creation of public 
value. 
The same PhD research question and research agenda can be extended to the corporate field. In 
fact, similarly to Italian public administration, some companies (e.g. Enel) have started a process of 
‘platformisation’ that aims to build an ICTs architecture based on several platforms and ecosystems. 
These companies will also become ‘platform of platforms’ and the main assumption is that they will 
face the same complexities described in this research about GaaP. Moreover, many companies aim 
to become sustainable through the achievement of the UN development goals. Therefore, these 
companies will likely focus on creating economic value for shareholders and, at the same time, 





Despite the contributions of this thesis, some limitations remain. The socio-technical view of this 
study represents a theoretical limitation because it has restricted the research focus to a specific 
and situated context. The GaaP configuration is studied as a socio-technical system that is the result 
of the interaction between different and contextual socio, political, administrative and technological 
variables (Bostrom and Heinen, 1997). According to this perspective, in other countries, the GaaP 
configuration might be different. In fact, the different administrative, technical and socio-political 
characteristics of each country inevitably impact not only the configuration of GaaP (Heeks and 
Bailur, 2007), but also the mechanism of public value creation (O’Flynn, 2007; Crosby, ‘t Hart and 
Torfing, 2017). Therefore, the explanation of how GaaP impacts public value creation in Italy cannot 
be generalised to other contexts because the ways in which technical and social variables interact 
and impact the creation of public value might differ. 
The second limitation is related to the adoption of a single case study approach. This research 
required the adoption of the single case study approach because the socio-political context of the 
case could not be detached from the study of the impact of GaaP on public value creation (Yin, 
2009). Moreover, compared with other contemporary examples of GaaP (Brown et al., 2017), the 
Italian case study represents an extreme case of GaaP, which justifies the adoption of the single case 
study approach but also represents a limitation (Yin, 2009; Baškarada, 2014). In fact, differently from 
other countries, Italian public administration has found itself in a privileged position to adopt GaaP 
because some of the fundamental digital platforms and ecosystems were already diffused and 
formed a clear modular structure for e-government services. The development of multiple 
ecosystems made evident the willingness of Italian public administration to co-produce services 
with third parties on a large scale and revealed the complexities related to the existence of various 
ecosystems. However, as a single case study, the Italian case represents also a limitation because 
the findings do not have statistical validity and cannot be generalised to the universe. Nevertheless, 
the findings can be analytically generalised because they represent theoretical propositions (Yin, 
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